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During the early years of the Second World War, Canada was cut off from Britain, its
traditional supplier ofwar materiel. This forced the Canadian Army and the Mackenzie
King government to attempt to arm itself using domestic resources as well as those of the
then-neutral United States.
One of the results of this policy was the Ram Tank, a design based upon the latest US
medium tank in combination with the recent battle experience and expertise of British
tank designers. Originally intended to arm Canadian and British formations, the Ram
design was outstripped by faster and more responsive American technical innovation in
the form of the Sherman tank.
Though the Ram proved adequate for training, for conversion to an armored troop carrier,
and gave useful experience for the later manufacture in Canada of self-propelled guns, it
was an undoubted failure as a tank. This essay examines the reasons for that failure.
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Introduction
During the Second World War, most Canadians were immensely proud of their
contribution to the Allied war effort. The first tanks built in Canada for the army began
to be publicized as soon as they left the production lines in 1941. But today, few
Canadians have even heard ofthe Ram tank, and those who have might well be
embarrassed to think that it was obsolete before it was even manufactured. This thesis
examines the complexities of design, bureaucracy, international cooperation (or the lack
of it), and sloppy workmanship that plagued Canada's first home-built tank, complexities

































































































































































































































































































Chapter 1 : Beginnings
On the 15th of October 1940, Winston Churchill announced to Britain's House of
Commons, "We cannot hope to compete with the enemy in numbers ofmen, and must
therefore rely upon an exceptional proportion of armoured fighting vehicles." On July 3,
1 94 1 , an editorial cartoon in the Montreal Daily Star entitled "And the Moral Is—"
portrayed the Grim Reaper showing a group of people that the "Lesson of Recent
Defeats" was that machines, especially tanks and aeroplanes, were now more important
in war than the infantry.2 It may not have been a coincidence that one of the major stories
in the previous day's edition of the paper was the rolling-out of the first of the Canadian
Cruiser M3 tanks, later to be known as the Ram, from the Montreal Locomotive Works
factory in East-end Montreal.
A crowd of dignitaries and politicians were at the June 30th public ceremony, as were
many of the workers who had built the tank. It was proclaimed by J. L. Ralston,
Canada's Minister of National Defence, to be ". . .the beginning of the fulfillment of the
dream of a Canadian armored division."
1 Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 462.
2 Montreal Daily Star, Thursday, July 3, 1941, 10.
1 Montreal Daily Star, Wednesday, July 2, 1941, 15. The identical quote appeared on page one of the
Gazette (Montreal) story on the same event in its Tuesday, July 1, 1941, issue, and many details
are the same, suggesting extensive use of either a press release or wire service copy.
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The Ram was the product of ideas and supplies from many sources. The ballistically-
shaped hull and cast turret were designed by Canadians and Britons; the armament was
British and American but manufactured in Canada; the running gear (tracks, idler wheels,
bogie assemblies, and drive sprockets) and engine and transmission were from the latest
model American medium tank. It was an amalgam of the latest, most modern thought of
how a tank should be, at least insofar as British, American and Canadian designers were
concerned. Yet the Ram never participated in any battle in the role for which it was
designed.
At the outbreak of war in 1939, Britain had not thought of Canada as a source of tanks.
Rather, the reverse was true: Prior to the war, Britain had been Canada's source for
tanks. But once hostilities began in Europe, it became obvious that all British tank
production would be required for British forces on the Continent or elsewhere in the
Empire. Canada would have to make do with the few tanks that it had, or find an
alternative source of supply.4
Other factors, too, worked against the development and integration of war industries in
Canada. The British Treasury was not interested in spending vast amounts ofmonies
overseas (in the form of orders for military materiel) to build war-production factories
that might never be needed, and that in any case would eventually compete with British
ones. Equally, the Canadian government (and Canadian private industry) thought that it
would be far too expensive to construct such industrial facilities without an overseas
4 There were 16 light tanks in Canada at the declaration of war, according to CP. Stacey,
Six Years of War, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 20.
5
buyer, as Canadian military requirements would not provide sufficient orders to make
such construction economically sound.5 For the first nine months of the war, both the
British Treasury and the Canadian Government were still treating war-time needs with a
peace-time mentality: According to H. Duncan Hall, one of Britain's official historians,
[0]wing to the combination of a long view on finance
and a short view on the value of a munitions potential,
Canada continued to be treated during the whole period
of 'the twilight war' as a purely marginal source of
armaments supply[.]6
Even though expenditure on armaments was minimal, Canada was still a source of raw
materials for Britain. Its importance can be gauged by the swift dispatch of the British
Purchasing Commission to Ottawa, where it held its first meeting with the [Canadian]
War Supply Board on October 25th, 1939.7 The two agencies met on a weekly basis, and
by the end of August 1940 British purchases of raw materials amounted to just over 23
million Canadian dollars.
Several factors changed this complacency in procurement. One was that the United
States, which had an already-existing industrial base, and from where Britain had hoped
to get many of its military supplies, was interpreting its Neutrality Act quite strictly.
5 H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply. Histoiy ofthe Second World War, United Kingdom
Civil Series, War Production Series (London: HMSO, 1984), 6.
6 Ibid., 16.
7 Library and Archives Canada (hereinafter LAC) Record Group (RG) 28 Vol. 40, Department of
Munitions and Supply (DM&S), File 1-1-36-1 .
8 LAC RG 28 Vol. 40, DM&S, File 1-1-36-2. Thereafter British expenses accelerated rapidly, until
by the end ofMarch 1941 raw materials and war plant expenditures in Canada had reached
nearly $172 million.
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Britain could get its war supplies, but no credit would be issued; purchases of American
war materiel would have to be made on a cash-and-carry basis. The Neutrality Act had
been put in place in reaction to memories ofhow the United States had become involved
in the Great War in 1 91 7. It was a widely-held American belief that the United States
would not have entered that War on the side of the British if its investments in the
Entente powers had not been so great.
Another factor was British concern about German tank production. Britain's intelligence
organizations and, in particular, its Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), had attempted
to calculate both the numbers of tanks possessed by the German Army and the monthly
output of tanks from its factories. There was little hard intelligence on these numbers;
estimates of tank strength and production were based on comparing German factory floor
space, capacity, and manpower to British equivalents, and then calculating potential tank
output from the resulting figures. It was also thought that the Germans would give
increased priority to tank and aircraft production because of the impetus of war, and
factories would be working either two- or three-shift schedules. The consensus was that
German tank production was far exceeding that of Britain and France together.
All of the above assumptions were in error. At the beginning of September 1939 the
British thought that the Germans had 5000 tanks, 1400 of them the "medium" Panzer III
and IV types, and 3600 the "light" Panzer Is, Hs, 35Ts, and 38Ts. In reality, the German
9 F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, and R. C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second
World War, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), 226-230.
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Army had only 3000 tanks, 300 of them medium, the balance light types.10 By March
1940 there was an even greater discrepancy between British estimates and German actual
tank strength: The War Office estimated German strength at 5,800 tanks, when the true
figure was only 2,445." Finally, by June 1940, the British considered that the German
Army had between seven and eight thousand AFVs available. This would have meant the
Germans had produced an average of 200 tanks per month between September 1 939 and
June 1940, whereas the true figure was closer to 75.
The other great factor was Dunkirk, and the subsequent fall of France. At one blow the
British Army lost most of its vehicles, heavy weapons, and supplies on the Continent, and
had lost its main Continental ally as well. Only 13 tanks made it back from the Continent
with the BEF.13 Winston Churchill later wrote that there were only 469 tanks in the
United Kingdom, mainly in training schools.14 Another estimate sets the total at 340
modern tanks and armoured cars available to repel a German invasion in June 1940,
along with a few "scout cars, carriers, and obsolete training machines" . Factories were
10 Ibid., 62.
11 Ibid., 134. At the same date, the French Deuxième Bureau [Military Intelligence] was estimating
German tank numbers at 7,000 to 7,500 and, as Hinsley notes, "...this gigantic estimate cannot
but have had an inhibiting effect on French dispositions."
12 Ibid., 230.
13 David Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal: British Armour in the Second World War, Part I
(London: HMSO, 1989), 34. Another source, A. J. Smithers' Rude Mechanicals (London:
Grafton, 1989), states on page 73 that twenty-five tanks had returned from Cherbourg, and that of
those that had remained in Britain "there was little enough available and most of the runners were
unfit for combat."
14 Winston Churchill, The Second World War (New York: Mariner Books, 1985), 128.
15 Fletcher, op. cit., 34.
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constructing tanks virtually by hand, and their aggregate output was only about sixteen
per month16.
In fact, the British tank industry was in severe disarray. Until 1937 there were only two
manufacturers of tanks in Britain, The Royal Carriage Factory (Woolwich Arsenal) and
Carden-Loyd (Vickers).17 The subsequent addition of other manufacturers, all building
their own tanks without the benefit of consultation with any of the others, resulted in
much wastage and duplication of effort. ' 8 Also, because of changes to the administrative
agencies and because of the bureaucracy of the War Office, the various design bureaux
that had worked on tanks were broken up and dispersed to separate locations in Britain,
eliminating the close working relationships between departments that had earlier been
achieved.19
Britain was desperate for tanks and vehicles from any source; and it was this that really
began the British investment in Canadian war production. Canadian automobile
manufacturers were already being used for the production of military vehicles, and it was
thought that railway companies, with their experience in handling heavy metal castings
and parts, would be well-suited to the production of tanks. The Treasury, in concert with
the Canadian Government and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, "...proposed to
16 Ibid., 34. However, Smithers in Rude Mechanicals, op. cit., 76, states that "by mid-summer [1940]
Valentines were coming out at about forty a month."
17 G. MacLeod Ross and Major-General Sir Campbell Clarke, The Business ofTanks, 1933 to 1945
(Ilfi-acombe, Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1976), 70.
18 This point is extensively discussed in Smithers, op. cit., 40-52 and 78-87.
19 This is discussed in detail in Beale, Death By Design, op. cit., 146-1 65, and in M.M. Postan, British War
Production (London: HMSO, 1975), 188-195.
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create capacity for the construction of infantry tanks [in Canada] at the rate of two per
week."20 Earlier in the year, on 6 February 1940, an inspection party from the Canadian
Government and the British Supply Board arrived at the CPR' s Angus Shops in East-end
Montreal to evaluate its production capacity, and issued a favourable report on the Shops'
suitability for tank construction.21 A preliminary order for tanks was issued, but then
cancelled in April when it was considered that deliveries would only start in 1941 .
Nonetheless, the CPR had begun the process of looking for the specialized supplies and
subcontractors needed for tank construction.23 This preparatory work was not wasted,
however, as a firm British order for 300 tanks came in June 1940.24
Thus the first tank to be built in Canada was the British-designed Valentine. Small,
underpowered, undergunned, and underarmoured, it was nonetheless mechanically
reliable and one of the most recent British designs.25 It was arranged that blueprints and
construction drawings be hurriedly shipped to Canada to allow its production, to be
followed by one or two tanks for tests and study.
20 Hall, op. cit., 14.
21 Anonymous, "Canadian Pacific Ry. Munitions Manufacture," Canadian Transportation
(July, 1942) : 378.
22 L.R. Cameron, "Tank Production in Canada," Report No. 38, Historical Section (G. S.), Army
Headquarters, 27 Jul [19]50, 2, accessed February 6, 2009 at
http ://www.cmp-cpm. forces, gc. ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/ahqr-rqga/ahq03 8 .pdf.
23 Anonymous, "Canadian Pacific Ry. Munitions Manufacture," Canadian Transportation
(July, 1942): 378.
24 Cameron, op. cit., 2.
25 "Whatever its faults, the Valentine had one unique and compensating virtue. It was the only British tank
of the day that could be trusted not to break down in moments of crisis." Smithers, op. cit., 41-42.
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The initial order of 300 Valentines issued to the CPR by the British was to be delivered
between February and August 1941 ; an additional 488 tanks ordered by the Canadian
General Staff were to be delivered for Canadian Army use by February 1942.26
(Eventually 1 ,420 were to be constructed in Canada, many going to Russia under the
provisions of Lend-Lease.27) Preliminary construction of the Valentine got underway at
the CPR' s Angus Shops, but various delays slowed its production, Blueprints and
drawings were slow to arrive, and many of those that did were illegible. The
Engineering Section of the shops had to re-draw many of the plans and, in some cases,
had to wait until the tank arrived from England so that it could be stripped and its parts
could be removed, measured, and drawn.29 These problems and the subsequent slow
pace of production caused the British and Canadians to look around for other sources for
their tanks.
The Joint Committee on Tank Development was formed in late August 1940 to act as a
liaison between the Department of National Defence which would detail its requirements,
the Department of Munitions and Supply which would procure the materials needed to
fulfill those requirements, and Canadian industry representatives who would be
Hall, op. cit., 221, and LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, "Report ofMeeting Held at
729, Fifteenth Street, Washington. Friday 20th September, 1940," n.d. There is no record of who
recorded the meeting but a Captain T. Newton-Dunn was listed as "In Attendance".
There is some confusion in official sources over this figure. This figure of 1 ,420 comes from
Cameron, op. cit., 1, but Hall in North American Supply, 223, quotes a figure of3,556. Ross and
Clarke, op. cit., put the number of Valentines at 4,452. It appears that these last two contain a
conflation of figures for the Valentine and the initial orders of the Ram.
Anonymous, "Canadian Pacific Ry. Munitions Manufacture," Canadian Transportation
(July, 1942) : 379.
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manufacturing the needed weapons. Major M. Evans of the Ordnance was seconded to
the Department of Munitions and Supply as Chief of the Tank Division. Evans'
experience, both in the Tank Corps and as the Assistant Chief Engineer of General
Motors of Canada, gave him unique qualifications for the post.31 Two other key
Committee members were Colonel E.L.M. Burns and Colonel F.F. Worthington, veterans
of the Great War and members of the Permanent Active Militia (as the Canadian Army
was known at the time) during the interwar years. As captains, both had contributed to
the Canadian Defence Quarterly, ajournai that, as its name implies, was devoted to
writings on military subjects. Several of Burns' articles discussed possible future
doctrines for tank warfare. In one article, "A Division That Can Attack," he contended
that the slow-moving tanks then known as "I" (Infantry) tanks should no longer have a
place in the Canadian order ofbattle.
The function of the "I" tank was to accompany the infantry forces to help them break
into—and through—the enemy's lines. Because the infantry would only be moving at a
walking pace, it was thought necessary to give the "I" tank heavy armour because its
slow pace would be subject it to a sustained volume of antitank fire from the enemy. This
heavier armour, in turn, would handicap the tank and keep its maximum speed as little
more than 3 to 5 miles per hour.
30 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, G.K. Sheils to W.F. Drysdale, "Tank Committee,"
29 August 1940.
31 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-4, DM&S Joint Committee on Tank Development with the
Department ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of the First Meeting," 30 August 1940.
32 Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 15, No. 3 (April, 1938), 291-2.This led to a spirited exchange of
further articles between Burns and Guy Simonds, then a Captain but later a Corps Commander.
Simonds' articles propounded an all-arms formation for attack and defence, not just one
containing armour.
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Burns thought that it would be better to have troops accompanied by general-purpose
Cruiser tanks, which might be more vulnerable to enemy fire but that certainly could
exploit a breakthrough of, or breakout from, the enemy lines, relying on speed rather than
armour for their defence. They would be accompanied by light tanks, which would fulfill
¦3-5
the former cavalry tasks of reconnaissance and screening.
Burns, however, did not devote as much thought to the armament needed for the Cruiser
tanks to fulfill the breakout function. There was no discussion of the need for a tank to
have a dual-purpose gun, good against both "hard" targets (other armoured vehicles and
defensive works) and "soft" targets (personnel and unarmoured vehicles). Had he done
so, realizing the need to mount ever-larger weapons into tanks, the story of the Ram
might have been very different.
Worthington's writings, by contrast, dealt mainly with the use of machineguns in modern
warfare and the use of films and miniature ranges for troop training. His articles on the
use of the machinegun in defence and in attack built on his experience in the Great War
in armoured cars of the Machine-Gun Corps, and in the Canadian Machine Gun Brigade
after that. Lessons on the effective siting, concealment and operation of the machinegun
were imparted in the form of an imaginary dialogue between a somewhat naive author-
interviewer and the experienced Colonel of a machinegun battalion, whose unit the
author was visiting.
33 Ibid., 292.
34 See Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 9, No. l(October 193 1), "Machine Guns in Attack," 49-61, and
Vol. 9, No. 2 (January 1932), "Machine Guns in Defence," 224-232.
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Worthington' s article on training troops through the use of terrain models stemmed from
the financial limitations of the inter-war years, when the Depression caused a succession
of cash-strapped federal governments to withhold funds from the military. Since there
was no money for full-scale training in field manoeuvres, Worthington devised several
schemes in which infantry troops could build and use miniature models of different types
of terrain to learn the lessons of fieldcraft and how to plan defences and attacks in
varying situations. He noted that the practice range was in use four nights per week in his
regiment's armoury.35 Likewise, his advocacy ofusing films for training was intended to
liven up lectures as well as to illuminate lessons with filmed examples, such as showing
troops how to advance in open country.36 Worthington went on to become the
Commandant of the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicles Training Centre [CAFVTC]
at Camp Borden, Ontario, and his use of miniatures was later expanded with the RYPA
simulator that was used for the training of tank crews.37 The simulator moved in a
realistic way, duplicating the roll, yaw, pitch and alteration of course that a tank
traversing open ground would encounter, and it also reproduced the views that tank
crewmen would see through the vision devices of their tanks. The RYPA was primarily
used to teach the principles of acquiring, tracking, and shooting accurately at a target, as
Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 4 (July 1933), "The Miniature Battle Practice Range as an
Aid to Training," 489-497. Worthington's regiment was the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
Infantry (P.P.C.L.I.), based in Winnipeg at the time.
Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 1 (October 1932), "The Motion Picture as an Aid to
Teaching," 87-92.
Larry [Clara E.] Worthington, Worthy: A Biography ofMajor-General F.F. Worthington,
C. B., M.C., M. M. (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1961); there, the acronym is said
to stand for the Canadian Armoured Force Vehicle Training Center.
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well as those of deflection and indirect fire. Worthington's experience in evaluating
tank design had been called upon when he attended the Hempstead, New York trials of a
Christie Light Tank in 1938. He noted that it was fast, smooth-riding and had a good
gear-box. But he criticized its lack of a turret with all-around traverse, and thought that
its 2-man crew was inadequate. In his opinion, it was "not recommended in its present
forai" for Canada.39
The Dewar [later, the British] Tank Mission arrived in New York in July 1940.40 Its
members had the experience needed to assess the suitability of tank designs; it was led by
Michael Dewar (head of British Timken Ltd, with experience in the Great War's Ministry
of Munitions), and also boasted Mr. L. E. Carr (a Mechanisation Board tank design
expert) and Brigadier Douglas H. Pratt, who had recent battle experience from
commanding 1st Army Tank Brigade (4th RTR and 7th RTR) at Arras in France.41 The
Mission immediately began to meet with American manufacturers and American Army
officers regarding the construction of tanks for Britain. Britain had wished to have
American firms build British designs—not simply because of a chauvinistic pride, but
from a desire for the standardization of types of war materiel. This would ease supply
problems as well as ensure that all of the Empire / Commonwealth forces could be
38 Major M.R. McNorgan, "The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School History,"
http://www.aiTny.forces.gc.ca/Armour_School/histor-eng.asp , accessed June 16, 2009.
39 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2588, File H.Q.S. 3352 Vol. 2, Worthington to NDHQ, "Report on Christie Light
Tank Trials earned out Hempstead, L.I., 29-30 September, 1938," 1 Oct 1938.
40 Hall, op. cit., 170.
41 Fletcher, op. cit., 88. British Timken was a Birmingham-based manufacturer ofball- and roller-bearings.
RTR is the abbreviation for Royal Tank Regiment.
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similarly equipped and thus obviate differences in training, doctrine, and the like. The
Dewar mission was informed that the US authorities would prefer that Britain purchase
American tank designs, rather than have US companies tool up to produce British
designs.43 The chief tank design that was on offer was the new M3 Medium tank
currently being engineered for the US Army. Though its design had not yet been
completed, the M3 was more powerful than anything the British currently had in
existence or even in development, while its large 75 mm sponson-mounted gun gave it a
greater potential on the battlefield. (A sponson-mounted gun is carried in the hull of a
tank, rather than in the turret. This makes it possible to mount a larger gun in the tank,
but it limits the traverse available to the gun. As a result, to aim the gun the M3 tank had
to be pointed at its target, and it had to be "hull-up", exposing much more of its
superstructure to possible return fire.)
The British Tank Mission viewed trials of the M3 medium tank at Aberdeen, Maryland,
at the end of July 1940, and placed orders for the British Army. (The Treasury authorized
the purchase of 1250 tanks, but Dewar initially ordered over 3000, considering that
"...the British General Staff consistently underestimated the number of tanks needed."44)
The need to purchase other urgently needed war materiel (and a squeeze on US dollar
reserves) forced the Tank Mission to trim its orders, but by the end of 1940 Britain had
ordered 2,086 M3 tanks from the United States, to be manufactured by the Pullman
42 Hall, op. cit., 180-181. See also the discussion of this in H. Duncan Hall and CC. Wrigley, Studies of
Overseas Supply. (London: HMSO, 1956), 47-48.
43 Fletcher, op. cit., 88-89.
44 Ibid., 89-90.
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Standard Manufacturing Company, the Pressed Steel Car Corporation, the Baldwin
Locomotive Works and the Lima Locomotive Works.45 In the British models of the M3,
later to be called the Grant, changes were made to reconfigure the tank to benefit from
Britain's recent combat experience.46 The most obvious of these changes was a slight
lowering of the tank's silhouette by the removal of a cupola-mounted machine-gun, and
the relocation of the radios to a redesigned and enlarged turret, where the tank
commander would have control of them.
Even with these modifications, however, the British and Canadians were not happy with
the US M3 tank. It was still too high, measuring 123 inches (10 feet 3 inches) from
ground level to the commander's cupola on the top of the turret, and had to expose too
much of itself to fire its main gun, mounted in the hull sponson.47 It had been learned in
the interwar years that, in the presence of enemy tanks or anti-tank weapons, the best
thing for a tank to do was to hide and try to stalk its opponent by stealth. For this
purpose, a low silhouette was useful in order to allow the tank to use folds in the ground
to camouflage its moves.
A joint British-Canadian working group, made up from members of the British Tank
Board and the Canadian Tank Production Committee, was formed to suggest changes to
be incorporated in the next US tank design. It was hoped that this successor model,
45 Hall, North American Supply, op. cit., 291. On page 215 of the same volume, the figure of 2,085 - one
tank less - is quoted, possibly omitting the prototype.
46Ibid., 181.
47 Dimensions are from Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, M3 Medium (Lee/Grant) AFV 11, (Windsor,
Berks.: Profile Publications, 196-), n.p.
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dubbed the "modified M.3" or M.4, would be built in Canada; but it was necessary to
wait for the Americans to finalize the M3 design before any modifications could be made
to it.48
Since more information was obviously needed, it was recommended (at a 14 September
1940 meeting of the Tank Production Committee in Ottawa) that Major M. M. Evans of
the Ordnance branch be sent to the USA and temporarily attached to the Dewar Mission
to get more information on the US M3 Medium tank.49 Evans turned out to be an
excellent observer; upon his return to Ottawa he reported what he had found out in a 4-
page, single-space typed memo.5
Evans arrived in Washington in time for a 20 September meeting between members of
the Dewar Mission (Brigadier-General D. H. Pratt, Mr. Michael Dewar, and Mr. L. E.
Carr) and Canadian representatives (Mr. E. P. Taylor of the Department of Munitions and
Supply and Colonel F. F. Worthington of the Canadian Army General Staff). The
attendees discussed the orders for Valentine tanks as well as potential orders for the US
M3 and "modified M.3" tanks. Various manufacturers were suggested as possible
production centres for a British/Canadian version of the new US M3 Tank, among them
48 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1.
49 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, P.A. Chester, M.G.O., to A.D.M.(M.) [Acting
Deputy Minister (Militia)], 16 September 1940. Evans was to leave before 21 September.
50 LAC RG 24, Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major M.M. Evans to D.O.S.(M.), Ottawa,
"Report of a Visit to the United States Primarily With Reference to the Design and Procurement
of Cruiser Tank M.3," 1 October 1940. Evans reported on much more than the US M3; he
relayed information on other new tracked, half-tracked, and wheeled vehicles in development,
obtained their photographs and specifications, and discussed differences between the British and
US reconnaissance doctrines.
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the Montreal Locomotive Company, the National Steel Car Company, the Dominion
Steel and Coal Company, and the Dominion Bridge Company. It was thought that
production capacity could be on the order of 4 tanks per day (to be split between
Canadian and British requirements) and Taylor put forward the D.M.&S. view that
Canada and the UK would each pay half of the cost of capital expenditure on this plant.51
If Canada were to purchase the American high-hull design, Colonel Worthington wanted
the British-designed 6-pounder (57 mm) cannon installed to replace the M3's sponson-
mounted 75 mm gun, as it had a more rapid rate of fire and a higher muzzle velocity, with
a consequent flatter trajectory for its shot. It was also established that Canada would
provide No. 9 wireless sets for all of the British-ordered tanks built in the USA. The
balance of the afternoon was taken up with discussions regarding M3 design details with
Mr. L.E Carr, "the engineer of the Dewar Mission."53
The following week was a busy one for the Canadians and the members of the Dewar
Mission. On the next morning (Saturday, 21 September 1940), Colonel Worthington and
Major Evans were at the British Purchasing Commission in New York City, arranging to
have obsolete 6-ton training tanks [WW I Renaults] shipped from Rock Island Arsenal,
51 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, "Report ofMeeting Held at 729, Fifteenth Street,
Washington. Friday 20th September, 1940," op. cit.
52IbJd.
53 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major M.M. Evans to D.O.S. (M.),
October 1, 1940, op. cit.
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Illinois, and Fort Mead, Maryland, to the CAFVTC at Camp Borden. 4 (The tanks had
been about to be sold for scrap; Worthington arranged their purchase (as scrap metal) at
the rate of $20 per ton, and got thirteen spare engines and 45 tons of spare parts from an
obliging US Army for no extra cost. The shipment was consigned to the "Camp Borden
Iron Foundry" as a way of avoiding any unpleasantness with the US Neutrality Act. )
That same afternoon, Evans met with Mr. Fraser of American Locomotive Company
(ALCO) and the Montreal Locomotive Works to discuss production problems regarding
M3 tanks. Fraser informed Evans that ALCO had a contract with the US War
Department for the construction of 685 tanks, and their experience in tooling up for M3
production would be helpful if and when an order was placed with the Montreal
Locomotive Works.56
Evans spent much of Monday, 23 September, at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in
Maryland, examining an incomplete wooden mock-up of the M3. As of this date, the
design of the turret and its traverse gear was still unfinished, as were some internal
arrangements.57
Ibid. Both of these sites are listed as sources for the Renault tanks, but it is possible that they only came
from the Rock Island Arsenal. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 2588, File H.Q.S. 3352, Vol. 3, letter from
Colonel H. DesRosiers, Acting Deputy Minister (Militia) to O.D. Skelton, Undersecretary of State
for External Affairs, 15 June 1940.
Worthington, op. cit., 167.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major M.M. Evans to D.O.S. (M.), October 1, 1940,
op. cit. ALCO was the parent company of the Montreal Locomotive Works.
57IWd.
The next day he was back in Washington in discussions with Canadian and US Military
officers and with Mr. Sheehan of the General Steel Castings Corporation on the
feasibility ofhaving cast armour for both the hull and the turret of the Canadian version
of the tank. (The American M3 was also to have a cast turret, but its design had not yet
been finalized.)58
Further talks with Colonel Worthington clarified the points that Evans would bring back
to Ottawa regarding the M3; it would not be possible to develop definite Canadian design
changes until the US tank design was "frozen" (complete), so close contact would have to
be maintained between Canada, the US War Department and the Dewar Tank Mission to
ensure that Canadian proposals could go forward at the earliest possible time. These
changes included the re-design of the tank hull, lowering its silhouette and placing the
main gun in a fully-rotating turret atop the hull. Worthington added that the Montreal
Locomotive Works, as a subsidiary of ALCO, was the logical facility for producing the
modified M.3 in Canada. Also, Mr. Dewar felt "confident" that his Mission could obtain
the necessary engines and transmissions for made-in-Canada tanks from US suppliers.
One major problem was still the US Neutrality Act. American War Department officers
were eager to help the Canadians but were constrained in what they could offer by way of
"free interchange". Negotiations would have to take place at a higher level to allow the
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major M.M. Evans to D.O.S. (M.),
October 1, 1940, op. cit.
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exchange of plans, specifications and production drawings so that the tank could be built
in Canada.60
The Montreal Locomotive Works would face a daunting task when it came time to start
tank production. When its design was finalized, the American M3 required the efforts of
197 engineers working for 4 weeks "under pressure" to translate 186 lbs. ofblueprints
into production drawings needed for the factory floor and for the many subcontractors.
Each part of the tank had first been made in wood (as part of a full-scale mock-up) to
ensure that the components would fit together properly.61
Further changes in the M3 were discussed at a 27 September meeting at the Department
of Munitions and Supply between representatives of the DM&S, the DND and the British
Technical Mission and the BPC. The British appeared to be very enthusiastic about using
6-pounder guns as the main armament in their Canadian-built Cruiser tanks, as well as
about adopting the gun as their standard carriage-mounted antitank gun. It was agreed
that, if necessary, the M3 Cruiser's turret would be redesigned to accommodate the 6-
pounder, and a mounting for the gun would be adapted or designed by Canada in
conjunction with the BPC.
60Ibid.
61 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, information from "the Whaley-Eaton letter—a
Washington dope-sheet on political and other subjects", attached to personal letter from Bill
Davidson, British Purchasing Commission, to Maj. Max Evans, DM&S, 25 September 1940.
62 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, Colonel E.L.M. Burns to General H.D.G. Crerar,
27 September 1940.
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Another British delegation was at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in October. On October
third, R.H. Fowler (the Scientific Attaché at the British High Commission in Ottawa),
British Army Lt. -Colonel F. C. Wallace, and Canadian Army Colonel H. F.G. Letson (the
Military Attaché at the Canadian Legation in Washington) examined the latest US tank
designs, especially the M3 Grant.63 All of these men had been seconded to the Tizard
Mission, a British delegation sent to North America to arrange the exchange of scientific
and technical information between Britain and the United States.
A further visit was made to Aberdeen a week later, this time by members of the Tank
Mission. Again, emphasis was placed on the need to lower the silhouette of the M3 tank
in its revised British version. Suggestions included the replacement of the tank
commander's cupola by an all-round-vision periscope, removing the 75 mm main gun
from the hull sponson to the turret, and changing the gearing of the propeller shaft from
the engine to the transmission; this last change would allow its radial engine to be
mounted at a flatter angle and thus lessen the height of the rear hull of the tank.
Other practical recommendations learned from recent battle experience were the need to
replace the tank commander's top-mounted machine-gun with another that had greater
elevating ability for anti-aircraft use; a protectoscope to eliminate a blind spot (and
63 David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 126-127.
64 When Tizard went down to the United States three Canadians were attached to his mission:
CJ. Mackenzie, head of the National Research Council in Ottawa; Air Vice-Marshal
A.V. Stedman, R.C.A.F. research chief; and Colonel H.E. Tabor, Master-General of the
Ordnance. Zimmerman, op. cit., 161.
65 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 . "Record of Visit to Aberdeen Proving Ground on
9th October, 1940," Appendix II.
possibly a pistol port) was required on the left of the turret; and seats should be modified
for the easier removal of wounded or dead crew, with easily-accessible escape hatches.
Dewar forwarded these suggestions to the Ministry of Supply. He also wished to adopt a
cast hull for the British version of the tank, because casting the hull would result in
savings in production time (by reducing the need for machining and assembly) as well as
improve the ballistic protection afforded by the hull. (Ainsworth, another member of the
Tank Mission, confirmed this from his experience manufacturing tanks with the
Hotchkiss arms combine in France.)67 Another factor was the evidence of Colonel
Martin-Frevel, a leading tank designer of the French Army who was now in North
America. He had worked on the French Somua, a tank that was largely made from cast-
metal components, and had brought along enough working drawings to demonstrate how
the same techniques could be used for tanks produced in North America. Using this
method of casting armour would utilize those facilities that could only cast metal, and
free up rolling steel mills to make armour needed for other uses.68 The Ministry, with
minor caveats, agreed with Dewar' s recommendations.
Ibid.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol, 1. "M3 U.K. Tank Production in U.S.A. Memo No. 1,"
Appendix A, 27 November 1940.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-4, Department of Munitions and Supply Joint Committee on
Tank Development with the Department ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of the First Meeting,"
30 August 1940.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, "Record of Visit to Aberdeen Proving Ground on
9th October, 1940," Appendix HI.
There was still discussion in late October 1940 among senior Canadian Army officials
and the government regarding the purchase and use of tanks being manufactured in
Canada. Colonel E.L.M. Burns laid out the current choices in an information letter to
General Crerar, then the Chief of the Canadian General Staff (CGS).
As of the 21st of October, 488 Mark 3 Infantry [Valentine] tanks and 1 157 M3 Cruisers
had been ordered, with delivery ofboth to Canadian units anticipated around August,
1941 . Current cost estimates for each model were that the Valentine tank would cost
about $75,000 per unit, with the Cruiser costing about $50,000 (though it was recognized
that these were only preliminary estimates at best). Burns noted that the discrepancy was
mainly due to the need for additional labour in the case of the Valentine, because of a
lack ofmass-production economies in its original British design and construction. These
tanks had been ordered at a time when it seemed that they would be the only tanks
available for Canadian use, and so they were a case of making the best of a bad situation.
But under the current Canadian Table of Equipment and Organization, there was no place
for the Valentine tanks (except as training tanks) unless an Army Tank Brigade was
established.
Burns suggested that if the M3 Cruiser turned out to be significantly cheaper, it might be
a good idea to reexamine Canadian orders for the Valentine and switch CPR production
over the manufacture of Cruiser tanks. A handwritten note in the margin from Crerar
noted that until both production lines were up and running, there was insufficient
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information upon which to base a decision and so production of the two tanks for
Canadian use would be continued until there was a firmer basis for a decision.
The day after this letter was sent, H. J. Stevenson (D.O.S.(M)) and Major M. M. Evans
were authorized to fly to Washington on 22 October to meet with US Army officers and
the Dewar Commission regarding "design problems of the M3 Cruiser Tank".71 Despite
these ongoing problems with the design, two three-way contracts were signed on 23
October between the Department of Munitions and Supply, the Montreal Locomotive
Works, and the American Locomotive Company (ALCO). The first contract was to
"Construct a plant for 5.5" Gun Carriages or M.3 Cruiser Tanks"; the second, to
"Produce 5.5" Gun Carriages or M.3 Cruiser Tanks."72
At this point, the design of the M3 tank was "frozen" by the US Ordnance, to allow the
tooling-up for its construction to begin. The M3 as initially designed had a crew of seven
men, more than most other countries' tanks, and had a very high profile, much higher
than most of the Axis tanks it might face in combat. From the ground to the top of the
main hull it measured T 1A", and its total height, including the tank commander's cupola
atop the turret, was 10' 3". The turret contained a high-velocity 37 mm gun and a .30
caliber coaxial machinegun, but the main armament was contained in a sponson on the
front right side of the main hull. The 75 mm gun in the sponson had a limited traverse of
70 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, Colonel E.L.M. Bums to C.G.S. [Crerar],
21 October 1940.
71 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major G.L. Frawley, for D. of S. & T., to
D.O.S. (M), reply to letter from D.O.S.(M). Their flight transport warrant was 48713.
72 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1. Both contracts are in the same File docket.
fifteen degrees off the centerline of the tank, which meant that to hit its target the entire
tank had to be pointing in the direction in which it was firing. An additional .30 caliber
machinegun was in the commander's cupola atop the turret, and two fixed forward-firing
.30 caliber machineguns were set in the glacis plate just above the transmission housing
on the front of the hull, operated by the driver.
The tank was 8' 11" wide at its widest point and its overall length was 18' 6". Motive
power was provided by a Continental Motors R-975 9-cylinder radial engine in the rear
of the hull. The tank drove on two 16 Vi" wide caterpillar tracks, one on each side of the
hull. The suspension consisted of six road wheels in three bogie assemblies (two wheels
to each bogie), three return rollers (one atop each bogie) and a drive sprocket and idler
wheel for each track. There were four large escape hatches for the crew, one on each
side, another on the upper surface of the hull behind the main gun sponson, and a final
one atop the turret for the tank commander.74
Now that contracts had been signed between the Canadian government and ALCO, and
because the design of the M3 tank had been frozen by the US authorities, it became
possible for blueprints and construction drawings of the M3 to have "free interchange"
between ALCO and the Montreal Locomotive Works. Captain Coventry of the British
Purchasing Commission informed Colonel G. B. Howard (the Chief Inspector of
Armaments) that drawings of the M3 would be sent to Howard's department "as they
73 These dimensions, apart from the height of the main hull, come from R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman (Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 528. The height of the hull is from Mr. Charles Lemons, Curator at
the Patton Museum, Fort Knox, Kentucky; personal communication, 13 July 2009.
74IbJd.
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become available". They also discussed the free interchange of M3 drawings between
ALCO and Montreal Locomotive Works.75 Howard, in rum, requested that Major Max
Evans, the Director-General of Munitions, arrange courier services between Canada and
the US for the transport of the drawings.76 All of these details (including the port of exit
for the drawings, so that US Customs could clear them as rapidly as possible) were sorted
out between ALCO, MLW and the Chief Inspector of Armaments by the 5th of
November, 1940.77
By this point, production capacity was being found for the two types of tanks, with an eye
to switching the Valentine lines over to producing Cruisers when practicable. It appeared
that the Valentine was nearing the limits of its design potential, whereas the Cruiser Tank
still could be improved.78 The Joint Committee on Tank Development projected that the
M3 Cruiser Tank could be produced at the rate of 2 per day, rising to a maximum of 3 per
day in 1941, and with a further rise to 5 per day "as soon as circumstances would
permit"; also, design work to change the M3 would be put into effect at the end of
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major Max Evans, for the Director General of
Munitions, to Colonel G.B. Howard, Chief Inspector ofArmaments, Ottawa, 30 October 1940.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Colonel G.B. Howard to Major Max Evans,
5 November 1940.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 6294, File H.Q. 38-72-261 Vol. 5, cover letter "Re: Drawings for Mill Cruiser Tank"
and 3 letters between ALCO, the D.G.M., and the Chief Inspector ofArmaments,
5 November 1940.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, J.L. Ralston to CD. Howe, 25 October 1940.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, "4th Meeting of the Joint Committee on Tank
Development," 8 November 1940. It is not apparent if the reference "end of 1941" is a misprint
for "end of 1940."
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To keep up with this projected five-tanks-per-day demand, armour production would
have to increase in Canada. The Steel Company of Canada was building a new mill
which would add capacity by February 1 941 . Heat-treating apparatus had not yet been
installed, however, because there was no definitive agreement on the needed capacity
between Steel Company of Canada and the Department of Munitions and Supply. Burns,
in a letter to the Associate Minister ofNational Defence, noted that several manufacturers
were still reluctant to invest in additional war production capacity for their plants,
worried that it would create a surplus problem after the war. He urged that the
Department of Munitions and Supply create a Tank Division, headed by a man
experienced in heavy manufacturing, to ensure the confidence of everyone associated
with the M3 project.80
A meeting of the key British, Canadian and American tank experts was held at the
Willard Hotel in Washington on November 13, 1 940, ". . .To Discuss Questions of
Demarcation Between Material To be Supplied to Tank Erectors and Material which
They will have to provide for themselves."81 Discussions were held on the production of
the M3 in both the United States and in Canada, and it was arranged that all of the
engineering drawings needed by MLW for the construction of the M3 would be passed to
Canada via the BPC; this would ensure that all of the companies building the M3 were
building the "same" M3, current with one another in every respect. It was noted that the
80 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, E.L.M. Burns to the Associate Minister ofNational
Defence, 10 December 1940.
81 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1. "Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Willard Hotel on
Wednesday, November 13th, at 10 A.M. To Discuss Questions ofDemarcation Between Material To be
Supplied to Tank Erectors and Material which They will have to provide for themselves."
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design drawings were to be ready for duplication and distribution by early December.
Mr. Dewar, for the British, put forward the idea that it was more efficient to have a single
subcontractor supply the same component for all the tank manufacturers than to have the
duplication of effort involved in all of the erectors making the same part; for instance, all
the tank engines would come from Continental, all of the transmissions would come from
Chrysler, and so on. He thought that this would save on machine tool needs as well.
Also, following a suggestion by Mr. Kent, representing the US National Defence
Advisory Committee, the main contractors expressed an interest in forming a joint
purchasing combine, based on a similar one already formed by aircraft constructors.
(Such a combine was formed, and a document was later drawn up that listed over 1 10
suppliers for equipment carried in or built onto the M3.)84 The Dewar Mission took on
the task of ensuring that engines, transmissions and other non-Canadian components
would be delivered to the Canadian M.3 assembly lines; it was believed that the
transmissions would be the hardest items to procure, compared to other parts. Dewar also
requested that Canada supply a "resident (technical and production) Tank Liaison




LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Lt.-Colonel Edmond L. White, U.S.A., to
J.H. Bradshaw Jr., BPC, "Sources of Equipment for Medium Tank, M3," 1 1 June 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1. Memorandum, Major Evans to DMGO, DND,
Ottawa, "M3 Anglo-American Cruiser Tank Design," November 12, 1940.
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Among many other topics discussed that day, a key one was to determine what
improvements were desired for the M3's successor, designated as the M.4 for discussion
purposes.86 Most of the major improvements had already been discussed by the Tank
Committee. The M.4 should have its main armament (the 75 mm or the 6-pounder gun)
in a fully-rotating turret, and the hull profile should be lowered as much as possible and
its armour thickened. Both the new upper hull and the turret should be made of cast
armour, for quicker production time, and the turret would have sufficient space for the
No. 1 9/24 wireless radio so that the tank commander had easy access to it. 7 The idea
was put forward that because these changes above would require shop facilities for
design, experimentation and construction, a design staff should be assembled at the MLW
to fulfill that function.88 In its report to the MGO the Tank Committee agreed,
emphasizing that the "starting point of the new design must be an established model
[M3]"; the Committee hoped that the experts of the British Tank Mission would act as
advisors.89
86 There are three different reports in the archives relating to this meeting. It appears to have been an
ad hoc group of many of the concerned parties and not a formally-constituted one, such as the
Tank Committee. All of the reports are in LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 .
87 The most modem wireless set at the time, the 19 Set had a 12 mile range, when equipped with a 6 ft
aerial; the range of the 24 Set was 400m in flat country. See LAC RG 24, Vol. 2597, File
H.Q.S. 3352-11 Vol. 1, "Wireless Set 19/24," 8 November 1940.
88 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 , Major Evans to DMGO, DND, Ottawa,
"M3 Anglo-American Cruiser Tank Design," November 12, 1940.
89 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Col. E.L.M. Burns (ADCGS) to D/M.G.O.,
19 November 1940.
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Chapter 2: Design Commences
Originally, it was thought that Canada would start producing M3 tanks at the same time
as did the US factories; at least 300 were expected to be produced at the MLW before
changing over to any newer design.1 However, it transpired that production would
actually start somewhat later in Canada, and there would also be a lesser capacity on the
Canadian assembly line. These factors, combined with British/Canadian dissatisfaction
with the M3 design, instead led to the idea that tank production in Canada might start
with the new Canadian design of the M4.2 Mr. L.E. Carr, at the request of the
Department of Munitions and Supply, began developing designs for the new M4 hull,
lowering its silhouette as much as possible and incorporating all of the other changes
desired by the British.3 In this he was aided by Dr. R.E. Jamieson, a Canadian civil
engineer with expertise in the casting and welding ofmetals. Jamieson had served with
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. I1 W.F. Drysdale, Director General of Munitions, to
Wm. Monis, Vice-President, Montreal Locomotive Works, December 13, 1940.
2 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 . E.P. Taylor (Director General for Munitions
Production) to Michael Dewar (BPC), "Re: Anglo-American M3 Cruiser Tanks and Armament,"
November 26, 1940; see also "Minutes of a Meeting held in Washington, Saturday, January 4*,
1941, at 4:00 PM in Mr. Michael Dewar's Office.," in the same box and File.
3 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 , "Minutes of a Meeting held in Washington,
Saturday, January 4*, 1941 , at 4:00 PM in Mr. Michael Dewar's Office." See also Fletcher,
op. cit., 94.
4 Noted in Ross and Clarke, The Business ofTanks, 1933 to 1945, op. cit., 202. At the time, Jamieson had
left his position as the William Scott Professor of Engineering at McGiIl University in Montreal
to work for the National Research Council. Later in the war, he served as Director-General of the
Supply Branch of the Department of Munitions and Supply.
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the Canadian Siege Artillery in the First World War and had experience in both gunnery
and armour strength.5
Though a final decision was yet to be made on whether to build the US M3 or the
"Modified Canadian M.4", the various erectors chosen to build the tanks were still able to
work together to coordinate the ordering of components. Despite the marked difference
in the upper hull designs of the two tanks, the running gear, engines and transmissions
were the same, allowing common parts to be ordered for both designs.
The British continued to observe the progress of the American M3 with interest. A group
from the Dewar Mission returned to Aberdeen on 28 November 1940, where they
watched (as well as participated in) a trial of gyro-stabilized gun firing on the Aberdeen
range. Impressed by the results, Dr. Fowler of the British High Commission in Ottawa
and Lt.-Col. Wallace of the British Army both urged the adoption of the gyro-stabilizer
for British tank guns.6
There was still uncertainty over whether Canada would build the standard American M3
or the Modified Canadian Cruiser M3 in mid-December. W.F. Drysdale, the Director-
General of Munitions, had authorized tank production at the Montreal Locomotive Works
on the understanding that the first 300 tanks to be constructed there would be identical to
the American M3 being made for the British at ALCO's Schenectady workshops.
5 From http://www.archives.mcgill.ca/resources/guide/vol2_3/gen0 l.htm#JAMIESON, ROBERT
EDWARD, accessed December 14, 2007.
6 Zimmerman, op. cit., 127. Footnote 38 quotes Fowler, "Report on a Visit to Aberdeen Proving
Ground 28 November 1940," National Archives (UK) File PRO AVIA 10/2.
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Drysdale urged Mr. William Morris (the MLW Vice-President in charge of the Tank
Programme) to inform his office of any difficulties they might have in obtaining parts or
US export permits, so that the Dewar Mission could in turn be informed and take
remedial action.
By- mid-December the new "U.K. Design" cast turret for the American M3 was available
for inspection by the British and Canadians. The cast armour turret was considered to be
easier to make, and to have a thirty percent lower production cost, than a comparable
turret of equivalent strength made from armour plate. Unfortunately, once the turret was
fitted to the tank it appeared that, in the words of Major W. Mavor, "The result was
disappointing. From an appearance point of view the Tank was very top heavy[.]" A
final judgement on the design was reserved until the finished turret, with all its guns and
other equipment installed, was ready to be inspected. This was tentatively scheduled to
take place at Aberdeen on Monday December 30th by Colonel Burns, Colonel
Worthington and Major Evans, the best Canadian tank experts available.
The British had also commissioned the fabrication of a one-piece upper hull casting that
closely followed the original design of the US M3 tank. Cast and machined at the
General Steel Castings foundry in Philadelphia (the same plant that had cast the new
turret), the casting qua casting was considered an excellent job, and its adoption would
7 LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, W.F. Drysdale, Director General of Munitions to
Wm. Morris, VP, Montreal Locomotive Works, December 13, 1940, op. cit.
8 LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major W. Mavor to Major Evans, Mr. Drysdale,
Colonel Burns, Brig. Letson, and Mr. Carswell, "Tank Programme Memo No. 4,"
16 December 1940.
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result in savings in both labour and armour plate.9 (The Baldwin Locomotive Company,
one of the constructors of the M3 tank, held a controlling ownership in General Steel and
this was at least one of the reasons why it had been chosen by the British. )
Casting had the advantage ofbeing faster and easier to produce than complex hull shapes
made from straight armour plate, once initial tooling had been created. Another
advantage ofhaving a cast hull was that there were no vulnerable joins between armour
plates, or rivets that could be hit by an attacker's shot and turned into lethal fragments
ricocheting around inside the tank.
On the other hand, casting has a disadvantage in that it is extremely difficult to ensure
that the "grain" of the metal alloy is aligned as the cast piece cools. It is this alignment
that gives metal much of its strength, although some of this can be achieved later through
a process known as "face hardening".
Based on the successful British attempt, it was considered that the hull of the Canadian
version of the tank should also be made of cast armour steel. The British had made a
large monetary investment in General Steel Castings, and there would be no need for
additional capital expenditure in order to fabricate the "Canadian" hulls. There was also
9 Ibid. Interestingly, these cast hulls, which were later designated with the model number M3A1, had side
doors identical to those on the Ram. See the drawing and picture in Jim Mesko, M3 Lee/Grant in
Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1995), 6 and 22.
10 Albert Churella, "Corporate Response to Technological Change: Dieselization and the American
Railway Locomotive Industry During the Twentieth Century," Business and Economic History 25,
No. 1 (Fall 1996), 28.
11 John W. Schaefer, from a discussion on http://yarchive.net/mil/ww2 _tank_armor.html, June 11, 1996,
accessed January 10, 2006.
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the fact that rolled armour plate was needed for other uses, and a cast hull would be both
cheaper and equally effective against antitank fire. The final decision was left to the Joint
Committee on Tank Production.
On New Year's Eve of 1 941 , Major Evans drew up the estimate of how many of the new
tanks were to be needed for Canada's sole Armoured Division. The Division was made
up of two Armoured Brigades, with three Regiments to each Brigade. Based on the
Division's Table of Organization, 304 Cruiser tanks and 36 "Close Support" (CS) tanks
would be required: 10 Cruisers were allocated to each of the two Armoured Brigade
Headquarters, 46 Cruisers were allocated to each of the six Armoured Regiments, and a
further 8 Cruisers were earmarked for the Headquarters of the Armoured Division. The
36 CS tanks were to be equally divided among the Armoured Regiments, at 6 apiece.
Calculations of "War Wastage" vastly increased these numbers, meaning that many more
tanks would need to be built than this. A wastage rate of 14% per month (or 168% per
year) was assumed by Evans, based on the best estimates available at the time. This
translated into a total of 815 Cruisers being required, rather than the original 304, and a
need for 97 of the CS version of the tank, close to two-and-a-half times the original figure
of 36. A further 245 Tanks "in excess of establishments" was added to make a total of
12 LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major W. Mavor to Major Evans, Mr. Drysdale,
Colonel Bums, Brig. Letson, and Mr. Carswell, "Tank Programme Memo No. 4,"
16 December 1940, op. cit.
13 LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Evans to ADCGS [Burns], NDHQ,
December 31, 1940.
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1 157 tanks.14 Two days later, a memo from Victor Sinon, the Master General of the
Ordnance to Ralston, the Defence Minister, set out the contract cost for the tanks as
$57,850,000. This, however, turned out to be optimistic. In a handwritten addendum to
the letter, initialled several days later by H.D. [Crerar], it was noted that the total value of
the Contract Demand, signed on January 8, 1941, had already risen to $138,840,000.00.15
Evans, in a January 8 letter to the Department of Finance, confirmed that the 1 157
Cruiser Tanks M3 had been ordered on Contract Demand #283 of 1940-1941 at a price of
approximately $120,000 each.16 The formal approval by the War Committee of the
Cabinet for the purchase was issued on 29 January 194 1.17
On January 4th Colonels Burns and Worthington, and Major Evans, attended a meeting
in Washington following their visits to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds and to General
Steel Castings in Philadelphia. Their brief had been to assess how the US Army had
revised the M3 Cruiser Tank in line with the design changes proposed by the British
Purchasing Commission. At the meeting, the attendees (members of the BPC and the
Tank Mission) discussed the new Canadian/UK M4 tank design, to be built at the
14lbid.
15 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, V. Sifton to Minister of Defence Ralston,
January 2, 1941.
16 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Evans to W. Smellie, Clerk of Estimates,
Department of Finance, 8 January 1941.
17 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1. L.M. Breen, Asst. Private Secretary, to C.G.S.,
M.G.O., and D.M. atD.N.D., 3 February 1941.
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Montreal Locomotive Works in place ofmanufacturing the M3.18 It was again thought
that there would be no difficulties in getting supplies of engines and transmissions from
the US, because total Canadian requirements were projected at only two per day once
production got under way (as opposed to total US and UK requirements ofbetween 24
and 29 daily).19
Another reason that engine and transmission supply was not thought to be a problem was
the similarity of the Canadian/UK design to the forthcoming US M4 tank, whose redesign
(incorporating many British suggestions for improvement) was due to begin in February.
But in a January 7 meeting with Brigadier-General Barnes of the US General Staff, the
Canadians and British were informed that the US might not supply the parts for the tanks
if they did not like the design.20 Cooperation was key between Britain, Canada and the
U.S., as
Canada would be dependent on the U.S. for engines and
transmissions and possibly other components and we
should not wish to run the risk of having deliveries of
these components restricted, as the U.S. authorities might
possibly do if they were doubtful as to the soundness of
the design of the armoured fighting vehicle in which it
21
was proposed to incorporate them.
18 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 "Minutes of a Meeting held in Washington,
Saturday, January 4th, 1941, at 4:00 PM in Mr. Michael Dewar's Office." Evans had been sent
along by the A.D.C.G.S. specifically so that he could learn, and report back upon, technical
proposals regarding the manufacturing of tanks in Canada.
19 Ibid.
20 LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major Evans to DND, "Memorandum of a
discussion held at the U.S. War Department 7th January 1941," dated 13 January 1941.
21 Ibid.
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The US view was that the parts were too valuable, and in too short supply, to be wasted
on substandard designs. From now on it would be necessary to have US approval for
Canadian tank design and production. Barnes noted that the US General Staff had no
objections to the Canadian arrangements with General Steel Castings to produce hulls at
the rate of two per day, as this was not anticipated to interfere with any American
production requirements.22
Further conferences took place on January 9th and 1 Oth regarding the decision to build
the Canadian/UK pattern cast hull. It was again pointed out that the original American
M3 design appeared lop-sided and top-heavy, did not have a fully traversing turret and
had a "prevalence of vertical surfaces" that were highly vulnerable to antitank weapons.
In three meetings held over these two days, it was ultimately determined that 1 1 00 lower-
silhouette cast hulls would be fabricated by General Steel Castings Corporation, at a total
cost to be determined later, and that a mock-up of this hull design (built at the Montreal
Locomotive Works) should be available for inspection by January 1 6th, when it would be
evaluated for "the adequacy of the design from the fighting angle."23 Mr. Carr suggested
that this full-scale mockup was the best way of showing the Americans how to make
improvements in their own design, and also to ensure that they would see the Canadian
LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, A.F. Gill, DM&S, "Department of Munitions and
Supply, Armour for M3 Cruiser Tank," undated but probably between January 10 and 16, 1941 .
The reason for the discrepancy between the contract demand for 1 1 57 tanks and the figure of 1 1 00
hulls noted here is not known.
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Cruiser as a feasible project and release the necessary components for its assembly.
Upon completion, the mock-up of the new cast upper hull was examined, especially with
reference to how the hull fit over the internal arrangements of the fighting compartment.
It had been necessary to reposition the main drive shaft, gearbox, and to lower the
driver's and gunner's seats from their original placement within the higher M3 hull.
After some minor adjustments had been made to the mock-up, the go-ahead was given to
prepare final working drawings of the hull, with the "casting thicknesses to be decided on
by Mr. Carr with the advice of Colonel Worthington and General Steel Casting
Company." It was estimated that the final weight of the hull would be approximately
10,500 lbs and would provide a minimum 30% ballistic improvement over an equivalent-
thickness hull made with rolled armour plate. As a part of the manufacturing
arrangement, General Steel Castings would design the escape hatches on the hull but the
hatches themselves would be cast by another supplier.25
Once the plans had been finalized, 2 prototype hulls were cast. One, unfinished, was
eventually sent to Valcartier to be used for ballistics tests.26 The second was to be
completely machined, for use as the first finished sample tank. The unfinished hull would
be ready between the 1 st and the 1 5th of March; the finished hull would be available by
24 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, Department of Munitions and Supply Joint
Committee on Tank Development with the Department ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of the
Seventh Meeting," 31 January 1941.
25 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 , Major Evans, "Report of the Meeting held at the
Works of the Montreal Locomotive Company, Montreal, January 17th 1941."
26 Kennedy, J. de N. History ofthe Department ofMunitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World
War. Vol. I. Production Branches and Cro\vn Corporations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), 64.
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the 1st of May. Both samples would be cast at General Steel Casting's Eddystone Plant,
but the production runs would probably take place at their Granite City Plant. It was also
agreed that Carr would provide direction to General Steel Casting for the engineering
work on the new turret, which would contain the No.9 or No. 19/24 Wireless Radio Set.
On January 19th 1941, the War Committee of the Cabinet "approved, in principle, the
purchase of 1 ,1 57 cruiser tanks" for use by the Canadian Army.28 In the terms of the
contract (signed on the 30th of January), MLW was to accept the offer of General Steel
Castings Corporation of Eddystone, PA "to manufacture and sell to His Majesty 1,157
cast armour tank top hulls [. . .] in connection with production contract No. 1 053, dated
October 23rd, 1940".29 These were to be delivered as part of requisition Q-855-0, Order
Q- 12676 (Ordnance),
fully machined and weighing approximately ten thousand
five hundred (10,500) pounds, each conforming in design
to your drawing number 53018 and manufactured in
accordance with and passing the tests prescribed by U.S.
Army Ordnance Specification AXS-499, exclusive of
paragraph F.l.C. (providing for radiographing).30
The price of each hull casting was set at $6,650.00 US dollars.31
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 , Major Evans, "Report of the Meeting held at the
Works of the Montreal Locomotive Company, Montreal, January 17th 1941," op. cit.
LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 , Minister ofNational Defence [Ralston] to CGS,
MGO, DM, 3 February 1941 .
LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1A-1, 30 January 1941. Production contract No. 1053 had originally
been for the manufacture of cast hulls for the British variant of the M3, the Grant tank.
31 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, MLW to the bankers J. P. Morgan & Co.,
26 February 1941.
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As the tank took shape in the design stage, responsibilities for the supply of all the
components needed were established for the construction of tanks at the Montreal
Locomotive Works. Major components, such as the Continental 9-cylinder engine and
the Mack Truck Company transmission, were to be supplied complete and "Free Issue"*
by the manufacturers. The same applied to the gun mounts, all optical equipment, and
the tank's radio sets and antennas; however, MLW was to supply the exterior antenna
mount on the tank, and the wiring from the interior turret bustle to that mount. MLW
also informed the Department of Munitions and Supply that it would not be able to
machine armour plate for the hull and expected to receive all plate and castings
"completely machined and processed ready for erection." Possibly because of Carr's
British background, Montreal Locomotive Works asked for and received assurances that
U.S. rather than Whitworth [British] threads would be used on all components in the
tank.32
It was further agreed that the Montreal Locomotive Works would make the turret
traversing ring in one piece, and that it would be based on a 60-inch diameter ring, a
larger diameter that that used on contemporary British tanks. This larger diameter meant
that the speed of the turret traverse would be reduced from the original British
* "Free Issue" in this context means that the Government would pay for the items and arrange their delivery
to the Montreal Locomotive Works production lines, rather than have Montreal Locomotive Works order
and pay for them, thus avoiding any surcharges that might be incurred by Montreal Locomotive Works.
32 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Major M.M. Evans (M.G.O. (Tanks)) to multiple
addressees, "Minutes of a Meeting held at the Montreal Locomotive Works on Friday, February 7,
1 94 1 ." Two different meetings were held at the MLW this day but, confusingly, they were both
written up by Major Evans and they both have the same title, though one is much longer than the
other. The long one concerns itselfwith many details about the tank, and the short one only
discusses the dimensions of the No. 9 Wireless Set, and the need to fit it into the turret of the
Canadian Cruiser M3. The information in this paragraph comes from the longer document.
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requirements, a design change agreed to by Carr. However, it was this single decision
that rendered the new tank design as obsolete before its time.
The larger a turret ring, the larger a gun that can be fitted into the turret. By restricting
the diameter to 60 inches, the Ram-to-be could only be upgunned to the 6-pounder, as
there would be insufficient space to fight a larger weapon (such as a 75 mm cannon or a
17-pounder) within the same ring. The Germans, farther ahead in tank doctrine, had
already grasped this fact. Their Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks (designed in 1935-36) had
from the outset been provided with turret rings far larger than their current armament had
required.34
It is not clear how or why the 60-inch diameter turret ring was chosen. In his biography,
F.F. Worthington is quoted as saying that he wanted the largest possible turret ring, 72" at
least, so that the tank could be upgunned if necessary, but the Committee decided
otherwise. According to the argument recounted in the book, the largest contemporary
British turret ring was 54", and some of those tanks had 2-pounder (40 mm) guns in their
turrets, so it is not clear why a 60" ring was thought necessary.35 (Another source points
The Panzer III had a turret ring diameter of approximately 60 inches, and the Panzer IV had one of
approximately 64 inches. The Panzer III ultimately became obsolete, but it had a much longer
career than the Ram as a gun tank, and its chassis (like that of the Ram) eventually served as the
basis for several designs of self-propelled guns and other specialist vehicles. See Bruce Culver,
PzKpßvIIIIn Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1988), 4, for the Panzer III
data, and LAC Microfilm T- 17473, File 1/AFV Guns/1, Department ofTank Design, information
from examination of captured Panzer IV #813, 2 December 1941.
Worthington, op. cit., 166.
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out that even the 6-pounder could fit inside a 54" turret ring.) No reason is given for
not making the largest diameter ring possible, though it may have been a lack ofmachine
tools available that were capable of handling the job. In his autobiography, E.L.M. Burns
(then the General Staff member on the Tank Production Committee) glosses over
whoever was responsible for the decision, saying
We decided that the Canadian tank should embody the
British turret principle, and considered mounting a
75 mm. gun, but this proved impossible because of
certain mechanical difficulties. [. . .] If we could have
placed the 75 mm. gun into the turret, we should have
produced precisely the "Sherman" tank with which
eventually American, British and Canadian armoured
troops were equipped, and which contributed so much
to winning the war on land.37
Unfortunately Burns never mentions what those "certain mechanical difficulties" were,
and there is no mention of any size-limiting difficulties in the minutes of the February
1 7th meeting. (This shortcoming seems to only have been recognized in January 1 942,
when DND authorized the procurement of machine tools to produce a 69" turret ring,
meant to be used on the Grizzly, the Canadian version of the Sherman. )
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, Mr. L.E. Carr, BPC, to Major W. Mavor, DND,
21 April 1941.
E.L.M. Bums, General Mud: Memoirs ofTwo World Wars (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1970),
104-5. One possible reason for Burns not mentioning too much about this period, or not giving
the reasons behind decisions, was that at the time he was having an affair with a married woman in
Montreal and trying to see her as often as he could. See J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The
Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995), 128.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting,"
3 1 March 1 942. The notes are not numbered, but this was either the fourth or fifth meeting of
the Committee.
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British and American tank design was still lagging behind that of Germany and the Soviet
Union. Both of these countries' tank designers had recognized the need to install the
largest turret rings possible in their tanks, to allow them to be up-gunned if necessary.
The Germans had 50 mm main guns (roughly equivalent to the British 6-pounder, though
of higher velocity) in their Mark III and Mark IV tanks, and the need to replace them with
75 mm guns had already been recognized by German tank crews. The Soviets had started
out with 76.2 mm main guns in their KV-I and T-34 tanks, which (when used correctly)
could defeat any German armour. Both countries also had recognized that additional
armour protection would be needed against an adversary's up-gunned tanks, and had
begun to develop face-hardened and appliqué armour for the more vulnerable frontal
surfaces of their tanks.39
Production schedules were being drawn up for the new tank even as its design was being
finished. General Steel Castings was to pour the first Canadian M3 hull on March 21st,
with the second one following two weeks later.40 It was anticipated that the first "Cruiser
Tank M3 (modified)", complete with its armament, would be delivered to the Army by
October 1st, 1941, and that the full production rate of two tanks per day would be
attained within 30 to 45 days after that date.41
39 For discussions of turret ring size, upgunning, and appliqué armour see Bruce Culver, PzKpfwIII in
Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1988), pages 4, 15, 21, and 23; Bruce
Culver, PzKpfiv IV in Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1975), pages 4-5,
15-21, and 27-29; and Steven Zaloga and James Grandsen, T-34 in Action (Carrollton, TX:
Squadron/Signal Publications, 1983), pages 7-8, 17, 32, and 36-37.
40 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, Department of Munitions and Supply Joint
Committee on Tank Development with the Department ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of
the Eighth Meeting," 18 February 1941.
41 LAC RG 24 Vol.2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, G.K. Shiels, DM&S, to Victor Sifton, M.G.O.,
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As part of the effort to convince the American Ordnance department that the recent
British battle experience had given them better insight into the tactical handling of
armour, a meeting was held February 27 and 28 in Montreal between Canadian, British
and US Army officers to discuss matters relating to tank construction and internal
arrangements, with an emphasis on radios and communications. Specialist officers from
the Signals Branch of all of the armies were invited to attend, as well as their superiors.
It was emphasized that the meeting was in no way official:
The object of the meeting is to have a frank and free
round-table conference on tank design and production,
and, ifpossible, to iron out any misunderstandings,
real or imaginary, which may now exist.42
Nonetheless, Major Mavor and Brigadier Letson were instructed to prepare an agenda
that would put across Canadian and British concerns to the Americans.
On the first day of the meeting, the conference attendees visited the Valentine III
production line at the Angus Shops in the morning. The Montreal Locomotive Works,
with its nascent tank production line and the mock-up of the cast M3 (Modified) hull, was
toured in the afternoon. As hoped, specialist officers in signals and tank design from all
three nations attended, as did senior officers from Ottawa and Washington, including
Generals Crerar and Burns of the Canadian General Staff. Informal discussions took
place that evening over supper and drinks at the Mount Stephen Club in downtown
4 February 1941.
42 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2615, File H.Q.S. 3352-25, Letson to Burns, 19 February 1941.
43 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2615, File H.Q.S. 3352-25, Burns to Letson, 22 February 1941.
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Montreal, and the formal meetings of the conference took place there on the following
day. The Canadians, who provided the minutes of the meeting, ensured that their views
predominated.44
In the minutes, it was emphasized that the curves of the cast upper hull of the Canadian
M.3 Modified Cruiser Tank gave better ballistic protection than vertical armour plate, and
that a cast hull also reduced tank production time in both assembly and machining. It
was pointed out that proper annealing of the casting in the production process should
remove any "shrinkage strains" within it, a problem not found in armour plate. The
horizontal plate that wedded the upper and lower hull halves was to be riveted to the
lower half and welded to the upper. (The lower hull was constructed ofplate because of
the multiple openings and machining operations required by the tank suspension.)
The wooden mock-up M. 3 Modified hull that had been shown to the American and
British officers at the Montreal Locomotive Works was waiting only for one part (the
driver's periscope) before finalization of the production design, and had an anticipated
completion date of March 14th. The design of the hull casting was based on an overall
60 mm thickness, and had the 60-inch turret ring with the 2-pounder gun installed in the
fully-rotating turret. The turret's power traverse enabled it to turn at three-and-a-half
revolutions a minute, and a gyro-stabilizer was to be installed on the main gun.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2615, File H.Q.S. 3352-25, Bums to Letson, 26 February 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2615, File H.Q.S. 3352-25, "Minutes of a Meeting at the Mount Stephen Club,
Montreal, February 28, 1941."
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Some of the attendees went away from the meeting thinking of other matters: General
Crerar wrote a memo to C. D Howe, the Minister at the Department of Munitions and
Supply, to complain of the slow construction of the tank assembly building at the
Montreal Locomotive Works. This was apparently due to a lack of structural steel
allocated to the project, and he asked Howe if more steel could be made available for the
building.47
General Burns wrote a memo detailing the problems still to be solved for the "M4C"
tank, including the final main turret design, and detail work on the auxiliary machine-gun
cupola. He noted that sources still had to be secured for optical equipment such as sights,
protectoscopes and periscopes, and that technical manuals were desperately needed for
shop workers and end-users both, and would have to be prepared.48 Mr. CI. Evans of the
Department of Munitions and Supply recognized this as well, and consequently asked
Major Max Evans to prepare and produce an instruction book for the "M3 Modified
Cruiser Tank".49 Major Evans, also looking towards the future, noted that the
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Crerar to Howe, 1 March 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Burns to DM&S, 3 March 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Mr. CI. Evans to Major Max Evans,
28 March 1941. Interim Ram servicing manuals were only issued in March 1942; they were
copies of the "USA M3 Medium Instruction Book No. TM 9-750", dated 1 October 1941, with
exceptions and additions noted on an attached sheet. Because of the similarities between the
M3 and the Ram, it could be used to instruct on the operation and maintenance of everything
except the armament. As late as June 1942, a final instruction book for the Ram was still
lacking, as were information sheets that described maintenance schedules and requirements.
This was more than two months after the tanks had been issued to Canadian troops and to the
UK authorities for testing, and more than five months since the War Office had asked for details
about the tank. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to
Captain Gibbons, A.F.V.l.(b), W.O., 26 March 1942, and LAC RG 24 Vol. 2600, File
H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 8, Ellis to AEDB, "Manufacturing and Service Information - Ram Tanks,"
2 June 1942.
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maintenance demands of this tank would require not only greater instruction but also
better-trained people in the service echelons to keep it working in battle.
Another delegation arrived from the United States in March to examine the "Canadian
Cruiser" mock-up at the Montreal Locomotive Works. Among the visitors were Colonel
J.B. Christmas of the U.S. Ordnance Corps, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Major A.V.
Goldring, the British Assistant Military Attaché in Washington, and Mr. L.E. Carr, the
man who had done most to design the hull and turret of the tank.51 All were experienced
tankmen, and it was understood that they would be submitting reports back to their
governments about the Canadian efforts.
During the delegation's visit, Colonel E.L.M. Burns spoke with Major Goldring
regarding possible improvements for the "M4C Tank", based on Goldring' s experience in
the British Army's Tank Design Department, as well as his part in designing the Matilda
Mk. II Infantry Tank. Goldring suggested that the Canadian Cruiser M3's escape hatches
should be hinged from the inside for greater crew safety; and also that the glacis in front
of the driver be modified to prevent bullet splash from penetrating the hull through his
visor and entering the tank. He also emphasized that trials of the finished prototype
should ensure that the auxiliary machinegun in the cupola worked well under simulated
combat conditions. Goldring noted that in the field, maintenance would be held to the
50 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Maj. M.M. (Max) Evans for D.O.S. (M). to
D./M.G.O., "Visit to American Locomotive Company, Schenectady, U.S.A.", 22 April 1941.
51 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Brigadier H.F.G. Letson, Military Attaché
(Canadian Legation, Washington) to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, NDHQ, Ottawa,
date unknown but internal evidence suggests between 12 February and I March, 1941. The
visit was to take place 21 March, 1941.
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minimum amount possible and parts that were well -lubricated on trials would probably
be much harder to move or turn in action. His own experience with the cupola in the
British Al 2 Tank showed that an auxiliary traversing mechanism, operated by hand,
would probably be needed. Finally, Goldring pointed out that the proper installation of
the No. 9 Wireless Set in the turret was critical, as even the slightest variation in the
wiring and positioning of the wireless set and its connections within the tank would
probably result in lessened performance and a painstaking re-adjustment of the set.
It was also suggested that Canada should establish a "Tank Design Organization" to
produce new type variants and improvements in the tanks presently being manufactured.
Goldring thought that the UK Ministry of Supply could second to Canada a senior
draftsman from its Tank Design Branch "if a sufficient inducement were offered."
Another possibility was that the Dewar Mission's designers might be made part of this
Canadian design staff should the British Purchasing Commission be reduced in size.
Even as Goldring proposed this, a Canadian Design Staff was already being created, with
the transfer of the Design Branch for Motors and Tanks from the DND to the Department
of Munitions and Supply, as part of an effort to consolidate Design and Production within
DM&S and avoid misunderstanding and duplication between departments working on
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Col. E.L.M. Burns, DND to W.F. Drysdale, DG
ofMunitions Production, DM&S, 24 March 1 94 1 .
50
similar projects.55 By late May, office space for some 75 technicians had been requested
and the wrangling for accommodation between the Department of Munitions and Supply
and the Ministry of Public Works went on for several months.56 At one point Public
Works suggested that there was considerable vacant space available in the Temporary
Buildings on Wellington Street and that it just needed consolidating to provide space for
the incoming technicians. J.S. Reynolds of the DM&S's Personnel and Equipment
Branch noted that this was incorrect, and that ". . .In fact yesterday we were forced to put
an important gentleman coming to work with Mr Turnbull in a woman's restroom [. . .] on
account of the lack of space."57 It was clearly realized that the Design Branch was
needed to keep pace with developments, as well as to outpace those of the enemy. In the
words ofVictor Sinon, the Master General of the Ordnance, to Defence Minister Ralston,
It is true that some original and very satisfactory work
has been done with respect to the development of the
Cruiser Tank, but with this exception, we have been
satisfied, strictly speaking, to duplicate British designs
as nearly as possible in this country.5
LAC RG 28 Vol. 59, File 1-1-127-1, CD. Howe to J.L. Ralston, 2 April 1941. Ralston agreed, on the
condition that the personnel be transferred from DND to Department of Munitions and Supply
premises, as well, to free up office space for other DND projects. By September 27th , it
was established that the Design Branch would be established in the new Temporary Building 4, at
Ottawa's LeBreton Flats. See Ralston' s reply to Howe in the same file, 4 April 1941 and see also
J.H. Barry (Technical Advisor, DM&S) to G.K. Shiels (DM&S), 27 September 1941.
LAC RG 28 Vol. 59, File 1-1-127-1, G.K. Shiels, Deputy Minister, DM&S, to J.B. Hunter, Deputy
Minister of Public Works, 19 May 1941.
LAC RG 28 Vol. 59, File 1-1-127-1, J.S. Reynolds to AJ. Martin, Department of Public Works,
22 May 1941.
LAC RG 28 Vol. 59, File 1-1-127-1, Sinon to Ralston, 30 May 1941. This letter also notes that
Mr. Garfield Evans is Director of Tank Production.
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From Maryland, Colonel Worthington sent back a report on the firing trials conducted
upon the experimental cast hull designed for the British Lee/Grant M3 Medium tank.
Shots were fired at the hull from both 75 mm and 37 mm guns. Though the armour was
sometimes gouged by the impact of the projectiles, the only penetration of the armour
came from some 37 mm fire at close range and high velocity. Subsequent examination of
the hull led to the conclusion that equal protection was achieved for plate and cast armour
at thicknesses above one-and-a-half inches.
The design of the Canadian cruiser tank prototype, now unofficially known as the Ram,
was finalized on schedule in the last half of March 1941 . The running gear of the tank
(the tracks, bogies, road wheels, etc.) was virtually identical to that of the M3, but in
contrast to the original M3 design, the hull was much lower, not only because the tall
sponson housing the 75 mm gun had been removed but also because the driver's and co-
driver's seats were now positioned behind, rather than above, the transmission of the
tank. This reduced the total height of the tank to 8 feet 9 inches, 1 8 inches lower than the
original American M3 design. The new cast hull had a rounded-edge shape that seemed
to flow up in a curve from the suspension of the tank. The main armament, a 6-pounder
gun, was mounted atop the hull in a turret that had a full 360 degrees of traverse. (The
mount for the 6-pounder gun was not ready in time for the initial production run, so the
first 50 tanks were equipped with a 2-pounder gun in a slightly different turret face plate
and designated as the Ram I, with the 6-pounder models given the name of Ram II. Both
designs had a coaxial machine gun beside the main gun which moved in synchronization
59 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, Colonel Worthington to NDHQ, "Report on
Firing Trials - Cast Hull M III," 24 March 1941.
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with it.) The machine-gun cupola (that had been on top of the M3 turret) was relocated to
the left-front hull of the Canadian tank and its .30 calibre machinegun was used by the
co-driver for close-in defence. Five large hatches afforded access and escape routes for
the crew: one in the bottom of the hull, two large ones in the sponsons above the tracks
on each side of the tank (which increased the width of the Canadian Cruiser M3 by
several inches over that of the M3), one above the machine-gun cupola, and one for the
tank commander. Finally, the crew had been reduced in number from the M3's seven to
five: The driver, a co-driver/machine-gunner, a loader and a gunner for the main gun, and
the tank commander.
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Chapter 3: Production Begins
As noted above, plans of the hull and turret had been sent to General Steel Castings for
manufacture even as other parts began to arrive at the Montreal Locomotive Works to
construct the first Ram I Tanks. Each individual cast hull required close to two weeks to
produce, because of the various processes required to give the armour of the hull its
correct properties. After the hull was released from its mold and the machining around
hatches and critical-tolerance areas was finished, the heat treatment of the hull took place
in four stages. During the first stage, known as "homogenizing", the hull was heated to
a temperature of 1850° to 2000° Fahrenheit and "soaked" (kept at that temperature) for 6
to 10 hours, and then allowed to air-cool slowly, a process which increased the strength
and hardness of the armour. The second stage, "annealing", heated the hull to 1 100° -
1250° F. for 4 to 6 hours and again allowed it to air-cool; this process reduced any
brittleness in the metal and made the hull easier to weld if any repairs or fittings were
needed. The third stage was "hardening", where the hull was again heated to 1500° -
1700° F., but this time for only 2 to 6 hours, and then it was rapidly cooled by
"quenching" it in a water bath. The final and fourth stage was "tempering" the metal,
heating it to 1000° - 1250° F. for 4 to 10 hours, and allowing it to air-cool. This last step
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was vital to ensuring the uniformity ofhardness throughout the armour.1 The first M3
Cruiser upper hull was to be sent to MLW on May 3rd, to be mated to a lower hull to
form the prototype tank. The second cast upper hull was to go to Aberdeen "for testing to
destruction," but the destination was later changed to Valcartier. The first cast turret was
expected to arrive at MLW on 25 May, and it was thought that the first finished tank
should be ready sometime in June, with small-scale production thereafter, gradually
increasing. (Full production could not be expected until September-October, upon
completion of the new tank assembly hall.)
In Montreal, rolled armour plate for the lower hulls of the tanks, "annealed, cut to shape,
heat treated and straightened", came from Dominion Foundries and Steel Ltd. of
Hamilton, Ontario to be assembled on the production line.3 Heavy transmissions used for
the US M3 tanks were ordered from the Iowa Transmission Company because the weight
1 The above data applied to Ram hulls that were produced up to "sometime in May 1942". After this date,
"Low Alloy" hulls (with a different metal mixture) were produced under contract #Q. 12676, with
these changes in heat treatment:
Temperature Hours Rise Hours Soak (Cooling) Coolant
1950° 10 10 Air
1250° 10 4 Air
1575° 12 4 Water
1150.° 12 4 Air
These two treatments resulted in equivalent ballistic protection for both types of hull. See LAC
RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, D.D.E.M. (D.Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q.) to D.D.O.S.(E)
(C.M.H.Q.), "For the attention ofMajor Relyea", 22 January 1943.
2 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, Department ofMunitions and Supply Joint
Committee on Tank Development with the Department ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of
the Tenth Meeting," 1 7 April 1 94 1 .
3 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1 A-1 1, Contract [unnumbered] with Dominion Foundries and Steel
Ltd. ofHamilton, Ontario, for the "Manufacture of Sets of Rolled Armour Plate for M3 Cruiser
Tanks", 17JuIy 1941.
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of the Ram exceeded the operating limits of any Canadian-made transmission. Co-axial
gun mounts for the 2-pounder gun, with their attached 65mm armour shield, were coming
from the York Safe and Lock Company ofNew York City, and Continental Motors had
the tank's R-975 engines, fittings, and spares on order at their Ohio factory.5 Many other
parts for the initial production run of tanks were arriving from US manufacturers because
so many components of the Ram's running gear, fighting compartment, and engine
compartment were identical to those of the US M3 Lee (and the UK M3 Grant) tanks; the
list of items and suppliers for these parts ran to six single-spaced legal-sized pages.
Later on, for the Ram II model, Canadian manufacturers would produce many of the
same designs under license.
Often, these parts arrived in advance of the formal signing of contracts. The Dominion
Foundries contract was signed in July of 1941 ; the contract for gun mounts with York
Safe was finalized in October of the same year.7 Other contracts were only agreed to
well after the production of the tanks was underway, many of them being modified as
specifications and parts requirements changed.
4 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1A-1, "Letter of Intent to Iowa Transmission Go.," 3 April 1941. This
Letter was later superseded by US Government Contract DA-W-271 -ORD- 137.
5 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1 A-l-17, Contract Canada No. 171 with the York Safe and Lock Co.,
dated 15 October 1941, and File 20-LV IA-I in the same box, Contract Canada No. 193 with
Continental Motors Corporation, dated 28 November 1942.
6 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1, addendum to "Minutes of Meeting held at Willard
Hotel - November 13, 1940," dated 14 November 1940.
7 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1 A-1 1 , Contract [unnumbered] with Dominion Foundries and Steel
Ltd., op. cit., and File 20-LV1A-1-17 in the same box, Contract Canada No. 171 with the York
Safe and Lock Co., op. cit.
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The expansion of the works at MLW to construct the Montreal Tank Arsenal was covered
by a contract for $200,000 US to be paid to ALCO for its "General and Administrative
Expenses and Direct Charges" over the period of 23 October 1940 to 31 December
1 941 .8 Further sums would be paid out over the course of the production programme,
but this was the figure for the initial investment at MLW. Later on in the year, several
tracts of land adjoining the Arsenal were expropriated to create a testing ground for the
tanks, simulating the conditions that they could be expected to face in action.
On 22 April 1941, Lt-General Taber, Brigadier Carr, Colonel Morrison, and Major Evans
visited the ALCO plant at Schenectady, New York, not only to examine the plant and its
production methods, but also to attend the ceremonial roll-out of the first production US
M3 Lee. The tank was essentially an olive-drab-painted shell, lacking radios, much of
the inside wiring, internal stowage, vision devices, and correct gun mounts, but it had
been mocked-up sufficiently to look complete for the press cameras at the presentation
ceremony.10 Within two weeks, the first M3 tanks emerged from the other US
production lines at the Baldwin Locomotive shops in Eddystone, Pennsylvania, and the
Detroit Tank Arsenal; however, something that was not revealed to the press was that the
same single transmission assembly powered the first two tanks out into public view. The
shortage of parts was so acute that no sooner had the first M3 returned inside the factory
8 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1A-1, Contract [unnumbered] between ALCO and DM&S,
4 September 1942.
9 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV 1 A-I , various notices dealing with property expropriation through
the offices of the City of Montreal. The expropriated land was returned to the owners on
20 December 1945.
10 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Maj. M.M. (Max) Evans for D.O.S. (M). to
D./M.G.O., "Visit to American Locomotive Company, Schenectady, U.S.A.", 22 April 1941.
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at Schenectady than its transmission was unbolted from the chassis and hurriedly shipped
to Baldwin for the public presentation ofthat factory's first M3 tank.1 ' Another
transmission arrived in time to power the Detroit tank, but transmission supply problems
would continue to plague the tank production programmes in both the US and Canada for
months.
A breezy article from an issue of Time Magazine for the period is clipped into the DND
files, describing the debut of the M3 pilot model at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds and
the trials that photographers and reporters were allowed to see. The article also compared
two different hulls planned for the M3 chassis, the present one made ofbolted-together
armour plate and a cast armour type. To compare the two, Time reported, "... [the bolted,
armour-plate] M3's hull took 1,100 man-hours to fabricate. The experimental hull, cast
as a simple piece of armor, was completed in 100 man-hours."
The first machined and finished cast hull of the Modified Canadian M3 tank was shipped
to Montreal from General Steel Casting Corporation via the Delaware and Hudson
Railroad on Saturday, 3 May.13 During an 8 May meeting of the Joint Committee on
Tank Development, it was noted that the upper hull had arrived at MLW and had been
welded and bolted to the lower hull being assembled there. The first tank was estimated
1 ' Noted in Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, M3 Medium (Lee/Grant) AFV 11, (Windsor,
Berks.: Profile Publications, 196-), np.
12 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, clipping from Time magazine, "Army M3",
dated April 14, 1941.
13 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, W. Mavor, BPC, to Maj. M.M. Evans,
2 May 1941. Mavor, the Canadian technical representative at the BPC, urged Major Evans to
notify Canadian Customs of the shipment to ensure that it could be cleared through to MLW
as soon as possible.
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at seventy percent complete (less the turret) and its completion was anticipated for
sometime in June, 1941. Also at the meeting, Major Evans and Mr. L.H. Carr reported
that they had investigated the possibility of casting the lower hull of the tank, but there
appeared to be no time or labour savings involved in having a cast lower hull in place of
the already-designed rolled plate one, so it was agreed to continue with the flat-plate
version. Headlamps were to be of the same type as were installed on the Universal
Carrier, and Vickers periscopes might be installed instead of the ones used on the US M3.
Evans and Carr also thought that, if necessary, they could develop a mount for the 6-
pounder gun, as there was so much delay in getting the British to supply plans for the
assembly.
In England, at the same time, now-Brigadier Worthington was speaking with the Director
ofTank Design at Egham, trying to instil a stronger sense of purpose into the design and
fabrication team creating the new 6-pounder gun mount for tanks. He reported to Canada
that the 6-pounder mounting design was coming along but the task was handicapped on
two counts: First, because the designers did not have an actual 6-pounder gun to work
with, as the first pre-production batch of 12 were still being produced by hand at the
Woolwich Arsenal. Second, because full-scale production of the gun was not to start
until October, "no great urgency" was perceived on the British end to finish the job on
the mounting.15
14 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, Department of Munitions and Supply Joint
Committee on Tank Development with the Department of National Defence, "Proceedings of
the Twelfth Meeting," 8 May 1941.
15 LAC Microfilm T 17885, Worthington to DM&S, "Report No. 6," 21 May 1941 .
Worthington had gone to the UK as part of a Canadian "Special Mission" that was
assigned on 12 April and was in the UK from 23 April to 7 June, 1941 . The Mission was
intended to "familiarize [itself] as quickly as possible with the basic features of tank
design and problems connected with production and supply," and was made up of
Worthington, Major S.E. Morres, and D. McKay Loomis, a Technical Advisor seconded
from the Department of Munitions and Supply.16 Among the suggestions that
Worthington sent back to Canada was the UK opinion that the metal of a cast hull could
be thinned as its slope approached the horizontal, because most anti-tank projectiles
would be traveling parallel to the ground and the greater slope of the armour would
compensate for its thinness; he advised the Department of Munitions and Supply that this
was a possible line of inquiry.17 (The Russians had already exploited this principle in the
sloped hull of their excellent T-34 tank, and the Germans would later copy it in their
Panther PzKpfw V.) In other despatches he enclosed plans and drawings of new splash-
proof pistol ports that had been designed for the new British A22 Tank (later known as
the Churchill), recommending that they be used in Canadian tanks as well. (New
models of armoured vehicles would undergo "splash tests" at the earliest feasible
production stage. These were trials in which various sized projectiles were fired at the
tank to see how much punishment the armour can take, as well as to assess how
vulnerable the hatches, vision devices, and turret ring were to bullet and shell fragments
("splash") entering the tank through gaps in the armour at these vulnerable points.) More
16 LAC Microfilm T 17885, Worthington to Senior Officer, CMHQ, "Special Mission," 10 June 1941.
17 LAC Microfilm T 17885, Worthington to DM&S, "Report," 15 May 1941, and "Notes on Armour
Protection for AFVs," n.d. but probably between 23 May and 5 June, 1941 .
18 LAC Microfilm T 17885, Worthington to DM&S, "Report," 15 May 1941, "Report No. 8," 23 May
1941, and "Report No. 13," 5 June 1941.
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information on a new way of minimizing bullet splash (with full descriptions and
drawings) was sent back to Canada by Worthington, and he added the suggestion that
Canadian designers should follow British practice and put an escape hatch in the
underside of the tank's hull (an idea that was adopted early on in Ram production).19
While the first Canadian Cruiser M3 was nearing completion, the first example of the
other tank being constructed in Canada rolled off the CPR production line at the Angus
Shops in Montreal. On 22 May 1941, in the presence of an estimated 2,000 onlookers, the
first Valentine III tank to be produced outside of Britain was driven out of the shops and
showed off its capabilities to the crowd. The tank was commanded by a veteran of the
Royal Tank Regiment, Corporal Colin Stirton, and driven by Mr. J.A. Chisholm, an
assistant foreman. In a brief ceremony that was recorded for later broadcast on the CBC,
Mr. D.C. Coleman of the CPR formally handed over the tank to CD. Howe, the Minister
of the Department of Munitions and Supply, who in turn handed it over to Minister of
Defence J.L. Ralston. All of these men spoke of their admiration for the achievements of
the CPR in making the tank, and Ralston added that "the Canadian army is ready to
receive just as many as they can produce and just as fast as they can produce them."
The ceremonial roll-out of the first Canadian Cruiser M3 duly took place at the Montreal
Locomotive Works on the 30th of June. As was the case with the Valentine, it was a
19 LAC Microfilm T 17885, Worthington to DM&S, "Report," 15 May 1941.
20 Anonymous, "First Tank Produced at CPR Angus Shops/' Canadian Transportation (July, 1941) :
371-372. As noted above, this did not happen. Most of the 1420 CPR-produced Valentines
went to Britain and Russia under Lend-Lease. Only the first 30 were kept by the Canadian
Army, and those solely for training and evaluation. See B.T. White, Valentine, Infantry Tank
MkIII, AFV 6 (Windsor, Berks.: Profile Publications, 196-), np.
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spectacle staged for the staff of the Works as well as for the cameras of the local
newspapers, with the tank bursting dramatically through "a huge poster depicting M3's
advancing into battle." Corporal Stirton of the RTR was again present, this time acting as
the driver of the tank, and many media accounts emphasized that he had been a veteran of
the Dunkirk fighting and evacuation. Many of those involved in the tank production
programme were there to see the tank's debut, including Mr. L.E. Carr, Brigadier N.O.
Carr, Mr. G.L. Evans, Dr. R.E. Jamieson, Lt-Golonel W. Mavor, and Colonel H.E. Taber
CD. Howe and J.L. Ralston were there as well, representing their respective
departments.21
Howe, in his speech to the crowd, said that this was only the first ofmany tanks to come
and noted that there were already several other partially constructed tanks on the Works
production line. Concerned about complacency in Canadian industry, he went on to warn
that
Continued production can only be achieved by a
steady flow of components from all parts of central
Canada. A strike in any one of 20 plants would stop
this production line. Both workmen and management
must see to it that nothing will occur that will cause
delay to the production of these tanks. I have every
confidence that the flow of components of this plant
will not be interrupted by any cause whatsoever.
21 Leslie C. Powell, "Steel Monster Makes Its Debut At Montreal Locomotive Works," The Gazette
(Montreal), 1 July 1941, 1 and 15, Anonymous, "Big Cruiser Turned Over To Ralston and Howe,"
The Montreal Daily Star, 2 July 1941, 15, and Anonymous, "Montreal Locomotive Works
Producing Cruiser Tanks," Canadian Transportation (August, 1941): 435-436.
22 Quoted, at least partially and word-for-word, in each of the above-mentioned stories in The Gazette,
The Montreal Daily Star, and Canadian Transportation, suggesting that all article writers took
it from an official press release.
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In his speech, J.L. Ralston congratulated the plant workers for their dedication in getting
'j'y
the first tank out nearly two months ahead the date specified in the contract.
The Canadian Cruiser M3 prototype did not stay in Montreal for too long after its
unveiling. On 14 June 19.41, a request had come from the US Ordnance Department for
the loan of the prototype "Cruiser M3" tank (upon its completion), for trials at the
Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland.24 The Tank Development Committee had
approved the request on the 19th of June, considering that it would be a good opportunity
for the US to test British and Canadian design ideas, as well as to get constructive
criticism from the trials.25 On the 12th of July, only two weeks after it's roll-out from the
Montreal Locomotive Works, the Cruiser M3 was shipped from Montreal to Maryland.
The tank crewmen who were to demonstrate the tank went down as well. As the United
States was still officially neutral, the tankmen had to have passports with US visas and
wear civilian clothes to cross the border, carrying their uniforms in their luggage to wear
at Aberdeen. Initial trials began on the 21st of July, lasting into the next month.26
During the Aberdeen tests, the Americans requested that the Cruiser M3 be allowed to
undergo further trials at the US Armor School at Ft. Knox, Kentucky. R.A. Macfarlane
(of the Directorate of Mechanization) gave permission for moving the tank "to wherever
23 Anonymous, "Montreal Locomotive Works Producing Cruiser Tanks," Canadian Transportation
(August, 1941): 436.
24 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, R.A. Macfarlane, D. Mech to the Military Attaché,
U.S. Legation, Ottawa, "Canadian M-3 Modified Cruiser Tank;' 13 August 1941.
25 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Crerar to Ralston. 4 July 1941.
26 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Mavor to Macfarlane, 7 July 1941.
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US Ordnance wants", only asking in return that the Canadian Legation in Washington be
kept informed of the whereabouts of the Cruiser M3 and its crew.27 After its stay at Ft.
Knox, the tank was returned to Aberdeen for armour and splash tests.
The tank was returned by rail from Aberdeen to Montreal in early November, having set
out on the 21st of October.29 Even before its return, a report on the first set of tests at
Aberdeen had been sent back to Canada by Corporal C. Stirton, the senior member of the
tank crew. These trials had tested the running and operation of the tank, not its
armament. Generally good results were obtained from the tests, and various
improvements were suggested for the fighting compartment, especially a "driver's body
belt" that would help the driver to stay in his seat when the Cruiser M3 was going down
steep slopes. The sole negative note in his report was that of an engine fire that occurred
near the end of the testing. Fire extinguishers in the tank's engine compartment failed to
function and Aberdeen's local fire department had to be called in; it took them 10
minutes to arrive but they quickly put out the fire. (When tested later, the extinguishers
worked; it appeared that the handles were not pulled hard enough to activate them the
first time.) Damage to the tank was minimal, mainly scorching of the paintwork around
the engine compartment. The apparent cause of the fire was that the "near side" [left]
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, R.A. Macfarlane, D. Mech to the Military Attaché,
U.S. Legation, Ottawa, "Canadian M-3 Modified Cruiser Tank," 13 August 1941, op. cit.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, C.G.S. to Canadian Military Attaché, Washington,
D.C.,2 September 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, D. Mech to K. AuIt, Tank Production Department,
21 October, 1941.
muffler had fallen out of position and blew hot exhaust gasses back over the engine,
igniting spilled gasoline there.3
A Canadian Army representative, Captain H.W. Steel, also attended the Aberdeen and Ft.
Knox trials and reported his findings (to Ottawa as well as to Dr. Jamieson and Mr. G.I.
Evans at the Montreal Locomotive Works) upon his return to Canada in November with
the tank.31 Steel's report was more detailed than Corporal Stirton's had been, the test
results itemized on a form that the US Ordnance Department had created for testing its
own tanks. Most of the observations about the tank were graded as either "satisfactory"
or "very satisfactory", but the perceived shortcomings of the tank were listed in detail.
The report noted that the vision devices on the tank were inadequate, especially for the
driver. When his armour hatch was closed, his field of view was very restricted, a small
slit in the hatch allowing him only limited vision to the front of the tank; when the hatch
was opened, it was far too large and the driver was unprotected, even by a sheet of glass,
from dust and debris. Also, the driver had no side-vision slots or rear-view mirror, so he
would have to depend heavily on the tank commander for directions on any alteration of
course. Other flaws that affected the driver were that the clutch and transmission, located
near his legs, would overheat his compartment during moderate and prolonged use and
30 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, enclosure report by CpI. C. Stirton in letter from
K. AuIt, Tank Production Department, D.M.S., to Lt. F.W. Findlay, D.N.D., October 3, 1941.
31 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Dr. R.E. Jamieson, Department of Munitions and
Supply, to J.V. Young, D/M.G.O., November 1, 1941. In the letter Jamieson misspells Steel as
"Steele".
32 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Capt. H.W. Steel to Lt.-Col. Mavor, D.O.S.(T.S-),
Ottawa, 12 November 1941.
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that on one occasion it burned his leg when he leaned it against the transmission housing.
It was also found that the seats of the driver and the co-driver/cupola gunner were badly
located, interfering with the movements that they would be expected to make in combat,
and that the driver's steering rods needed to be repositioned to avoid being fouled
(interfered with) by the co-driver's feet. The pistol ports were difficult to operate and the
side hatches were not adequately armoured against bullet splash. And the official opinion
of the US Ordnance observers was that the tank definitely needed to have a gyro-
stabilizer fitted to the main gun, to allow it to fire while the tank was on the move.
In field trials, the vibration set up by the tracks while traveling on roads caused the main
turret to traverse from side to side on its ring, and a lock for the traverse mechanism was
suggested as a remedy. The tank was comparatively inconspicuous by day, its low
silhouette allowing it to use folds in terrain and other ground cover for greater
concealment; but by night, its exhaust system gave off flashes of light that clearly
signaled its location. Also at night, the external lighting on the tank was too weak to be
used by the crew for driving, and it was considered that a siren would be better suited to
the tank than the low-volume automobile horn currently fitted.34
In the engine compartment, the fuel lines tended to vibrate loose from their fittings, and
more insulation against heat was needed over the gas tanks. Both mufflers were
34Ibid.
considered to be badly placed and, as noted earlier, one of them had come loose and
caused an engine fire.35
Overall it was considered that there were many shortcomings in the tank, but that was to
be expected in a prototype vehicle, and most of them were easily fixable. The main goal
now was to incorporate the fixes into the plans for the subsequent production vehicles,
while ensuring that these fixes did not result in further problems. There are no records of
the 2-pounder gun having been tested while in the United States, which speaks of a
strange complacency on the part of Canadian authorities—unless the knowledge that
"war" versions of the M3 were going to be equipped with the 6-pounder gun made them
think it unnecessary.
Construction of Canadian Cruiser M3s continued while the prototype was being
evaluated in Aberdeen. Scheduled production was projected as 4 M3s in September
1941, 8 in October, 16 in November and 24 in December, for a total of 52 (excluding the
prototype) by the end of the year.36 But in early August, one of the events that had so
concerned CD. Howe in his speech—a labour strike at a parts supplier—had come to
pass. It was a United States supplier: A strike at the Mack Truck Company temporarily
stopped the shipment of tank transmissions to Canada. The Canadian Military Attaché in
Washington was asked to get the War Department to maintain deliveries on time,
diverting transmissions to Canada from another manufacturer if necessary.37 In the event,
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, D. Mech to D.S.D., 17 September 1941.
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this measure was needed because the strike ended on August 1 8th. But it starkly
demonstrated how vulnerable Canadian tank construction was to elements beyond the
control of the constructors, and even of the Canadian government.
Also in August, the second prototype hull arrived from the United States and was sent to
Valcartier, Quebec, for firing range trials. In reports, the hull casting was considered to
be free of flaws and well-finished. It was subjected to 2-pounder fire at various ranges
and offered comparable protection to armour plate of the same thickness. The most
vulnerable area of the hull appeared to be the lower part of the casting, as this was where
it was at its thinnest, only 1 1A" thick. Mr. J.M. Ireton, the Inspection Officer for Tanks,
said, "All shots at normal showed good petalling effect on the face of the casting, and
very little tendency to spalling on the back."38 This meant that the armour was fulfilling
its role, sacrificing itself through flaking (petalling) on the outer surfaces, yet not
separating into layers and fragmenting on the inside face of the armour (spalling). Of 41
shots fired at the hull with 2-pounder armour-piercing shot (solid) rounds, most only
caused surface damage to the armour. Six shots caused the armour to crack, but did not
penetrate; four shots resulted in pinhole penetrations, holing but not entering the tank;
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Brig. Stuart (V.C.G.S.) to the Military Attaché,
Canadian Legation, Washington, D.C., 14 August 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Inspector-General of the Inspection Board of the
U.K. and Canada to Colonel G.P. Morrison, Director ofResearch, Ottawa, "Firing Trial Reports
on Hull #2 and Turret of Cruiser Tank M3," 29 August 1941. One of the cast turrets was sent as
well, but though there is a summary sheet referring to it, the file does not contain any information
referring to what firing trials were performed on it.
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and only 5 shots resulted in penetration, piercing the armour through. This was deemed
to be an excellent result; but on the Axis side, the standard German antitank guns were
now the 50 mm PaK 38 and the 75 mm PaK 40, with shot weights of4 pounds 9 ounces
and 1 5 pounds respectively, both with much higher penetrating power than the British
2-pounder shot.40 Both shots would be able to punch through the M3's armour with ease.
In late September 1941, War Supplies Limited (the Crown Corporation set up for selling
war materiel to Allied countries) received a request for an M3 Modified Cruiser Tank
hull casting from AMTORG, the Soviet trading organization. By now, War Supplies had
plenty of the hulls available, and asked the Department of Munitions and Supply if there
were any objections to the sale. The Department of Munitions and Supply in turn asked
the Master-General of the Ordnance if the hull was a secret weapon; also, if the Soviets
liked the hull and wanted to buy more, would their request for additional hulls put a strain
on US production?41 Ultimately, the MGO said that if the United States (as the producer)
had no objection to the sale, then Canada did not.42 Unfortunately, there does not appear
to be any further correspondence in the files, so the outcome of the Soviet request is not
known.
39 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Inspector-General of the Inspection Board of the
U.K. and Canada to Colonel G.P. Morrison, Director of Research, Ottawa, "Firing Trial Reports
on Hull #2 and Turret of Cruiser Tank M3," 29 August 1941, attachment.
40 For a discussion of these weapons, see http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/50mm/index.html and
http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt07/pak40.html , both accessed 4 September 2009. See also
Bruce Culver, PzKpfw HI in Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1988), 23 and
33, for the early adoption dates in tanks of the German 50 and 75 mm guns. PaK is an acronym
for Panzerabwehrkanone, anti-tank gun.
41 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Beamish (DM&S) to Young (D/M.G.O.),
27 September 1941.
42 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Young (D/M.G.O.) to Beamish (DM&S),
8 October 1941.
Plans were also being made for modifications to future models of the Canadian Cruiser
Medium Mk 3, in accordance with British War Office (WO) plans. The decreed policy of
the WO was that ten per cent of tanks in armoured formations were to be dedicated to
Close Support (CS) work with the infantry, and as such needed to be equipped with a
dual-purpose gun (a gun that could fire both antitank and antipersonnel ammunition). To
conform to this requirement, the CS Cruiser Mk 3s would be equipped with either the US
75 mm gun or the UK 3-inch howitzer, when the tanks and the guns became available.
Each of the guns was able to fit inside the 60-inch turret ring of the tank, though the
larger size of the gun meant it would be a tight fit for the crew if the turret were not
redesigned and enlarged.43 This requirement for CS-gunned tanks was ultimately
dropped by the WO, but not before a great deal more correspondence was exchanged on
the matter.
By mid-October the first 12 tanks in the production run had successfully been "joined"
(had the upper and lower hull halves welded and bolted together) but the only tank that
was actually complete was Hull #1 , still at Aberdeen under test. All of the other tanks
still lacked full equipment, and none were ready to be passed for inspection or to be
issued to troops.44 The first 10 tanks off of the production line were to be sent to A8
CACTC in Ontario for training; the balance of the first order was to go to the 5th
Canadian Armoured Division, training in southern England.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Canmilitry to Defensor, 12 August 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, Montreal Locomotive Works to MGO, "Progress
Report No. 1 -M3 Modified Cruiser Tank," 14 October 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, D.S.D. to D. Mech, 2 October 1941.
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Around the same time, General H.D.G. Crerar sent a personal letter to Lt-General A.G.L.
"Andy" McNaughton, commander of the Canadian forces in England, keeping him
informed about the progress of Canadian tank manufacture and the tests that the tank had
been undergoing in both Canada and the United States. He told him that the US War
Department trials had revealed some minor problems, but otherwise the tank was
considered to be structurally and mechanically sound. He went on to add:
The U.S. War Department have now produced a pilot
model of the M.4 Cruiser. This model is a development
of our Canadian M.3. It has a cast upper hull which is
an improvement on our present hull, and a cast turret.
It has a 69-inch turret ring in place of the 60-inch ring
in the Canadian M.3. The turret can take either a U.S.
75 mm. or a 6 pdr. This new model is now under order
at certain of the U.S. plants producing to British and
U.S. order. As this new model has been accepted by
the U.S. and the British and as it is a better fighting tank
than the Canadian M.3, the General Staffhas agreed to
accept it provided production is not unduly impeded.
Department of Munitions and Supply state that the
change over will not impede production and they hope to
introduce the change over at Montreal Locomotive after
production of about the 150th M.3 Canadian Cruiser.46
In late October 1941, official word went out that the tank variously known as the M3
Modified Cruiser Tank or the Medium Tank M3 (Canadian) would henceforth be known
as the Ram. The Ram I designation was reserved for tanks armed with the 2-pounder
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/1 1, personal letter from "Harry" [H.D.G. Crerar], C.M.H.Q.
to "Andy" [Lt-General A.G.L. McNaughton], 17 October 1941. Ultimately, it took far longer than
was anticipated for the production line to change over, and even then the M4 production run was
brief. After only 1 88 examples of the Canadian M4 (the "Grizzly") had been produced, its
production was halted to allow the manufacture of the Sexton self-propelled gun.
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gun, and the Ram II for those armed with the 6-pounder gun. The American
designations for the tanks recognized their advance from the M3 model and instead
placed them within the M4 Sherman series. The Ram I received the model number
M4A3, and the Ram II was to be known as the M4A5.48
During the same month the new Tank Arsenal building next to the MLW shops was
finished. Two separate main assembly lines ran most of the length of the 800-foot-long
building; sub-assembly lines ran parallel to these, terminating at the points where their
completed assemblies would be mated up with the tank hulls.49 Each of the main lines
was nearly 200 feet wide and they were separated from one another by a row of offices
down the middle of the building.
Production of each tank began on the main assembly lines where precut armour plates
were joined to form the lower hull. The cast upper hull was then lowered onto this
assembly and the two were welded and bolted together. The suspension components
(idler wheels, springs, housings, bogies, and return rollers) were attached at this stage. At
the first subassembly installation point, parts of the electrical harness were put in, gas
tanks and fire extinguishers were installed in the engine compartment, and ammunition
LAC Microfilm T- 1 2 1 8 1 , memo from War Office to Director ofAFVs and many other recipients,
28 October 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, Maj. L.M. Hart, Canadian Army Staff, Washington, DC,
to Maj. E.D. James, Director ofMechanization, Ottawa, "Specifications and Photographs: Ram I
and Ram II Tanks," 4 September 1 942 .
The information in this and the following two paragraphs comes from Anonymous, "Montreal
Locomotive Works Tank Production," Canadian Transportation (November, 1942), 625-627.
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stowage racks and the steering and control systems were installed in the fighting
compartment.
Next came the transmission, secured at the front of the fighting compartment within its
heavy bolted cover, followed by the front-side fenders with their external stowage bins.
The motors were then installed, and also the driveshaft connecting the transmission to the
main engine.50 This was followed by the fitting of the turret basket and the turrets, and at
the very end of the line the tracks were installed. The tank would then be driven out of
the factory on a short test run to check that everything was operating as it should. (A
purpose-built Tank Testing Ground which duplicated that of the Aberdeen Proving
Ground was created near the Arsenal the following year, to assess the tanks more
realistically.)51 The tank would then return to the Arsenal, any faults discovered would
be corrected, and it would be painted and have its guns installed prior to being handed
over to the Army.
50 The main engine and the auxiliary generator were both in the engine compartment, but the motor
that powered the turret was attached to the turret ring, inside the fighting compartment.
51 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-Ll VA-I, "City of Montréal;" 1 December 1941. Land
expropriated "for the purpose of a Tank Testing Ground" on 1 December 1941 was returned
to the owners (or their estates) on 20 December 1945. .After the City ofMontreal, the
Montreal Industrial Land Co. Ltd. and the Canadian National Railways owned the bulk of the
land, with a handful of individuals owning smaller plots—see the blueprints and contracts in
other files in this series dated 5 December 1945.
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Chapter 4: Growing Pams
With the new Tank Arsenal building complete, it was anticipated that the output of tanks
from the plant would speed up considerably. In mid-December 1 941 , as part of a
measure to ensure greater control over the construction process, the Department of
Munitions and Supply took over all of the contract arrangements for the manufacture of
tanks. The ad hoc methods that had prevailed up to that time, with contracts let by the
DND as well as by the Department, were discarded and the new sole responsibility of the
DM&S was formalized by the Privy Council and the Treasury for greater accountability.
One reason for this stemmed from problems in production at MLW. Soon after the
DM&S takeover, a report on MLW detailed a lack ofurgency and a seeming indifference
towards efficient tank production until that time. The Master-General of the Ordnance
noted that there had been continued delays in finalizing the tank's stowage arrangements
and construction drawings. He complained that MLW had frequently missed deadlines,
and tanks that were to be ready by the end of August had had their completion date
pushed back to the 4th of October, and then delayed again (as of the report's writing)
until the new year [1942]. It was strongly urged that the Department of Munitions and
Supply use its new powers to exercise more control over tank construction at MLW.
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 5, Internal Treasury Office Memorandum "Re:
Montreal Locomotive Works tank contract, your file HQ CTO 296," dated 17 December 1941.
The discussions had begun in July; see LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 5,
D.K. Sheils, Deputy Minister, DM&S, to Col H. DesRosiers, Deputy Minister, DND, 25 July
1941, plus subsequent letters in the file.
2 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 11, M.G.O. to DM&S, 22 November 1941.
In addition to production delays, faults in assembly were found in tanks that did get
despatched from MLW. Reports were made of a number of potentially serious errors in
the installation of fittings within the fighting compartment. In one tank, a smoke bomb
holder was installed so that it blocked the right-side escape door. Ammunition racks
were incorrectly sited because overlarge angle iron was used in their mounting; access to
2-pounder ammunition was impeded by the wrong positioning of an ammunition box
bracket and the radio spares box; and turret hatch catches were installed in reverse,
protruding into the tank interior. In many cases it seemed as ifplans were not being used
as instructions to be followed exactly in the tank's construction, but rather were mere
suggestions, leaving it up to the workers at MLW to put together the tanks as they
wanted.3
All of these problems raised concerns within the DND, and Defense Minister Ralston
sent a questioning memo to CD. Howe about the Locomotive Works' competence to
build tanks. In his response, Howe admitted "for once that the DM&S has fallen down"
but he added that because of the recent reorganization at MLW, it was hoped that tank
production and delivery would work more smoothly from then on.
But another difficulty arose that would continue to trouble Ram production for much of
the following year. The delivery of engines and transmissions from the United States,
originally thought to have been of no concern by the members of the Dewar Mission
3 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, M.G.O. to MLW, 2 December 1941.
4 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, Howe to Ralston, "Ram I and Ram II Cruiser
Tanks," 2 December 1941.
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when designing the tank around these components, was a source ofworry at the
Department of Munitions and Supply.5 Projected delivery schedules of these two
components were going to fall short of requirements as tank production increased over
the next year at MLW.
One reason for this was the enormous demand being placed on American industry.
President Roosevelt, with a brief declaration in September 1941 , had doubled the planned
output for tanks for the next year.6 As a dramatic gesture made in response to the
German invasion of Russia, it was fine political theatre. But at the time there was
insufficient American production capacity to keep up with his new requirements, and this
was recognized by industry if not in the political world.
The public and most Congressmen simply do not
understand the time element in industrial production of
munitions. They must be told again and again until
they do understand why it takes time to build tanks,
guns and planes. They must realize that wars are won
in factories years before the conflict in the field.
A second and more serious reason was that the War Department in the US was allocating
a lower priority of deliveries to MLW, due to a perceived slowness of production at the
5 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2597, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 . "Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Willard Hotel on
Wednesday, November 13th, at 10 A.M. To Discuss Questions ofDemarcation Between Material
To be Supplied to Tank Erectors and Material which They will have to provide for themselves,"
op. cit., 8.
6 Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The
Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents,
1955), 232. Roosevelt did this against the advice of his technical advisors, but they were bound
by his decision.
7 Factory Management and Maintenance, n.d., quoted in Time Magazine, "Production: Facts without
Fooling," October 21, 1940. Accessed 18 August 2009 at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,88 1 6,777437,00.html .
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Canadian shops. Major J.R.K. Taylor, the Canadian Army Procurement Officer in
Washington, DC, requested that Canada remedy this by asking the US for a larger supply
of engines and transmissions. He also noted that, "As pointed out in our letter of
yesterday, the U.S. tank manufacturers report a tank completed as soon as the work on
the runner tank only isfinished, and add the armament, optical instruments and fittings,
afterwards."8 [Italics added.] By contrast, in Canada a tank was only considered
complete when everything had been installed and it had been issued with an Inspection
Receipt Voucher by the Inspection Board. Discussions on this difference between
national practices followed between the Department of Munitions and Supply and
Montreal Locomotive Works, and finally the Director of Mechanization asked if Canada
should change its policy to conform to that of the United States.9 It was proposed that
two sets ofbooks be kept, one for the Americans and one for Canadian use, but this was
eventually dismissed as being too unwieldy and likely to cause confusion.1 As a stop-
gap solution, a section of the Montreal Locomotive Works was roped off so that tanks
which conformed to American standards could be placed there and reported to the US as
"delivered".1 ' Ultimately it was decided that Canada would continue its current practice,
but she would make sure that the United States understood the reason for the apparent
8 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, Major J.R.K. Taylor to Colonel R.W. Johnson,
DM&S c/o MLW, "Transmissions and Engines for Canadian Cruiser (M3 Modified) Tanks,"
13 November 1941.
9 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, R.A. Macfarlane (D. Mech) to B.D. Beamish,
Director of Tank Production, DM&S , 27 November 1 94 1 .
10 See the following documents in LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 3: Major J.R.K.
Taylor, Army Procurement Officer, Washington, to Col. R.E. Johnson, Technical Officer,
Montreal, 12 November 1941; E.D. James to D/MGO, 24 November 1941; and Kingsley AuIt,
DM&S, to Lt. CL. Fraser, D. Mech, 4 December 1941.
11 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 1, "Minutes of the StaffMeeting, Washington
Representatives of Canadian Government," Meeting No. 23, 24 December 1941.
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discrepancy in output figures between MLW and the various tank production plants in the
United States.
A further meeting held in Washington noted that the problem was by no means solved.
Canada was allocated only 12 transmissions in December, even though the Iowa
Transmission Company was producing from 75 to 80 per month. Also, Canada was
allocated 6 tank engines for the entire month ofNovember, but Continental was
producing 20 of them per day. Apparently, the different standards regarding when tanks
were deemed "completed" had not yet been communicated to the US War Department.
Major Taylor asked if some War Department officials could be invited to Canada to see
how well the Ram programme was going, and thus get them to release the supplies. It
should be noted here that American tank assembly plants were not immune to parts
shortages. During one 19-day period in September 1941, Chrysler's Detroit Tank
Arsenal received only four engines from Wright, an event noted as "disturbing" by its
vice-president of operations, H.L. Weckler.1
Meanwhile, design work was proceeding on the Ram II prototype, with field trials being
carried out at Petawawa Military Camp. The new 6-pounder gun was test-fired (with
Canadian-made ammunition) in a mock-up mount and found to be "highly satisfactory"
12 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, "Minutes of the StaffMeeting, Washington
Representatives of the Canadian Government," Meeting No. 18,21 November 1941. The problem
ofperceived inadequate tank output at MLW continued to be discussed into 1942. See
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, "Minutes of the StaffMeeting, Washington
Representatives of Canadian Government," Meeting No. 30, 26 February 1942 for more
discussion of Canadian worries on this matter.
13 Wesley W. Stout, Tanks are Mighty Fine Things (Detroit: Chrysler Corporation, 1 946), 36. Accessed
November 26, 2009 at http://imperialclub.com/Yr/1945/46Tanks/Page036.htm .
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by senior officers.14 In the course of these trials, recommendations were made on
redesigning the turret basket to give more room to the tank commander and the gunner in
action, as well as permitting the gunner faster access to ready-use ammunition. Further
suggestions discussed the repositioning of various control wheels and levers to be within
easier reach of the gunner and the loader, as well as to lower the driver's seat by 3
inches.15 On the outside of the tank, a redesign of the upper hull for better protection of
the turret ring was considered a prerequisite before further production was started. One
other outcome was the proposal that a User's Committee be formed that would evaluate a
full-scale wooden model of the tank, made from design drawings prior to production. By
examining this mock-up from the point ofview of the crew's comfort and convenience,
the Committee could pass on its recommendations to "the Tank Design people" so that
flaws in the design could be caught and fixed before any metal had been cut or cast.
For the Canadian Army, it was an unfortunate fact of life that heavy dependence on US
sources of supply meant that American approval of the Ram II design was necessary in
order to procure parts from American manufacturers. By the 2nd of December, 1941, the
Ram mockup was ready for viewing by United States Ordnance representatives, but
14 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1, Major J.M. McAvity to various recipients, "Report on
Visit to Petawawa", 7 November 1941 .
15 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1, Major J.M. McAvity to various recipients, "Report on
Observations of Ram 2 - M.3 (Modified) Cruiser Tank - Trials held at Petawawa Camp, 3 Nov
41", 5 November 1941, and LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-11 Vol. 3, J.A. McCann,
"Report on No.2 Cruiser Tank M3 (Canadian) at Petawawa Camp - Ont", 6 November 1941.
16 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 3, Victor Sinon, M.G.O., to B.D. Beamish, DM&S,
"Ram II Tanks", 1 2 November 1 94 1 .
17 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1 , Major J.M. McAvity to various recipients, "Report on
Visit to Petawawa", op. cit. The User's Committee eventually came into being later on, but
usually only managed to make its suggestions after equipment had been designed, making it
necessary to retrofit tanks with their improvements rather than introduce them before production.
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repeated delays prevented this from happening until late in January, 1942. Nonetheless,
production of major Ram II components such as the turrets and upper hulls had continued
to be made at and shipped from American foundries, and Ram Hs began to emerge from
the Montreal Locomotive Works in early 1942.
In December, further reports on the Ram's Aberdeen trials arrived from Captain H.W.
Steele and the US Ordnance, both confirming Steele and Corporal Stirton's original
reports (described above) that the tank was generally good, but could be improved in
many ways.19 It was noted that this was only to be expected in a prototype, especially for
a tank that was constructed in haste by an inexperienced workforce. The Army
Engineering Design Branch (A.E.D.B.) had asked for two specific improvements, the
first being more protection against splash around the turret ring (as noted above), and the
second requesting a greater degree of depression for the main gun. Dr. Jamieson, on
behalf of D. Mech and the MGO, responded that because only about 20% of the turret
ring could be protected (and that in an unproved manner), the effort of such protection
was not worth proceeding with. However, main gun depression was deemed an issue
worthy of consideration. A maximum depression of "as near to 1 5° as possible" was
desired in both frontal and broadside firing, but the actual maximum achieved in those
18 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 3, Colonel R.B. Gibson, D.M.O. & I., to Brigadier
H.F.G. Letson, Military Attaché, Canadian Legation, Washington, 25 November 1941, and
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, Major E.D. James, D. Mech, to
B.D. Beamish, DM&S, 9 January 1942. Most of these delays were caused by the sudden entry
of the United States into the war.
19 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 2, H.W. Steel, CAC, Camp Borden, to Lt-CoI. W.
Mavor, D.O.S.(T.S.), Ottawa, "Report on Performance Tests ofRam I at Aberdeen Proving
Ground," 12 November 1941. See also LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2,
Department of Munitions and Supply Joint Committee on Tank Development with the Department
ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting," 1 1 December 1941, and LAC
RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, Letson to Secretary, DND Army, "First Report on
Canadian Medium TankM3," ca. 12 December 1941.
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directions was only 10°. When firing the gun to the rear, the high silhouette of the rear
hull limited depression in that direction to a theoretical maximum of 7° 30', and in
practice even less because of interference by rear-deck stowage. D. Mech hoped that
AEDB could come up with a better place than the rear deck to stow the tank's
camouflage nets and tarpaulins. At any rate, greater overall gun depression could only be
increased through a major redesign of the hull and turret.20 (Splash tests were later
performed on the sponson doors (but not the turret ring) of a production Ram I hull.
Standard .30 caliber ball ammunition was fired from 25 feet away by a Browning M. 191 9
A4 machine-gun; these tests were conducted on both an unmodified tank, and (later) on
the same tank which had been equipped with a supplementary 5/8" mild steel ring around
the inside of the sponson hatches. In many places, the ring improved the protection
against bullet splash and would have prevented injury to the crew.21) Further splash tests
were performed on a different Ram I at Valcartier with the same type ofmachine gun and
ammunition, but this time from a range of only 10 to 12 feet. Bullet splash was more
severe in these tests, possibly because of the closer positioning of the machine-gun to the
tank. Its effect was most marked at points where the armour joined or was compromised
in some way, among them the pistol ports, the machine-gun cupola face, the driver's
vision door, the top edge of the mantlet and its machine-gun air vent, and the upper turret
20 LAC RG24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, D.S.D. to C.G.S., 2 January 1942, and
LAC RG24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, D. Mech to the Director-General of the
Army Engineering Design Branch, 8 January 1942.
21LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, V.W.G. Wilson, A.E.D.B., to Major E.D. James,
M.G.O., "Splash Proofing of Side Doors Ram II Tanks," 20 January 1942, and LAC RG 24 Vol.
9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, Major J.L. McAvity, M.G.O. Experimental Committee,
to various recipients, "Splash Trials of Sponson Doors Ram Tanks," 6 February 1942.
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hatch, especially where the two hatch halves met in the middle. It was estimated that all
of the crew would have become casualties from the splash.
Following the satisfactory firing trials of the 6-pr. gun at Petawawa, a contract was let
with the Canadian Car and Foundry Company for the manufacture of 1 , 1 07 6-pr Tank
Gun Recoil Systems. Deliveries were to start on the first of February, 1942 "at the best
rate possible", and would increase to an eventual rate of 50 per week until all were
delivered.23 The contract was issued despite the fact that the existing design of the 6-
pounder elevating gear, and its proposed re-work, still did not permit the incorporation of
the gyro-stabilizer, and it did not allow the gunner to use his telescopic sights while
elevating or traversing the gun. Major J.L. McAvity of the Department of Munitions and
Supply suggested redesigning the elevating gear by using a similar mechanism to that of
the 37 mm gun mounted in the US M3 turret, which had already been worked out and
found satisfactory.24
In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, war production in
Canada and the United States was integrated to higher levels. On 16 December 1941 , it
was decreed that Rams were to have US War Department numbers as well as Canadian
22 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, Major J.L. McAvity, M.G.O. Experimental Committee,
to various recipients, "Bullet Splash Trial Ram I Tank," 20-21 February 1942. These tests were
carried out on Ram 1 41-1-3609 .
23 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, G.I. Evans, Director of Tank Design to R.E.
Jamieson, "Test of the Six Pounder Gun and Mount in the No. 2 Cruiser Tank M-3," 12 November
1941, and LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1A-1, Contract M.P. 1 1 1 between DM&S and
Canadian Car and Foundry Ltd. for 6-pdr. Recoil Systems, issued 1 December 1942.
24 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, Major J.L. McAvity to J.V. Young, DMGO,
"Elevating Gear 6-pdr Ram Tank," 3 December 1941. Young repeated this letter verbatim to
Beamish, 10 days later.
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Department of National Defence numbers. The WD numbers [T38781 to T40980
inclusive] would be stamped on the manufacturer's nameplate mounted inside each tank,
and the DND numbers were to be painted on the hulls.
Throughout December 1941 and January and February 1942, discussions were taking
place over the relative merits of the Ram and the new M4 Sherman design. These
comparisons were undertaken because the Canadians would soon have to decide whether
to proceed with construction of the Ram II or to switch production over to the Sherman.
Informal discussions regarding these two options had convinced R. A. Macfarlane, the
Director of Mechanization, that the better option was to switch over to the M4. In his
opinion,
The facilities now at the disposal of the Department
of Munitions and Supply are so limited that it is
impossible for them to keep up with normal production
changes such as are occurring daily. As a consequence,
it is impossible for the Army Engineering Design
Branch to keep up with design as it progresses in the
United States and Great Britain. The result is that
whereas we are now building a tank which is
considered equivalent to the United States design,
in a year or two we will have dropped behind because
of the lack of design facilities, and will be producing
an out-moded tank.
25 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, J.V. Young D.M.G.O. to Dr. R.E. Jamieson, DG,
A.E.D.B., "Serial Number - Ram Tanks," 16 December 1941 . If the tank were to be shipped
overseas, the DND number would be painted out and the War Department number used instead
on all documents. The WD tank numbers are listed in a letter from Hoare to Jamieson,
3 December 1941.
26 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, R.A. Macfarlane, D. Mech, to M.G.O.,
26 January 1942.
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He went on to point out that Americans would continue to develop the M4 Sherman and,
because of their greater research and testing capabilities, it would soon improve faster
and more steadily than the Ram II. Also, the Canadian Army planned to eventually
employ Shermans in the Close Support role, because its larger turret ring allowed it to
mount the 75 mm gun that could fire both solid shot and high-explosive shell. This
would result in the armoured divisions having a mix of Rams and Shermans, similar but
not identical tanks, with potential difficulties in logistics and repairs for both. In
Macfarlane's opinion, it would be far better to standardize production on the M4 and
phase out the construction of Rams as soon as possible. He suggested that, to disrupt
tank production as little as possible, the Montreal Locomotive Works begin working on a
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parallel production line for M4s so that the changeover could be made smoothly.
Others involved in its production supported the Ram, noting that it was more heavily
armoured and should be able to stand up to combat better than a Sherman. Armour on
the Ram averaged 75mm in thickness, whereas plans for the Sherman showed a 60mm
thickness overall in its cast hull.28 Also, production of the new M4 tank would require
several 84-inch or 100-inch boring mills, very large machine tools which would take
approximately 5 months to build in Canada if they could not be obtained from a US
source. A decision on their acquisition was desired soon because otherwise, it was noted,
"we shall certainly require an additional run of the Ram II tanks in order not to lose
production while boring mills are being built."
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, Department ofMunitions and Supply Joint
Committee on Tank Development with the Department ofNational Defence, "Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fifth Meeting," 1 1 December 1941.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 3, Beamish to Jamieson, 2 December 1941.
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At the December meeting of the Joint Committee on Tank Development, it was estimated
that, with the heavier 6-pounder gun and mounting plate, the Ram II would weigh 64,000
pounds, fully loaded. Among the more prosaic matters on design changes dealt with was
a scheme for improved internal stowage in the Ram II turret. This could be achieved by
blocking an escape hatch but, because the right-hand sponson door had already been
blocked by the installation of a new ventilating fan, this would mean the elimination of
two escape routes for the crew. Final say on this design alteration would be left to the
DND.30 In the short term, no decision was made on acquiring the boring mills, and Ram
II production would continue. However, because of this uncertainty, the General Staff
only authorized the construction of 700 of the original 1 157 tanks at this time.31
The public began to see the Ram in press releases, the first publicity since the tank's
initial roll-out. The Toronto Evening Telegram ran a photo of tank 41-1-3600 in
December, accidentally breaking a DND embargo on pictures taken during an NFB
publicity shoot at Camp Borden. Following a minor fuss, more photos from the same
shoot were released to the media.32 Later, publicity photos of a Ram tank that had been
30 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, Department of Munitions and Supply Joint
Committee on Tank Development with the Department of National Defence, "Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fifth Meeting," op. cit. At the end of this meeting the Joint Committee on Tank
Design disbanded, it being thought that its functions could now be taken over by future
cooperation "between Army authorities, the Army Engineering Design Branch, and the
Production Branch." Its responsibilities were assumed by the Tanks Committee, which began
meeting in February 1942. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson,
"Tanks Committee Meeting," 12 February 1942. Several of the members of the first committee
retained their seats in the second one.
31 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, Major E.D. James, D. Mech, to B.D. Beamish,
Director of Tank Production, DM&S, 15 January 1942.
32 RG 24 Vol. 2598, File H.Q.S.-3352-1 1 Vol. 3, DMO and I for CGS to E.L.M. Bums, Officer
Administering, Canadian Armoured Corps, "Photographs Ram I Tanks," 1 1 December 1941.
The tank had its main armament installed but none of its machine guns were fitted.
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fitted with an engraved plate reading, "Donated by the Citizens of Kitchener and
Waterloo, Ontario", were distributed to news outlets.33
By now, preparations for transporting the first 40 Rams to England were being
undertaken on both sides of the Atlantic. London cabled Ottawa asking for the outside
dimensions of the new tanks, so that the War Office could supply transport for them
when they landed in England.34 This information was crucial for logistics purposes.
Because of the damage that tank tracks can do to civilian roads, and more importantly
(from a military standpoint) because of the damage that excessive travel can inflict on a
tank's tracks, tanks are usually transported to a battle zone on railway flatcars or on
special road trailers. For the Ram, as for most tanks, both methods were used. The
vehicles were loaded onto railway flatcars and transported to the railhead nearest to their
destination, and then transferred to road hauliers for final delivery. The dimensions of
the tanks were needed because British railway lines could only handle loads that
measured a maximum of 1 14 inches (9 feet 6 inches) wide at their widest point, due to
clearance restrictions between train carriages where the railway tracks ran side-by-side.
When both trains on parallel tracks had cars or loads ofmaximum width, the distance
between passing trains was two inches.35 If the tanks would not fit onto rail cars,
arrangement would have to be made for more road transport and thus more petrol
expenditure. Eventually the answer came back that the Ram I measured 9 feet 3 inches at
33 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, DM&S to D. Mech., 4 February 1942.
34 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2600, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 8, Canmilitry to Defensor, 10 November 1941.
35 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1/2, CMHQ to Captain D. E. Magnus, Canadian Planning
Staff, War Office, 31 October 1942.
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its maximum width, and so could fit on UK rail flatcars.36 It was hoped that all 40 of the
Ram I tanks destined for England would be shipped in the month of January, but
ultimately this goal was not achieved. Only 28 were despatched by January 27th, with
the last 12 scheduled to follow as soon as shipping was available.37 All 40 had arrived in
io
the UK by the end of February.
The hostile environment that the tanks would face in transit to England called for
exacting instruction in how they were to be prepared for the voyage. Until the Longue
Pointe Ordnance Depot (in east-end Montreal, near the site of the Montreal Locomotive
Works) became operational, responsibilities for the safe delivery of the tanks were
divided up and explained by the Master-General of the Ordnance in an exactingly
detailed letter. MLW was to ensure the stowing and sealing (waterproofing) of each tank
(with the exception of the left-hand sponson door, which was to be padlocked but not
sealed), under the supervision of the Inspection Board, and was to give the Board seven
copies of the tank's packing list, which detailed any shortages or deficiencies in that
tank.39
36 Ibid.
37 LAC Microfilm T-17883, Cable (extract) from Stuart to McNaughton, 9 January 1942; LAC RG 24
Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, DND to DM&S, 26 January 1942; and (in the same file)
D. Mech. to Chief Ordnance Officer, Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot, Montreal, 27 January 1942.
38 LAC Microfilm T-17883, Lt.-Colonel WJ. Megill, GSO 1 (Staff Duties) at CMHQ, to BGS,
28 February 1942.
39 LAC RG24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Victor Sifton, M.G.O., to Mr. W.M. Townsend,
Montreal Locomotive Works, 26 January 1942.
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The Inspection Board in turn was to check the tank seals, ensure that the tank was
properly fitted out with authorized equipment, and make sure that it was tied down
properly on railway flatcars for shipping. It was also to pass on paperwork to Ordnance
that showed the status of the tank (including any deficiencies) and also to pass on one key
to the padlock on the unsealed sponson door and two copies of the "Instructions for
Entering Tank". Ordnance representatives would then place the paperwork in the tank
turret, have MLW lock and seal the left sponson door, and supervise MLWs rail
shipment of the tank to its destination.40 Once there, the tanks would have to be carefully
handled in transshipment from their rail cars to the decks of their sea transports, and
secured on board with their protection against salt water corrosion intact.
The demand for tanks meant that the pressure was on MLW to produce them as quickly
as possible but, as seen above, this meant that quality control suffered on the production
line. To remedy this Mr. Victor Sifton, the M.G.O., sent a letter to Mr. Berry, the
Director-General of the Automotive Production Branch, which detailed several of the
flaws in Ram I construction in the hope that they would not be duplicated in the Ram II.
Earlier, in an effort to get as many "runners" (tanks that could move under their own
power, but were incomplete in some way) as possible, the Director of Tank Production
had allowed tanks to be shipped out with over twenty individual defects, ranging from
running gear problems to improperly grounded radios.41 But from this point on, Sifton
announced that Department ofNational Defence policy would be
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, letter, Victor Sifton (M.G.O.) to Mr. Berry,
Director-General, Automotive Production Branch, 9 February 1942.
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(a) A tank shall be considered complete when all items
of equipment are included as determined by the "Table
of Tools and Equipment" issued by the Director-General,
Army Engineering Design Branch. Deviations and
shortages will only be permitted when notified to this
Department in writing and agreed to in writing by us. [. . .]
(b) The Inspection Board must be satisfied with all items
and no such lists as "Unsatisfactory Items" will be allowed.
42
This policy followed the already-established practice used with "B" vehicles
(unarmoured army vehicles such as trucks and automobiles), which had been in
production in Canada since the start of the war. Sifton added, no doubt with the wish
father to the thought, that "It is well known that if this policy is followed strictly, greater
efforts will be put forth by all concerned in the production of the tanks as was the case
with the "B" vehicles."43
R.A. Macfarlane backed up the M.G.O.'s argument that many faults had been accepted in
production Ram tanks in the search for quantity over quality:
A study of the defects of Ram I Tanks already produced
by Montreal Locomotive Works reveals a number ofpoints
to which inspection took exception, but which were
overlooked in order that a good production showing
could be made. A number of these defects were minor,
but unreasonable when it is considered that each tank
costs between $50,000 and $100,000. In short, the Ram I
tanks already produced are not, at present, fighting tanks
but would require considerable modification before they
would be in a fit condition to fight.
42IbJd.
43 Ibid.
44 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, Macfarlane to M.G.O., 12 February 1942.
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Macfarlane went on to repeat his earlier recommendation that the production lines at
MLW prepare to switch over to Sherman Tank construction at the earliest possible date
and thus benefit from advances made in the design by the Americans. Otherwise, he said,
"Under present conditions, much time and effort is being directed toward trying to
improve the Ram in directions which have already been covered by U.S. Ordnance."
Trying to defend itself against accusations of delays in production and deliveries, the
Montreal Locomotive Works accused the Inspection Board of unnecessarily holding up
its approval of completed Ram Hs. In response, the Board documented the results of an
inspection performed on the second of March. 14 tanks produced in the previous week
had been "passed as complete" by MLW at a noontime production meeting. At the
conclusion of the meeting, Board inspectors singled out three of the vehicles and
examined them closely. W.L. Auchinclose (the Inspector ofTanks) stated that, "To
complete the inspection on these three machines, it took until 8.30 p.m. due to Montreal
Locomotive's staffhaving so much work to do on what was presented to us as completed
machines."46
He noted that one examiner was not able to inspect "his" tank because MLW employees
were still working in it from 12.30 p.m. until 4.30 p.m., despite its having been passed for
inspection. Another tank had 21 specific faults listed, including defective tires, missing
interior stowage racks, and an interior that had not been cleaned before inspection and
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, W.L. Auchinclose to DM&S, 4 March 1942,
with enclosures.
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which was littered with "matches, cigarette boxes, paper, welding material, chips, etc."
Auchinclose attached a report which itemized the deficiencies in the inspected vehicles,
with the comment, "It would appear that the statement which Montreal Locomotive has
made during the last ten days, to the effect that they have a number of vehicles ready to
ship pending our inspection, is a mis-statement of facts which is born out by the above."
Even when parts were available, the suppliers were often unfamiliar with military
packing procedures. In January 1942 Camp Borden complained to D. Mech that machine
guns and cannons for their Rams were arriving with light coatings of rust because the
manufacturers were not shipping them packed in mineral jelly (used as a preservative).
The Inspection Board reacted quickly and suppliers were notified of the proper
procedures before the end of the month.48 Camp Borden added that they had not yet
received the official Issue Vouchers for the nine Rams they had received for troop
¦ · 49training.
In early January 1942, production at the Montreal Locomotive Works switched over to
the Ram II, even though the final design of the turret was not available because the main
guns and their mounts had not yet had their designs frozen.50 However, the demand for
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, HQ CAC Camp Borden to D. Mech, 1 January
1942.; in the same file, DND to Inspector-General, Inspection Board of the U. K. and Canada,
16 January 1942, and Inspection Board to DND, 26 January 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, HQ CAC Camp Borden to D. Mech.,
27 January 1942
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 4, handwritten memorandum from Victor Sifton
to D. Mech, 6 January 1941.
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tanks was such that even unarmed Rams would be useful for training tank troops in the
mechanical care needed for their new armoured force, and so production went ahead.
Other than the heavier armament of the 6-pounder, several changes had been made that
distinguished this model from the Ram I. (Most of these were not easily apparent from
the outside, as the hull casting remained basically unchanged until hull number 401 01 did
away with the sponson doors later in 1942.) Beginning with the first Ram II (hull CT-
3983 1), an exhaust fan replaced the pistol port in the right-hand sponson door, the
internal storage of the turret was rearranged, and a redesigned turret basket was
installed.51 While January would see few tanks produced, the Works reached its
projected production rate of 36 tanks per month for both February and March of 1942.
Stuart cabled to General McNaughton that 80 Ram Hs would be produced up to March
1 942, but they would still be missing guns and mounts. Despite McNaughton's desire to
have as many tanks as possible in England to train his troops there, Stuart had to tell him
that 60 would be kept in Canada to train the 4th Armoured Division.53
General McNaughton soon had a chance to see the parlous situation of tank production
for himself. He was brought back from his post as GOC (General Officer Commanding)
of the Canadian forces in England on a six-week publicity tour to rally support for the
war in Canada. On his first day in Montreal, among other activities, he visited the
51 The new turret basket was cylindrical rather than conical in shape and gave the gunner, loader and
tank commander more room in which to move about.
52 LAC Microfilm T-17883, Lt.-Colonel W.J. Megill, GSO 1 (StaffDuties) at CMHQ, to
BGS, 28 February 1942.
53 LAC Microfilm T-17883, Cable (extract) from Stuart to McNaughton, 9 January 1942.
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Valentine and Ram production lines in Montreal and the Dominion Engineering Works in
Longueuil, where he saw the manufacture of 6-pounder guns for the Ram II.
While the 6-pounder guns were being manufactured in quantity, the mounts for them
were not. The designs of the mantlet, the mantlet/mount adaptor plates, and the recoil
mechanisms had taken longer to finalize than had the gun, and production of these pieces
was only expected to begin around the 19th of March.55 The first of these off the line
were not examples ofmass production. Because of difficulties in the manufacturing
process, each of the first 110 mantlets produced was matched to a particular adapter plate,
rather than being interchangeable with others.56
By this time 50 Ram II tanks had been shipped overseas, less their 6-pounder guns and
mounts, which were to follow later. General Staff meetings in Ottawa determined that no
further tanks were to be shipped to the UK without their armament, so the balance of the
unfinished tanks destined for overseas were to stay at MLW until the mantlets and guns
John Swettenham, McNaughton: Vol. 2, 1939-1943 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), 196. Another of
McNaughton's goals was to organize Canadian war production on the basis of the needs of the
troops. To do so, McNaughton proposed the establishment of a Weapons Development Committee
in Ottawa, to take suggestions from the fighting troops and design weapons according to their
needs. His arguments were found to have such merit that the committee was running before
McNaughton returned to Britain, with Victor Sinon and R.E. Jamieson among its members. Ibid.,
197-198.
LAC RG24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, Meeting No. 32, "Minutes of the Staff Meeting,
Washington Representatives of Canadian Government," 12 March 1942.
See LAC RG24 Vol. 2600, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 7, D.Mech (Major B.A. Gunn) to E.C. Perley,
DM&S, 18 June 1942, and M.C. Perley to Mr. W.M. Townsend, Works Manager, MLW,
2 July 1942.
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had been fitted.57 Tanks intended for training the Armoured Divisions in Canada could
still be sent out and 47 unarmed Ram Hs were promptly dispatched to the 4th Armoured
Division at Debert, Nova Scotia.58 Soon after, 49 more Rams were sent to Canadian
destinations for familiarization and training—two to the Canadian Army Trade School in
Hamilton, one each to the Army bases at Kingston and London, 15 to Camp Borden and
an additional 30 to the 4th Armoured Division.59 A sufficient number of 6-pounder guns
and mounts were expected to arrive at MLW in April to equip another 50 Ram Hs due to
be shipped to troops in England that month.60 Depending on the supply of guns and
mantlets, the situation would be reviewed by the Chief of the General Staff on the 31st of
May.61
Soon after the first Ram Hs began to be received in England, a design change to the hull
showed the necessity for the designers to consult with the end-users. The Ram I hull, as
noted above, was only 9 feet 3 inches wide, and thus was within the load limits of 9 feet 6
inches of British railways. But because of the new ventilator louvre in the right-hand
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, "Shipment, Ram Tanks," Major E.D. James
(D. Mech) to Chief Ordnance Officer, Longue Pointe, 14 March 1942. NFB pictures dated
10 September 1942 show rows ofunfinished tanks parked under tarpaulins outside the Tank
Arsenal at MLW, that testify to a continuing lack of mantlets and guns. There are at least 82
tanks visible in the photos, and probably more that were not photographed during the NFB visit.
Photos are numbered e000760835 to e000760855, located at http://collectionscanada.gc.ca,
accessed July 1 6, 2006.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol.5, D. Mech to Chief Ordnance Officer, Longue Pointe
Ordnance Depot, 27 March 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, DM&S to D. Mech, 8 April 1942, and D. Mech
to C.O.O., Longue Pointe, 8 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, Meeting No. 34, "Minutes of the StaffMeeting,
Washington Representatives of Canadian Government," 2 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 5, Telephone memo between Lt.-General Stuart and
Young re Ram distribution March-August 1942, 18 March 1942.
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sponson door, this brought the overall width up to 9 feet, 6 and 5/8ths inches, over the
maximum. A plaintive telegram to Ottawa noted,
May be able arrange rail transport depending on how
many this type to be received. Presume from DCI tank 2
[an earlier telegram] that tank 350 will be less doors.
Cable overall width Ram 2 without doors and state
probable lot number of first tank.
A return cable from Defensor stated that the Ram II without any side doors was still in its
design stage and that the width ofthat model was still not known. In the meantime, other
alterations to the Ram hull were going to make life more difficult for transport officers in
the UK. The first 149 Ram Hs, numbered CT-39831 to CT-39980, had (as noted above) a
ventilator in one sponson door and the original pistol port in the other. The 1 50th hull,
and the one hundred and eighteen hulls that followed [CT-39981 to CT-40100], had fans
in both sponson doors, resulting in an overall width of 9 feet, 9 and 1A inches (Wl 1A
inches).63
The solution that was eventually hit upon by CMHQ was to have one or both of the
sponson doors of the Ram removed prior to shipment overseas, and seal the opening(s)
with weatherproofplywood inserts, the removed door(s) being stored inside the tank.
Ultimately, a redesign of the Ram II hull that eliminated the sponson doors also
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Canmilitry to Defensor, 16 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting T-7,"
21 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Canmilitry to Defensor, 16 May 1942.
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repositioned the ventilation louvers further inside the tank, bringing its overall width back
down to the maximum UK railway limit of 1 14 inches.
The louvres had been installed because gun-firing trials had shown that propellant fumes
built up rapidly in the fighting compartment. The fan in the right-hand sponson door was
implemented with the first Ram II, hull number CT-3983 1 . The problem remained and
Jamieson wrote to Young proposing that a second ventilation fan replace the unneeded
pistol port in the left sponson door.66 This change, as noted above, came into effect with
the 1 50th Ram II hull, CT-3998 1 .67
Trials at the Farnborough (UK) test track revealed several major problems with the Ram I
tank that had been sent there for evaluation. The periscopes in the turret were badly
placed, the eyepieces being mounted too high and thus leaving insufficient clearance
between the crew's helmeted heads and the inside of the turret roof of the tank. It was
also noted that the 8500 lb suspension springs were severely overloaded. They were
measured as being within one-quarter inch ofbeing fully compressed under normal
circumstances, meaning that the suspension system was almost at the limits of its load
with no play remaining for severe march conditions. The rubber tires on the bogie
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting T-Il,"
2 June 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, R.E. Jamieson, A.E.D.B., to J.V. Young,
D/M.G.O., "Re: Ventilating Fan - Ram Tank," 13 February 1942.
Paul Roberts, The Ram: Development and Variants, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Service Publications, 2002), 21-23.
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wheels were distorting under this load, and one had failed completely at the 250-mile
mark.68
The same suspension springs that equipped the Rams were also failing on Lee tanks in
US service.69 CMHQ hoped that these springs could be replaced by the new 12,000 lb
springs that were going into the new Sherman tanks, as they would fit within the same
suspension assemblies without modification.70 But there were problems with the
suspension assembly castings themselves. The castings on the first 90 Rams despatched
to the UK were found to be "defective or liable to be defective."71 The Department of
Munitions and Supply responded with a request that only castings known to be defective
be replaced, not all of them; but D. Mech's response was that all were defective and all
needed replacement.72 A compromise was reached, wherein faulty suspension castings
68 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, R.W. Morris, Experimental Wing, Tank Design
Department, Farnborough, to Brigadier CR Stein, DND, "Ram I [Trials]," 27 April 1942. In this
file, as well as several others, there are multiple references to bogie tire failures, almost always
those supplied by the Dominion Rubber Company. In correspondence between CMHQ and
Dominion Rubber, the company said that something occurring subsequent to the tires'
manufacture was the cause of the failures. A sample tire was sent to the U.S. Rubber Company
to test. LAC RG24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Ellis to D.A.D.O.S. (MT), CMHQ, "Ram
Bogie Wheel Tires - Dominion Rubber Co.," 30 September 1 942.
69 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Defensor to Canmilitry, 21 March 1942.
70 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Canmilitry to Defensor, 14 April 1942. The Lees were
later fitted with a spring that was 30 percent "stiffer" and 5/8" longer, and it was hoped to replace
the Ram springs with these. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis
(T.A.M.T.) to Major J.J. Johnson, D.A.D.O.S. (E), "Tanks Ram I and Ram II," 13 June 1942.
71 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, D. Mech to Department ofMunitions and Supply,
"Suspension Castings," 10 April 1942.
72 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Department ofMunitions and Supply to D. Mech ,
"Re: Suspension Castings," 27 April 1942, and D. Mech to DM&S, "Re: Suspension Castings,"
30 April 1942.
would be replaced if or as they failed during training, but the castings would be entirely
replaced if the tanks were needed for active service.73
Other quality control problems continued to affect the Ram programme. A routine
inspection showed that some of the oil filters in the Rams had accidentally been installed
in reverse. This error restricted the flow of oil and could cause the engine to burn out its
bearings. A bulletin was hastily issued to check the filters to ensure that they were
correctly oriented, or reinstalled ifnecessary, before the tanks were issued to the troops.
Ram crews in England found that the lubrication guns supplied with the tank kits did not
have nozzles that allowed them to lubricate the tanks' bogie wheels or turret fittings.
Correct-size replacement nozzles and adaptors for the guns were to be sent "soon" to
Bordón (UK) for use and distribution.75 New Ram lis received at Camp Borden
(Ontario) had problems with deposits in the fuel lines, possibly due to leftover flux from
the soldering of the gas tanks. The deposits were fouling strainers and made them
useless, and Borden hoped that the Inspections Officer at MLW would investigate the
matter.76 Also at Camp Borden, the transmissions on two Ram tanks broke down after
less than a mile of travelling from their transport flatcar to the Camp. The Synchro-Mesh
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Brigadier CR Stein, Chairman of the A.F.V. Users
Committee, D.N.D., to T.A.M.T., D.Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q., "Suspension Castings Ram Tanks,"
28 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to A.Q.M.G. (O.S.), "Assembly of
Ram Tanks at Canadian M.T. Depot," 20 March 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to Lt-Colonel J.A.W. Bennett,
C.M.H.Q., "Tank - Lubrication Gun Modifications," 23 March 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, D. Mech to Inspection Officer, Tanks, MLW,
30 April 1942.
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assembly within the transmission was assumed to be the problem. A litany of 1 8
"Minor Defects" (including burnt-out switches, leaks, breaking levers and cables, and
sticking parts) was sent to CMHQ by the Experimental Wing at Camp Borden. It was
considered that most defects could be remedied by modifying the defective parts before
installation on the production line, or by refitting tanks that were already with the
troops.78
The 4th Armoured Division, training at Camp Debert, NS, suggested that the
workmanship evident in the construction of the Ram was so poor that it could be termed
sabotage, and requested that an engineer from MLW go down there to be on hand to help
when troubles were found with the tanks.79 Three days later, the Inspection Board at
MLW despatched two of their men to investigate the charges.80 While the engineers
were still en route to Debert, Major-General Worthington (commanding the 4th
Armoured) had sent an amplifying letter on the poor quality of the tanks to the
Department of National Defence. He reported that steel and iron filings had been found
contaminating the lubrication system of the tank, and that "many other evidences ofpoor
workmanship in installation" were severely limiting the service lives of the tanks. This
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Kingsley AuIt (Captain for I. Tanks) to
Mr. J.H. McNulty, 2 May 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 18212, War Diary, Experimental Wing, C.A.C.T.G., entry headed "Appendix "E",
Minor Defects On Ram Mark I And II Tanks," dated 15 June 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, 4th Armoured Division (Debert, NS) to
Victor Sifton c/o Defensor, 7 May 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, D.Mech to Debert, 8 and 9 May 1942.
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was despite the fact that the tanks were being "nursed" along by the trainees and
? ?
generally travelled only on level ground during exercises.
Finally, a misunderstanding about a design flaw in the new turret basket caused a spirited
exchange between Ottawa and London, culminating with the 5th Armoured Division
declining acceptance of any more Ram Hs until the problem had been fixed. It was
discovered that the weight of the 6-pounder gun and mantlet on the Ram Hs overloaded
the attachment of the basket to the turret ring, causing the bolts holding the basket to the
ring to shear off when the turret traversed. Steps had already been taken to correct this
during production, and modification instructions were issued quickly.83 Unfortunately,
the initial reports from Ottawa to field commands had not mentioned that this only
occurred when the guns and mantlet had been fitted, and that unarmed tanks could still be
used for training purposes.84 When this was explained, the 5th Armoured Division
apologized for its ultimatum; but there were still so many problems with the Ram (among
these, persistent overheating of the transmission oil cooler) that the Division's frustration
QC
could easily be understood.
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Major-General Worthington (HQ 4th Armoured
Division) to the Secretary, DND, 9 May 1942.
2 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 11, Canmilitry to Defensor, 15 May 1942.
3 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Defensor (MGO) to Canmilitry, 4 April 1942, and
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to users (2nd Armd. Bde.,
#2 R.C.O.C. M.T. Depot, 5th Cdn. Div.), "Defect in Ram Basket," 16 April 1942.
4 See LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Defensor to Canmilitry, 15 May 1942, and
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, Defensor to Canmilitry, 19 May 1942
5 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Canmilitry to Defensor, 23 May 1942.
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In the midst of these problems, one vindication of the design of the Ram came through.
The United States ordered 1300 Rams and 13 sets of spare parts on its Lend-Lease
account, for use by British armoured units. They were to be armed with the 6-pounder
gun and to have the same layout (i.e., with right-hand drive) as Canadian Rams.
Because deliveries of the original 1,157 Rams (and their accompanying 12 sets of spares)
from the first contract were still being made, these Lend-Lease tanks would start being
delivered to ALCO only after the first 1,000 Canadian tanks had been produced. At that
point, the Canadians would take 2 of the tanks produced each day at the Arsenal, with the
Americans receiving the balance.87 Within approximately three months of the re-
equipment of the Arsenal, ten tanks per working day were to be delivered to ALCO, with
one set of spare parts being produced for every 100 tanks. Deliveries were projected to
OO
begin in November 1942 and end in July 1943.
The Directorate of Mechanization had wanted to make sure that the Canadian Army
would get all of its Rams before the fulfillment of the US Lend-Lease contract, but the
QQ
eventual delivery schedule was a compromise among all of the negotiators. Three
further Canadian contracts were let for additional Rams, as it was realized that more
86 LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1A-1-2-4, Memorandum ofAgreement between DM&S and the
American Locomotive Company, dated 1 1 August, 1942. The Agreement refers back to the
original contract of 23 October 1940 to build and equip the Tank Arsenal. The cost of re-
equipping the Arsenal for the new contract was estimated at $250,000.00. The estimated cost
of each tank was $54,555.55, plus a fixed fee surcharge of $1,455.00 US per tank "for the use of
the facilities furnished by His Majesty". The estimated cost of each set of spare parts was
$636,363.30.
87 Ibid., see also LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, B.D. Beamish, DM&S, to
Major E.D. James, D. Mech., "Re: Canadian Requirements Ram Tanks", 13 May 1942.
88 Ibid.
89 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Major E.D. James, D. Mech, to Director General of
Tank Production, "Canadian Requirements - Ram Tanks," 9 May 1942.
would be needed to equip the Armoured Divisions as well as two new Tank Brigades.
The new contracts were for a total of 2929 Rams, on top of the original 1 157 of the first
contract, and even with this there still would be a shortfall of 605 tanks in the Canadian
Forces estimates.90 It was foreseen that at some point the Ram would be superseded by
an improved model or a different tank altogether, but for the moment it was the Ram that
was on order with MLW.
Efforts to improve the Ram continued. The first major redesign of the Ram hull was
implemented with Hull 321, serial number CT-40101, based on experience gained from
the earlier hull design as well as suggestions from the AFV User's Committee. The
sponson side doors were removed and replaced by a new escape hatch fitted in the floor
of the tank, a position that would give the crew more protection if they had to abandon
the tank under fire. Welded-on armoured ventilator fan "bumps" and revised internal
stowage occupied the places where the side doors had been, and new splash beading was
installed around vulnerable hatch openings. The turret was modified as well, having its
armour thinned in places where it was thought that the original thickness needed had been
over-estimated.91 Additional turret and cupola ring splash protection was incorporated
The original contract for 1 157 was C.D.L.V. 283. The new contracts were:
C.D.L.V. 558 for 1351 Ram Hs
C.D.L.V. 1540 for 628 Ram Hs
C.D.L.V. 1554 for 950 Ram Hs
Sometime between August 2nd and September 15th, 1942, the last two contract numbers were
dropped and the first amended so that C.D.L.V. 558 was for the complete order of 2929 tanks.
The total number of tanks needed at full wastage rates was 4691. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601,
File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, V. Young, M.G.O., to Minister ofDefence Ralston, "Tank
Production," 2 August 1942, op. cit., and (in the same file) "Master Production Schedule No. 11,
Tank: Ram", 15 September 1942, attached to letter from B.D. Beamish, DM&S, to V. Young,
M.G.O., 15 September 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to Lt-Colonel B.H. Darwin, AFV
Advisor's Committee, "Revisions in Production to Ram Tanks," 12 June 1942.
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into the Ram II from Hull 340 on. Retrofitting this protection to earlier tanks was "not
feasible", and considered unnecessary because the turret ring had been impervious to
small-arms fire during tests conducted in Canada.92 The AFV Users Committee replied
that it still wanted those tanks fixed, because their tests in England had shown the area
was vulnerable.93 The discrepancy in results between the two sets of tests may have been
that the turret rings of early Ram Is had not been machined with tolerances fine-enough to
eliminate splash, but the problem appeared to be resolved in later-produced tank hulls.
AEDB responded that it was not possible to add the protection to the first 319 tanks,
though whether this was because of the hull design or the hull composition was unclear.
An endurance test ground, similar to the one used at the Detroit Tank Arsenal to improve
the tank's mechanical reliability, was surveyed to be built on CNR-owned land near the
Locomotive Works.96 Located in easy proximity to the Valentine tank works at the
CPR' s Angus Shops as well as the Tank Arsenal, it contained various types of terrain to
duplicate battlefield conditions. A two-mile-long roadway was planned as well, to test
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Defensor to Canmilitry, 27 March 1942.
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Canmilitry to Defensor, 18 April 1942.
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to various addressees at DND,
2 June 1942. The turrets of the Ram I tanks tested in both the United States and England had
exhibited "shivering", or excessive turret traverse and oscillation, from the vibration of road
travel during those tests. This shivering seemed to indicate ill-fitting parts in the turret race,
and it was thought that closer machining and finishing of those parts would remedy the
situation. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Ellis to Forsyth, Secretary of
the AFV Committee, 14 July 1942.
1LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Defensor to Canmilitry, 27 April 1942. This response
did not mention anything about hulls 320-339.
' LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting [T-15],"
21 July 1942.
the tanks' endurance and speed runs capabilities. In this way it was hoped that any
problems would show themselves during the test, and be fixed on their return to MLW
before the tanks were sent on to the troops.
R.E. Jamieson suggested that Canada follow a new US practice and weld together (rather
than rivet) the lower hulls of Ram Tanks to accelerate production, as long as testing
showed that the welds were "good" and the ballistic properties of the armour were
uncompromised.98 Tests on the welding procedure confirmed this and it was approved on
10 April 1942, less than 2 weeks later." A Capital Expenditure Contract was let on 22
April with General Motors of Canada in Oshawa to acquire and install the necessary
tools, including arc welders, dies and fittings "to weld lower hulls for Ram II Tanks at the
rate of Ten (10) per day when in full production," which was anticipated commencing in
August 1942.100
The accelerating pace ofproduction of the Ram II meant that more Canadian companies
were becoming parts suppliers, supplanting the original American ones. In the period
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting,"
31 March 1942. Two blueprint plans of the proposed test track, showing its path from the
intersection of Viau and Sherbrooke Streets to a point near where present-day Jean-Talon and
Langelier Boulevards meet in Saint-Leonard, are in LAC RG28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV IA-I ,
"Formal Agreement of Contract and Lease between Canadian National Railway Co. and
H.M. the King" dated 22 January 1945. Plan ?' is undated, Plan 'B' dated 31 October 1941 .
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, DM&S to MGO, "Re: Lower Hulls Ram Tanks,"
1 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, D/MGO to DM&S, "Re: Lower Hulls Ram Tanks,"
10 April 1942.
} LAC RG 28 Vol. 510, File 51-M-4, Capital Expenditure Contract M.P.I 096 between MLW and
General Motors of Canada, 22 April 1942. The initial contract was "not to exceed $291,173.00"
and by 6 November 1942 an amendment requesting an additional $166,250.00 to the above
for more tools was ready for signature.
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from April to June, 1942, MLW let contracts worth over $1.4 million with just four firms.
In addition to the above contract with GM, similar capital expenditure contracts were
signed with the Robert Mitchell Company of Montreal, the Massey-Harris Company of
Toronto, and Dominion Rubber in Kitchener. All were to build additional plant capacity
and to tool up for making suspension components. The Robert Mitchell Company was to
build track assemblies, Massey-Harris was to manufacture end connectors for the tracks,
and Dominion Rubber was to fabricate pins and wedges for the tracks and then assemble
Ram tracks with the components from the other two contractors. Dominion Rubber also
had a contract to make the bogie wheels that ran on the tracks.101
Victor Sifton continued to worry that the Ram program was not advancing
technologically as quickly as that of the Sherman. He suggested to Crerar that in the
interest of standardization, Ram production should be discontinued as soon as possible
and that the M4 (US) be built instead; the primary argument against this decision was that
the Ram had superior crew protection due to its thicker hull armour.102 In his response,
Crerar agreed to the changeover proposal on the conditions that there be no loss in tank
production, and that the M4 would use the "new Ford" engine that developed more
All contracts are contained in LAC RG 28 Vol. 510, File 51-M-4. Capital Expenditure Contract
M.P. 1538 "not to exceed $10,991.00" between DM&S, MLW and the Robert Mitchell
Company Limited, Montreal. 27 June 1942; Capital Expenditure Contract M.P. 1203
"not to exceed $596,654.00" between DM&S, MLW and the Massey-Harris Co. Ltd., Toronto,
16 May 1942"(an amendment to the above dated 19 August 1942 details increased costs of
$125,392.00); Capital Expenditure Contract M.P.1552 "not to exceed $402,423.00" between
DM&S, MLW and the Dominion Rubber Company, 10 June 1942; and Capital Expenditure
Contract M.P. 1205 "not to exceed $140,818.00" between DM&S, MLW and the Dominion
Rubber Company, 16 May 1942, with later amendments and additional costs of $45,991.00.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, M.G.O. (Sifton) to C.G.S. (Crerar), 2 April 1942.
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power.103 (This seems a curious choice, as it would introduce a new engine and thus
added complexity to the supply ofparts for the Armoured Corps.)
Upon further investigation, it was found that ensuring a smooth transition, with minimal
loss ofproduction, would require approximately 8 months lead time. During that period,
MLW would re-tool with larger boring mills to fabricate the 69-inch turret ring that could
provide the space needed for the 75 mm gun. General Steel Castings would also need to
re-tool, both to make the moulds for a new hull casting and to rejig machine tool setups
for cutting and finishing new access hatch locations in those hulls.104 GSC further
reported that the new M4A1 hull would be more difficult to machine than that of the Ram
II.105
A DM&S report to Ottawa from Washington explained that engine and transmission
spares were scarce because most spares were being sent overseas to combat areas, and the
balance were going straight into tanks on the assembly lines. US Ordnance would not
stop production by ordering more spares, preferring to ship complete units—that is,
tanks.106 As an earlier DND cable had noted, "We fully realize necessity providing
detailed stocks for repair and overhaul transmission engines etc but we are absolutely
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, C.G.S. (Crerar) to M.G.O. (Sinon), 4 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601 , File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1 , B.D. Beamish, Director-General, Tank Production
Branch, to M.G.O. (Sinon), 15 April 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, Beamish to Young, 10 July 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, DM&S (Washington) to DM&S (Ottawa),
28 April 1942.
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dependent on U.S. Production and supply stop U.S. will not release parts for these items
stop."107
This lack of spare parts had a domino effect through the Canadian training establishment.
General McNaughton cabled Ottawa that spare parts were desperately needed in Britain
to facilitate the repair and overhaul of Ram transmissions, engines, and other
components. He noted that it was bad for the troops' morale for their equipment to have
1 OR
too many breakdowns, or for them to have to wait too long for repairs. If the
Armoured Divisions were going to war in these tanks, they would have to know that they
would not let them down mechanically at a crucial time. Likewise, spares problems were
occurring at training camps in Canada as well. A message from Camp Debert to DND
HQ in Ottawa noted that tanks were breaking down more frequently and troops were
resorting to "cannibalization", taking parts from immobile tanks to repair ones that were
still running. The message reported that training was suffering, as the troops could not
train as a group in larger formations due to breakdowns.109 The Camp Borden War Diary
noted that
Mr. Hisscock, D. of M. & S., called with District Spare
Parts Officer. Discussed the question of spare parts for
tanks and stressed the fact that in many cases tanks
urgently needed for training were immobilized for weeks
107 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2599, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 6, Defensor to Canmilitry, 23 April 1942.
108 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1 , Canmilitry (McNaughton) to Defensor (C.G.S.
andM.G.O.), 8 May 1942.
109 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-11 Vol. 1 1 , Camp Debert to Ottawa, 14 May 1942. This
problem persisted over a year later, as a Canadian Grenadier Guards War Diary entry shows:
"Reports are being received that certain units are stripping tks before evacuation. This practice
will cease forthwith." LAC RG 24 Vol. 14259, War Diary, 22 Cdn Armd Rgt, Part 1 Orders,
"Cannibalization - Ram Tk 1," entry for 5 June 1943.
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for lack of a small part. Mr. Hisscock advised that as the
output ofparts was only in line with tank productions, it
was almost impossible to get spare parts and these that
were available were urgently needed Overseas. He further
stated that every effort was being made to get them.
The Minister of Defence, J.L. Ralston, sent a message to CD. Howe asking if the fact
that many Rams were missing vital equipment (especially their 6-pounder guns) would
delay the 5th Armoured Division from being included in the Canadian Order of Battle on
its scheduled date of the first of August.1 ' ' Howe replied that Ralston had no need to be
worried; the target date of August first would be met by the Department of Munitions and
Supply.1 12 For some reason neither Howe nor Ralston knew that the 5th Armoured
Division was only to be in the Order of Battle as of September, 1942, because a shortage
of shipping space delayed the Rams' delivery to the UK, not delays in production.
Just about two-thirds of the way through the first production run, the Ram II hull and
turret castings were modified again for easier manufacture. In the hull, the ventilation fan
"bumps" were now an integral part of the casting rather than being welded on afterwards,
keeping the width of the hull within the loading gauge of the British railways. As well,
additional splashproofing was placed around the base ofboth the turret ring and the
machine-gun cupola ring. The turret casting was changed to incorporate new pistol ports
that were less vulnerable to splash. This new casting also eliminated an access hatch
110 LAC RG 24 Vol. 18212, Camp Borden War Diary (H. Q., Canadian Armoured Corps Training Group),
entry for 5 June 1942.
111 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, Ralston to Howe, 10 April 1942.
112 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-11 Vol. 1 1 , Howe to Ralston, 13 April 1942.
113 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Ann Veh/13, Canmilitry to Defensor, 6 March 1942.
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located in the turret rear, originally meant to allow the removal and replacement of the
main gun without removing the mantlet. It had been found, in practice, that it was
actually easier to remove the mantlet and gun assembly together from the front of the
turret, rather than try to thread the gun back through the rear hatch without damaging it
(or any of the fitters) in the process."
However, problems with Rams continued to make themselves known, usually only after
they had left the factory. At Debert seven Rams needed replacement engines due to
damage from their oil supply running low, because they lacked a telltale light to alert the
driver that the oil pressure had dropped.1 15 At Borden, battery switches were burning out
from a combination of dust build-up and "faulty design".1 16 In the UK, transmission oil
coolers were breaking and the wireless sets in many tanks were working intermittently, if
at all.117 The voltage regulators frequently failed during firing training, and there were
recurrent troubles with booster coils.1 18 During training in both countries, mud build-up
in the space between the suspension and the return rollers of the Ram was causing the
tank to "throw" its tracks, immobilizing the tank until the crew could re-mount the tracks
114 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to Lt-Colonel B.H. Darwin,
AFV Advisor's Committee, "Revisions in Production to Ram Tanks," 12 June 1942. Ellis
says that the changeover for the turret will come at Hull 758 / CT-40538, but Roberts, Ram,
op. cit., lists both the turret and the hull changing on the same tank, Hull 768 / CT-40549.
In this case, Ellis is probably the more reliable source.
115 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2600, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 7, Major E.D. James to the Director-General, Army
Engineering Design Branch, "Ram Tank Engine Failures," 1 1 June 1942.
116 LAC RG 24 Vol. 18212, Appendix "B" Letter from Experimental Wing, Canadian Armoured Corps to
H.Q. C.A.C., appended to War Diary, Experimental Wing, C.A.C.T.G., 6 June 1942.
117 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9378, T.A.M.T. War Diary, entries for 9 May 1942 and 19 May 1942.
1,8 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Ellis to O/C 5th Div. Sigs, 1st Cdn Army, "Voltage
Regulator - Ram Tanks," 6 Aug 1 942.
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onto the running gear. To repair this meant that the crew had to unfasten the track, put it
back into its correct position using the tank's tow cables, and then connect the track ends
together again, a strenuous job at the best of times. This flaw was remedied by installing
a small spacer plate under the return rollers, which raised them just enough to keep the
mud from accumulating. This was a relatively simple repair, but it meant that six spacer
plates had to be fabricated for and installed on each tank.
Battle experience also resulted in changes. Reports from fighting in the Middle East
noted that the ammunition stowage racks in Lee tanks were vulnerable to penetrating fire
and shell splinters. Because of the similarity between the Lee and the Ram, 6 mm of
hardened armour was added to surround the stowage racks in the Ram.120 None of these
problems were fatal or insoluble in and of themselves, and most were solved relatively
quickly, but there were so many of them that they frustrated designers and users alike.
On June 1st, 1942, R.A. Macfarlane, the Director of Mechanization, wrote a very angry
letter to Victor Sifton, the Master-General of the Ordnance. Macfarlane noted that over
300 Ram tanks had been produced and there were still very basic problems with their
production. The greatest problem was still the lack of spare parts, but there were other
119 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/1 1, "D.M.E. Modification Circular No. A-574," 10 June 1942
Since each track shoe weighed about 18 lbs and even the easiest repair job entailed lifting
multiple shoes to reconnect the track, such a repair was hard work for the crew. (Track shoe
weight comes from LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1 A-l-4, Formal Agreement [between]
Montreal Locomotive Works, Limited [and] Fahralloy Canada Limited, 15 March 1943.)
120 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2600, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 7, Major E.D. James to the Director-General, Army
Engineering Design Branch, "Ammunition Racks - Ram Tanks," 30 May 1942.
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difficulties, especially a lack of communication between suppliers, producers and design
staffs.121
One example of this was that new engines being supplied by Continental (that ran on 80-
octane rather than scarce 91 -octane gasoline) had turned out to have different dimensions
from the original Wright engines provided for the Rams. As a result, the Ram engine
compartment had required a redesign to accommodate the different plumbing and wiring
on these engines. The situation was made more complicated because some tanks had the
older engine and compartment, some had the new engine with the redesigned
compartment, and others had the new engine but with mountings that allowed it to fit the
older engine spaces. Apparently the Chief Engineer at MLW had known about the
engine changeover for over two months but had failed to pass on the information to the
Design Branch or the Production Department. In addition, the oldest model engines were
now out of production, so no spare parts were going to be available for them in the
future.122
Another problem was that the first production run of 1 10 adapters and mantlets for the
6-pounder gun of the Ram II had been made to fit each other in specific sets, rather than
being completely interchangeable. They were stored at MLW until the 6-pounder guns
became available from Dominion Engineering in Longueuil months later. When these
guns were eventually installed in the Rams the need to match the specific adapters and
121 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, D. Mech (R.A. Macfarlane) [actually dictated by
E.D. James, his deputy] to M.G.O. (Sinon), 1 June 1942.
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mantlets had been forgotten, with the result that many of the guns could not reach their
full depression or elevation. All of the different agencies involved blamed one another
for the lack of communication.
Sinon passed on much of this information in a letter to Defence Minister Ralston on June
3rd. He added that discussions were held with Minister Howe of the DM&S and it was-
decided to halt the Ram production line to accommodate the redesign and rebuild of the
engine compartments, call back tanks already produced to retrofit them as necessary, and
to send work drawings overseas to allow modifications to be done there. It was also
agreed to track down and correctly pair off all of the 6-pounder guns to their proper
mantlets at Canadian Army ordnance workshops. Finally, to ease the burden on
Armoured Division workshops, Howe agreed that complete engines could be broken
down for distribution as spare parts.124
The same day as the above, B.D. Beamish (Director-General of the Tank Production
Branch) wrote a letter to Howe that minimized the problems in the tank construction
programme, and then essentially disclaimed much of the responsibility for them, placing
the blame on others—US Ordnance for not supplying engines, transmissions and spares,
MLW for working too slowly, and the Inspection Board officials for not catching errors
before the tank left the plant.'25 Howe replied to Sifton five days later, enclosing
Beamish' s letter to him. He expressed his opinion that any changes needed seemed
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1 , MGO (Sifton) to Ralston, 3 June 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1 , Beamish to Howe, 3 June 1942.
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minor, and that they could easily be effected in the field.126 Beamish, perhaps not
knowing that Howe had forwarded his letter, also wrote to Sinon the same day repeating
many of his same explanations to Howe, trying to deflect blame still further away from
the Tank Production Branch.127
Sinon replied directly to Beamish in a very stiff letter on the 15th of June. He refuted
several of Beamish' s claims, and insisted that the Tank Production Branch had to take
some responsibility for actually producing tanks. He further informed Beamish that all
tanks must be delivered complete from then on, lacking nothing that would make them
battle-worthy, and that the supply òf spare parts had to be improved.
Ralston summarized the various problems listed above in his reply to Howe and laid most
of the blame for them on the MLW, the Design Branch, and the Inspection Board. In his
opinion none of them were catching faults that needed correction, and that MLW in
particular was working at too slow a pace. He added, perhaps ironically, "It probably
does not give the true picture to say that not one of the 300 tanks produced is fit for
action."129
126 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601 , File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, Howe to Sifton, 8 June 1942.
127 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, Beamish to Sifton, 8 June 1942.
128 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 11, Sifton to Beamish, 15 June 1942. Sifton
emphasized that spares could not be more than 50 tanks in arrears; for example, if the spares were
not available for the 301st tank shipped, the 351st tank would not be accepted by the DND.
129 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, Ralston to Howe, "Re: Ram Tank Production",
11 June 1942.
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Eventually, it was considered that the deficiencies in Rams arriving in the UK were too
numerous to be dealt with by the Army Workshops there. Cable QMG 2342 was sent to
Canada asking for permission for British civilian firms to perform the work.130 Jack
Olding & Company Ltd. of Hatfield, a heavy machinery supplier, was chosen to
undertake the job ofbringing them all to a single up-to-date standard. "Oldings" was
already performing this function on "soft-skinned" (unarmoured) vehicles for the
Canadian Army, and agreed to extend the existing contract between them and the
Ministry of Supply to include Canadian tanks and AFVs. nl The contract was approved
by June 20th and the first Rams were en route to them for modifications ten days later.
Soon after, A.S. Ellis of the Motor Transport branch noted that 43 modifications were
being performed on Rams in England as a result ofuser suggestions or modifications
recommended by Canada. He also noted that there had been at least 1 77 design changes
on the Canadian production line, ranging "from changing the material specification of a
bolt to a complete change of the upper hull casting."
Two technicians from Continental Motors flew to England at the end of July to work on
problems that were occurring on Ram engines, accompanied by Ernest Whittick, Chief
0 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9378, T.A.M.T. War Diary, entry for 17 June 1942.
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2600, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 8, Canmilitry to Defensor, 8 July 1942.
2 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9378, T.A.M.T. War Diary, entries for 20 June and 25 June 1942.
3 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, A.S. Ellis (T.A.M.T.) to Captain W.D. Smith, A.D.O.S.,
5th Canadian Armoured Division, "Modifications to Ram and General Lee Tanks," 16 July 1942.
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Inspector of the Montreal Locomotive Works.134 They obtained the UK equivalents to
the greases and sealants needed from the RAF (as the specific US products normally used
on the engines were not available), and ensured a steady supply of these for Canadian
Army maintenance echelons.'35 The technicians visited the "assembly plant" at Jack
Olding & Company as well as tank units in the field during their instruction tour, and set
up maintenance training programmes at No. 1 CBOW.136 Whittick spent much of his
time in England in "Design and Provisions" meetings at Oldings and returned to Canada
in the last week of August, carrying plans and drawings for the Ram modification
programme in the UK as well as a list of Ram field modifications.
134 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Defensor to Canmilitry, 24 July 1942. The
technicians were Earl B. Byard Jr. and J.L. Edrington, hired on contract PC/1/5997 dated
10 July 1942.
135 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Ellis to D.A.D.O.S.(E.), 8 August 1942.
136 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Ellis to E.D. [Doug] James, D. Mech, Ottawa,
11 Aug 1942.
137 LAC RG 24 Volume 9378, T.A.M.T. War Diary, 23 August 1 942.
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Chapter 5: Bypassed by Events
While manufacture of the Ram continued, its fate as a main battle tank was determined at
a meeting of the London offices of the Department of Munitions and Supply on July 25th,
1942. General McNaughton, the G.O.C.-in-C, said that he felt that standardization was
the most important consideration for war production work in North America, and thus the
adoption by the Canadian Army of the M4 Sherman with its 75 mm gun (replacing the
Ram and the 6-pounder) would be especially beneficial in simplifying the jobs of supply
officers and maintenance demands throughout the Allied forces.1 In addition, the 75 mm
gun could fire both armour-piercing shot and high-explosive (HE) shell (for use against
infantry and "soft" vehicles); the 6-pounder gun could fire both kinds of projectile as
well, but the smaller size of its HE shell rendered it "almost useless" in the opinion of
British tankers.2 Unfortunately, McNaughton' s ideal of standardization contributed to the
Canadians (and possibly the Allies) having an armoured force that on the whole had
inferior armament to that of its enemies, as the Sherman's 75 mm gun had inadequate
striking power by the time Canadian troops landed in Europe.
The Allies did have three better guns in development at this time (the American 76 mm
and 90 mm, and the British 17-pounder), but complacency among higher commanders
about the effectiveness of the 75 mm gun would lead to the fiery deaths of many Allied
1 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, "Minutes ofMeeting Held at Department
of Munitions and Supply, 28 St. James Square, London, S.W.I, on July 9th, 1942."
2 Quoted in Beale, op. cit., 105.
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tank crews.3 The Canadian AFV User's Committee (through the Directorate of
Mechanization) recommended to US Ordnance that the 76 mm gun be adopted for the
Sherman, but only a few tanks were eventually so equipped.4 Another opportunity was
missed when McNaughton disapproved of trying to fit the 3" 17-pounder gun into the
Sherman, saying that it "was an impossible gun to fit into tanks".5 This cavalier
dismissal was much regretted later, when a comparatively few Shermans were hurriedly
equipped with enlarged turrets and 1 7-pounder guns and put into battle as the "Firefly",
one of the few tanks able to take on German panzers on roughly equal terms.
Accordingly, it became Canadian policy that the Sherman would become the main battle
tank in Canadian formations. Within weeks, Major James was to be in a meeting in
Washington to discuss the successor to the Ram with Colonel Christmas of the US
3 Months later, in November 1942, General Bernard Montgomery would say "the 75mm gun is all we
require" and his prestige as the only winning British general to the time would make his view
gospel in the British (and Commonwealth) Armies. See Beale, op. cit., 97.
4 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/29, "M.4 Tank Design Requirements," Lt.-Col. W.W. Goforth,
a/D.S.D.(W), to D. ofMech., 21 September 1942, and Bruce Culver, Shennan in Action ,
(Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1977), 41-47.
5 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, "Minutes ofMeeting Held at Department
of Munitions and Supply, 28 St. James Square, London, S.W.I, on July 9th, 1942." It is curious
that McNaughton, an artillery man by training, would think that the 17-pounder could not be used
in a Shennan. Perhaps he depended too much on the bad advice of "experts", or possibly was
carrying the idea of standardization too far, imagining chaos from introducing another weapon
into the supply chain. See also LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, personal letter
from Major E.D. James (D. Mech) to S.E. (Sid) Swallow, TA.M.T., C.M.H.Q., 27 July 1942.
James said, "We were disappointed to hear that General McNaughton did not favour the
17-pounder as it was our idea without ever seeing the gun but this might prove to be the real
tank killer".
6 The deadliness of the 17-pounder gun was recognized by the Germans, who responded by concentrating
their tanks' fire on the distinctive long-barrelled Fireflies as soon as one was seen on the
battlefield. These tanks were initially crewed by officers, but casualties swiftly became heavy
enough that the officers were replaced with sergeants, and a Firefly would only be brought into
battle when a difficult target or position had to be overcome. See Lt.-Col. H.M. Jackson, The
Sherbrooke Regiment (12th Armoured Regiment), (Sherbrooke, Qc: The Sherbrooke Regiment,
1958), 127.
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Ordnance Department, since "the Ram tank was, of course, now superseded by later U.S.
types".7 Despite this, and despite being eliminated as a gun tank, it was decided that the
Ram made an excellent chassis for the Command/Observation Post tank variant needed
by the Armoured and SP Artillery Divisions. Command/OP tanks had their 6-pounder
gun removed, along with the ammunition, the ammunition stowage bins, and the turret
traverse motor. The space that was freed up in the turret was occupied by an additional
crew member, map boards and two additional radios for better communications with
higher commands as well as accompanying infantry. A hollow tube welded to the turret
mantlet made it appear to be an ordinary gun tank. An initial order of 40 Command/OP
tanks increased to 64 in September 1942 when the allocation of tanks per battalion was
changed.8 Eventually 145 were built in Canada, and more were converted in the UK
from Ram stocks held there.9 Supply and repair problems were minimized in the artillery
regiments because the Ram OPs shared a common chassis with the 25-pounder Sextons
that they accompanied.
Also in July, in sharp contrast to the fuss occasioned by a photograph of the Ram
appearing in a Toronto newspaper seven months earlier, a Ram and a Valentine from
Camp Borden were used to help advertise Lux soap. Four Troopers posed with two
7 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, R.E. Jamieson, AEDB, to Department of Munitions
and Supply, "Meeting at Montreal Locomotive Works Aug 14/42," 19 August 1942.
8 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/31, Telegram from Canmilitry to Defensor, 23 September
1942. Initially there were contracts for two different but similar OP vehicles, the "Command"
variant and the "Armoured" variant, but by the time the tanks were being manufactured they
were all generally known as Command/OP vehicles.
9 The 145 Canadian vehicles were built on three separate contracts. See Roberts, The Ram: Development
and Variants, Vol. 1, op. cit., 9-10 and 21.
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female models and two child models.10 On a more warlike note, in August, "National
Film Board representatives started shooting film on Demonstrations of and Tactical
employment of A.F.Vs."
Though he was determined that military needs would come before those of industry,
McNaughton never lost sight of the fact that he had to be supportive of Canada's
industrial war effort. As CD. Howe noted in his journal during his visit to England in
September-October 1942,
"Motored to GHQ and lunched with McNaughton and
everyone in the Canadian Army with the rank of Brigadier
and up. . .After lunch McNaughton held a conference to
discuss Canadian production and Canadian weapons. The
ram tank is the best tank that has reached England; in fact,
McNaughton made the general statement that all Canadian
equipment is the best that they have received".
MLW continued to rum out Rams for training use. In addition to the new production,
100 tanks from General Worthington's 4th Armoured Division in Nova Scotia were
returned to MLW for rebuilding before being sent overseas. These tanks each had from
2500 to 3000 miles of use, but the rebuild process essentially returned them to "new"
condition. 6-pounder mountings were still in short supply; the Daily Production Report
10 LAC RG 24 Vol. 18212, Camp Borden War Diary (H.Q., C.A.C.T.G.), entry for 8 July 1942. The
pictures were taken on the authority of Military District No. 2. The men each received five dollars
for their work.
11 LAC RG 24 Vol. 18212, Camp Borden War Diary (H.Q., C.A.C.T.G.), entry for 18 August 1942.
12 LAC RG 28 Vol. 5, DMS History Minister's Office. "Diary ofVisit to London From Ottawa 26th
September 1942" by CD. Howe, datelined Dorchester Hotel, London, Oct. 3rd Saturday, 4.
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from MLW for July 27, 1942 showed that 217 Ram Hs were in Montreal waiting for gun
mounts.13
Canadian authorities even proposed that the CPR start manufacturing Rams or M4s when
Valentine production was finished at the Angus Shops, but this idea was vetoed by the
US Ordnance Department. They considered that the Montreal Locomotive Works still
had unused production capacity (ofup to 20 tanks per day) and to divert work to the CPR
facility would be a waste of resources.14 Accordingly, preparations for Ram/M4
production at the CPR were cancelled and all files and drawings returned to MLW.
Despite the fact that the Ram was no longer in consideration as a main battle tank, the
Ram II hull was redesigned yet again to eliminate a shot-trap behind the cupola machine-
gun, replacing the assembly with a ball-mounted machine-gun in the bow plate of the
tank.16 A wooden mockup of the new design was completed by August 27, and this hull
would be incorporated into the next (and, as it turned out, final) production run of Ram
Hs.17 With the addition of minor modifications against bullet splash for the co-driver's
hatch and a re-fairing of the armour around the new ball-mount MG, the plans were duly
13 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, personal letter from Major E.D. James (D. Mech)
to S.E. (Sid) Swallow, T.A.M.T., C.M.H.Q., 27 July 1942.
14 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, Maj.-Gen. James V. Young, MGO, to Minister of
Defence Ralston, "Tank Production," 2 August 1942.
15 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting T-1 7,"
11 August 1942.
16 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Defensor to Canmilitry, 4 June 1942.
17 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 11, E.D. James (D. Mech) to D.S.D., 26 August 1942.
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approved by a senior General Staff representative on August 29th.18 CMHQ was
informed that the production of these new hulls would be delayed until November 1942
(starting with the 101st tank of the second contract, CT 159502) because General Steel
Castings reported that new hull hatch designs had caused some unforeseen machining
problems.19 A contemporary journal article estimated that this simplification of the hull
saved approximately $930,000 in materials and labour and more than 88,000 man- and
machine-hours of manufacturing.
This final hull redesign essentially made the tank into a modified M4, and it was thought
that the first 700 tanks of the US contract production run might have Ram II hulls and the
balance have M4 hulls.21 It was stipulated that in any tank production subsequent to the
US Ordnance order the hull was to have a 69-inch turret ring diameter, which essentially
meant that MLW would be manufacturing the Sherman instead of the Ram by July
1943.22 Major James of the Department of Mechanization noted that
18 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 11, Captain (G.S.) Chas. Sale, D.S.D.
to D. Mech, 29 August 1942.
19 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-11 Vol. 1 1 , Defensor to Canmilitry, 1 September 1942, and
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, R.E. Jamieson, A.E.D.B., to DM&S,
"Meeting at Montreal Locomotive Works Aug 14/42," 19 August 1942. All of the Ram upper
hulls and turrets had been cast by the second week ofFebruary, 1943. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 2602,
File H.Q.S.3352-1 1 Vol. 14, Defensor to Canmilitry, 13 February 1943.
20 Figures from J.R. Pétrie, "Business Efficiency in the Canadian War Effort," The Canadian Journal
ofEconomics and Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug. 1943), 363. The estimates were based
on an annual production figure, and included a saving of 2,232,000 pounds of steel. However,
since this article was written in wartime and was meant to project and reinforce an image of
efficiency, it probably should not be taken as definitive.
21 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9364, File 38/Arm Veh/28, Defensor to Canmilitry, 4 June 1942.
22 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, Mr. W.M. Townsend, MLW Works Manager,
"Minutes of a Meeting held at Montreal Locomotive Works, Limited, August 14th , 1942,
Concerning Change in Design ofTank to be Produced."
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in all probability we will change the Montreal
Locomotive Works to build the M4A1 tank exclusively
and exactly the same as the one being produced in the
United States. There is one thing to remember on the
standardization program and that is if we adopt the U.S.
design 1 00% we will be tied down to their ideas and
will only be able to get changes into effect when we can
persuade Washington that this should be done. When
the Overall North American Tank Program is taken into
consideration this is no doubt a good idea as we can
interchange information and be talking about the same
thing. At the present, the U.S. Ordnance looks upon us
much as an orphan and lets us go our own way sometimes
to our detriment.23
As part of the effort that Major James outlined, a Directorate of Mechanization memo of
21st September 1942 listed over 50 improvements to the final M4 Sherman design that
Canada should suggest to the US authorities. Among these recommendations were that
the new 76 mm gun was preferred over the 75 mm or the 6-pounder, cast hulls were
considered preferable to welded hulls, there should be improved splash protection and
instrument reliability, and that the weight of the tank should not exceed 60,000 pounds.
In early October of 1942, the United States cut the allocation of transmissions by 40
percent throughout the entire North American tank production programme without any
warning. This immediately affected delivery schedules at MLW, to the point that the
delivery of the 1,000th Ram would now occur in the middle of December, rather than in
October as originally scheduled. Canadian production was disproportionately affected by
the cut and, instead ofproducing 200 tanks per month during October, November, and
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, personal letter from Major E.D. James (D. Mech) to
S.E. (Sid) Swallow, T.A.M.T., C.M.H.Q., 27 July 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/29. "M.4 Tank Design Requirements," op. cit.
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December, MLW predicted that only 167 new Rams would be built over the same three-
month period. It was hoped that part of the shortfall could be made up by bringing older
tanks back to MLW and reconditioning them, not only maintaining the supply for
overseas but also keeping valuable workers employed on the lines. It was still unknown
at this point how the production of the Canadian Sherman, or the new SP gun chassis
known as the Sexton, would be affected by this order.
In the meantime, further problems continued to be found with Rams. Oil cooler failures
in the UK were attributed to corrosion from exposure to sea air in transit, and the solder
on those cooler connections was melting because of the high temperature of the oil.
Bogie tires failed repeatedly.27 Some radio sets were wrongly positioned and failed to
work.28 Further bullet splash trials and chemical-warfare tests showed that increased
protection was needed, especially around the driver's periscope, direct-vision slots, and
the turret ring.29 And the integrity of some of the tank hulls was in question. During
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2602, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 12, Defensor [Brigadier T.D. Switzer, for Master-
General of the Ordnance] to Canmilitry, 12 October 1942, and LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, Maj.-Gen.
James V. Young, MGO, to Minister ofDefence Ralston, "Tank Production," 2 August 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, D.D.E.M. (D.Q.M.G.) to D.D.O.S.(E) (C.M.H.Q.),
"Ram II Transmission Oil Cooler," 23 October 1942 and, in the same file, letters from
Jack Olding & Co. to C.M.H.Q., "Ram I Transmission Oil Cooler," 6 October 1942, and to
Mr. Wolford, Chief Chemist, London Passenger Transport Board, "Ram Tanks Intermission
Oil Cooler," 14 October 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/2, Ellis to D.A.D.O.S. (MT), CMHQ, "Ram Bogie
Wheel Tires - Dominion Rubber Co.," 30 September 1942.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting T-26,"
1 December 1942.
For bullet-splash trials, LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/3, D.D.E.M. to D.D.E.M. [that's
what it says], 4 December 1942 and, in the same file, Lt.-General A.G.L. McNaughton
(G.O.C-in-C, 1st Canadian Army) to Maj.-General A.W.C. Richardson (Director A.F.V., W.O.),
9 December 1942. For the chemical-warfare tests, LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1
Vol. 1 1, Brigadier DCGS to DMGO (B), 31 August 1942.
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repairs to tank number #227 several holes had to be drilled into the metal. One part of
the hull was found to be extremely hard, while another area drilled with no more
difficulty than if it were mild steel. An Ordnance Corps officer speculated that some Ram
hulls may have had inadequate heat treatment in places, and urged the Directorate of
Mechanization to greater efforts at quality control and inspection of the hulls.
Engine fires in Rams were commonplace enough for an order to be issued that a man
with an extinguisher be stationed behind the opened engine-bay doors of the tank
whenever an engine was started in cold weather.31 Prior to the issuance of this order, on
December 7th, 1942, Ram 42-1-661 had become bogged down near Camp Borden with
one side four feet lower than the other. The tank was towed to level ground and an
inspection failed to find any fuel or oil leaks, but when the tank was re-started a fire
erupted in the engine compartment that required some 1 5 to 20 portable extinguishers to
put out, as the tank's own extinguishers and carbon dioxide suppression system failed to
do the job.32 One possible reason for the ineffectiveness of so many of the extinguishers
was that the carbon tetrachloride they contained was an extremely effective cleaner as
30 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 9, Captain B.D. Irvin, O.C. No. 1 Proving Ground
Detachment, R.C.O.C, D.N.D., Ottawa, to Lt-Colonel James, D. Mech, "Ram Tank Hulls,"
10 September 1942. Further tests on the armour in January 1943 found that its Brinell
[hardness] number was not as high as it should have been, registering a maximum of 225 rather
than 270. Despite this, the tanks were considered to be adequately protected. See LAC RG 24,
Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/3, C.M.H.Q. to H.Q. 1st Cdn Army D.D.M.E.,
"Cast Armour—Ram," 25 January 1943.
31 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/A.F.V. Ram/ 1/3, A.S. Ellis, D.D.E.M., C.M.H.Q., to D.D.O.S.(E),
C.M.H.Q., "Fire Hazards in Ram Tanks," 3 1 December 1942.
32 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2602, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 12, report from Driving & Maintenance Wing to the
Officer Commanding, No. 2 Det. R.C.O.C, [both at Camp Borden, Ontario], "Ram Tanks,"
8 December 1942. Engine fires had been frequent in the M3 Grant/Lee tanks, as well. See
Norris H. Perkins and Michael E. Rogers. Roll Again Second Armored: Prelude to Fame
1940-1943 (Surbiton, UK: Kristall Publications, 1988), 93 and 103.
well as a fire suppressor.33 George G. Blackburn, in his memoir Where the Hell Are the
Guns?, stated that the men in his Artillery unit had a tendency to drain off the carbon
tetrachloride to clean their uniforms, and refill them to their proper weight with another
fluid that would not freeze—petrol. This in turn rendered the extinguishers somewhat
worse than useless for fighting fires.34
The AFV User's Committee met at Oldings to discuss the modifications being performed
on Rams in the UK. The modifications were classified into three groups, (a), (b), and (c).
The (a) level modifications were those needed to make the tank fit for training purposes,
(b) modifications were those needed to make the tank fit for battle, and (c) modifications
were those that were not contained in (a) or (b) and which were deemed desirable but not
essential for either purpose. All new tanks arriving in the UK were to be refitted by
Oldings, with priority given to those destined for the 4th and 5th Armoured Divisions and
Reinforcement Units.35
In Canada, too, expenditures had to be made on the testing, maintenance and repair of
various components of the Rams. Engines and transmissions required overhauls and
bogie wheels had to be replaced, among many other parts, and it was again considered
33 In the dry repórtese ofLt.-Col. J.W. Bishop, the "suspected misuse of the carbon tetrachloride content of
the hand extinguishers no doubt accounts for the quantity expended". LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365,
File 38/Arm Veh/28/4, Lt.-Col. J.W. Bishop, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div to DDOS(E), CMHQ,
"Fire Hazards in Ram Tanks," 27 January 1943.
34 George G. Blackburn, Where the Hell Are the Guns? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1997),
351-352.
35 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/2, Major H.L. Forsyth, "Minutes ofFifteenth Meeting,
Canadian A.F.V. User Committee, Held at J. Oldings Ltd. at 1400 hours, 30 Oct 42",
30 October 1942.
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more efficient to contract this work out to civilian firms than to occupy the time that
troops could be using in battle training.36 For tanks that were still building, further
contracts were let to Canadian and American companies for parts for the Ram, especially
those comprising the suspension and running gear. Many of the parts ordered were
common to other vehicles that Canada would build, such as the Sherman/Grizzly and the
new SP gun built on the Ram chassis, and would still be usable should Ram production
cease.37 This was fortunate, as Sherman tank production had increased to the point at
which it appeared that there would be sufficient numbers to equip all of the Allied
combatants.38
A direct result of this enormous Sherman production was the cancellation of the 1300-
tank "American" Ram II order on December 28th 1942.39 To minimize the cancellation
and penalty charges for all of the parties concerned, the contract was cut back to 792 Ram
II Tanks, "to be produced and delivered against the 2929 vehicles called for on CD 558."
For examples see LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV1A-1-19/2, Contract M.P. 1238 between DM&S and
Canadian Wright Ltd. [for the overhaul, repair, and re-condition of Ram tank engines], originally
dated 1 1 November 1942 (plus three subsequent amendments), LAC RG 28 Vol. 509, File
51-M-4, Formal Agreement [to recondition transmissions of Ram tanks] between Mid-Town
Motor Sales Ltd. Montreal and MLW, 30 September 1942 and LAC RG 28 Vol. 510,
File 51-M-4, Capital Expenditure Contract M.P. 2638 between MLW and Dominion Rubber
Company to test Ram Tank Bogie Tires, 2 1 October 1942, (plus two subsequent amendments).
For examples see LAC RG 28 Vol. 509, File 5 l-M-4, DM&S Capital Expenditure Contract No.
M.P. 2757 for the Manufacture of Bogie Tire Assemblies for Ram 11 and/or M4 Tank Track __
between DM&S, MLW, and The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company of Canada Limited,
13 November 1942, (same file) DM&S Capital Expenditure Contract No. M.P. 2890 for
Canadian Dry Pin Track Shoes for Tanks between DM&S, MLW, and The Hull Iron and
Steel Foundries Limited, 4 December 1942, and LAC RG 28 Vol. 432, File 20-LV IA-I -4,
Formal Agreement [for manufacture of 500 sets of CDP Tracks] between MLW and
Fahralloy Canada Limited, 15 March 1943.
Eventually, over 46,000 Shermans in various marks and models would be produced by 1 0 heavy
manufacturing plants in the United States. See Culver, Sherman in Action, op.cit., 4.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 10, "Meeting re 1300 "American" Tanks, Detroit,
December 28th, 1942", dated 4 January 1943.
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In addition, MLW was to produce 84 25-Pdr. Self-Propelled Gun Mountings, and 24
Armoured Observation Posts, for a total of 900 hulls on the rewritten contract. Tools
originally meant to be used on the American order were to be returned to the US from
MLW, or they could be switched to working on goods needed for Canadian or US
accounts.41
Rams continued to be shipped to the Canadian troops training in the UK. As of December
19, 1942, there were 562 Ram Hs in England. 329 were with the 4th and 5th Canadian
Armoured Divisions, 30 were in workshops or under repair, 10 were loaned to British
forces for various trials, and another 193 were awaiting delivery to the Canadian forces.
64 Rams were known to have been lost to enemy action in transit from Canada to the
U.K., with a further 86 "assumed still on ocean" and 139 in Canada either waiting in port
for transhipment or were en route to their embarkation port.43 CMHQ reported in
January 1943 that 1 50 Rams were available for overseas shipment per month from then
onward.
40 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 10, "Meeting re 1300 "American" Tanks, Montreal,
6th January, 1943," and in the same file, E.C. Perley (Director ofTank Production) to
Mr. W. M. Townsend, MLW, "Re: Ram II and/or M4A1 Tanks - Schedules CD LV 558,"
5 January 1943.
41 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 10, "Meeting re 1300 "American" Tanks, Detroit,
December 28th, 1942," op. cit., and "Meeting re 1300 "American" Tanks, Montreal,
6th January, 1 943," op. cit.
42 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1/2, Canmilitry to Defensor, 16 December 1942.
43 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2601, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 1 1, M.G.O. [J.V. Young] to DND [Ralston],
"Tank State in England," December 19, 1942.
44 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/3, Defensor to Canmilitry, 22 January 1943.
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Despite its thickness, the Ram's cast armour was not invulnerable. During a practice
shoot at Beachy Head by the Perth Regiment, Tank CT 40195 (of the Headquarters
Squadron, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade) was towing a target when it was mistaken
for the target itself and fired on by a 2-pounder anti-tank gun from approximately 300
yards range. The solid shot went through 2 %" of armour, penetrated the turret basket to
wound the gunner in the leg and then ricocheted off the-far wall of the tank, ending up
under the driver's seat. There was no flaking on the inside of the hole and "very little
petalling" on the exterior and interior hull. The shot entered the left side of the tank
about 15° off normal [right angle], roughly mid-way between the cupola turret and the
hull side ventilator.45 This (or a similar incident) was referred to by Montrealer Bernard
Finestone in a postwar interview.
Then the Canadians developed the Ram tank which we
hated because the first time we used it on the range, some
guy made a mistake and, instead of firing at the target,
fired at the tank and drilled a hole two inches wide right
through it. We looked at that and said, "We're going into
action in that damned thing!" But we liked it because
it had a 6-pounder gun.46
This penetration of the hull at short range "was to be expected" in the opinion of Mr.
Rendali of the Department of Tank Design Armour Section.47 But over six months
earlier, 2-pounder shot fired head-on in tests against face-hardened German Panzer III
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/3, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div to 1st Cdn Army, "Armour - "A"
Vehs," 6 January 1943. The accident occurred on or before 29 December 1942. The time required
to repair the damage to the hull and tank interior was 1 1 .5 hours. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File
13/AFV Ram/1/3, H.Q. 5 Armd Div to D.D.O.S. (E.), C.M.H.Q., 22 January 1943
Bernard Finestone interview, quoted in Patricia Burns, They Were So Young: Montrealers Remember
World War II (Montreal, QC: Véhicule Press, 2002), 1 1 6.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1/3, Major J.R. Johnson, S.D. 7, "Report of Examination of
Damage to Ram II No. 40195 by 2-Pr.," attachment to the above entry.
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frontal armour plate failed to penetrate it at ranges in excess of 100 yards. Even at that
range, there was only some shatter penetration (penetration by broken-up shell fragments)
into the tank.48 The 2-pounder did, however, manage to penetrate the (non-face-
49hardened) thinner flank armour of the Panzer III at comparable ranges.
But the Ram's importance was rapidly becoming eclipsed; as of the 9th of March, 1943,
self-propelled 25-pounder gun mounts (Sextons) and Armoured Command [OP] Vehicles
were to have manufacturing priority over Ram Hs, per General Staff instructions.
Tooling was also being set up at MLW to build the Ram's successor, the Grizzly I.51
As the last of the Rams were being produced, the production line was not working at full
capacity. To maintain the labour supply until Grizzly production started, MLW
undertook to recondition earlier Ram tanks at a minimum of 10 per week, needing a
continuous supply of tanks from Canadian training camps to keep the reconditioning line
in efficient operation. There was a concern at MLW that a lessening of demand would
cause men to be reassigned to other tasks, ". . .and once a move of this type is made it is
very difficult to return these men to their original work."52 As they were reconditioned,
improvements were made to the Rams to bring them up to the latest standard being
48 LAC Microfilm T- 17472, Lt.-Col. D.M. Mycroft, A.D.A.F.V. (T)., Near East Command, "A.F.V. (T.)
Experimental Report No. 4," 20 May 1942. All such reports were circulated to all British and
Commonwealth commands.
49 LAC Microfilm T-17472, Lt.-Col. D.M. Mycroft, A.D.A.F.V. (T)., Near East Command, "A.F.V. (T.)
Experimental Report No. 5," 24 May 1942.
50 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting T-32,"
9 March 1943:
51 Ibid.
52 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2602, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 14, E.A. Hankin, Automotive & Tank Production
Branch, to Major B.A. Gunn, Directorate ofMechanization, "Reconditioning Program,"
27 April 1943.
turned out on the new production line. Many "early" Ram Hs were subsequently
equipped with the heavier suspension springs and trailing return rollers that were
identical to those used on Shermans.53 But certain aspects of the repair program
remained in some disarray for months. An April 1943 cable from London to Ottawa
plaintively stated, "Reconditioned Rams arrived less Sponson doors. Advise if
shipped."54
A further meeting on tank policy took place on the 4th of June, 1943, resulting from
uncertainties about where Canada was going to source its Shermans. Following a review
of the capabilities of the Ram II, McNaughton thought that it could be considered
battleworthy if it could be upgraded to carry the 75 mm gun. Accordingly, it was
proposed that 600 Rams be equipped with 75 mm guns right away, to be run-in and then
reserved for future use in battle. A further 1000 Rams, armed with the 6-pounder gun
and with sufficient modifications to bring them up to battle standard, were to be made
available for training, but without subsequent use in battle. Finally, another 1 00 Rams
would be equipped with 75 mm guns for use in formation training and on firing ranges.
These too would not be used for battle.
53 Roberts, The Ram: Development and Variants, Vol. J, op. cit., photos and captions on pages 10-17.
54 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/28/4, Canmilitry to Defensor, 10 April 1943.
55 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2602, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 16, Lt.-Colonel D.C. Spry, P.A. to G.O.C.-in-C,
"Minutes of Conference held at HQ First Canadian Army, 1600 Hours 3 Jun to Discuss Future
Tank Policy," 4 June 1943, 2-3.
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The 600 Ram Hs to be reserved for battle would be considered "modified and fit for
operational purposes."56 They would also be exempted from becoming training tanks.
But second thoughts about the use of the Ram as a battle tank must have prevailed,
because three days later a cable was sent to all Ram users from First Canadian Army HQ
stating that all Ram II tanks were to have a large letter "T" painted on their hulls after the
WD number, to denote their status as training tanks.58 This did not signify the end of the
75 mm Ram; in August, 100 Rams were listed as "Training Firing" tanks to be equipped
with 75 mm guns, and conversions were started in the Base Ordnance Depot. Fitting
the larger 75 mm gun into the space meant for a 6-pounder involved many problems and
progress was slow, with only 29 tanks modified before the program was halted in
December, 1943.60 It was determined that Sherman Tanks were now available in
sufficient numbers for gunnery training and range practice with field units, and therefore
Ram lis equipped with the 75 mm gun were no longer required for this purpose by the 1 st
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/4, D.O.S. C.M.H.Q. to O.C. No. 4 Sub Depot 1 CBOD,
6JuIy 1943.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/4, D.O.S. C.M.H.Q. to O.C. No. 4 Sub Depot 1 CBOD,
6 July 1943. The document is smudged, and the word "exempted" may be "excepted". [Though
sent on the same day between the same parties as the above document, this is a different memo.]
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/4, First Canadian Army to multiple recipients,
9 July 1943.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/4, D.D.M.E. to A.D.O.S. (M.T.), "Ram II Tanks,"
27 August 1943. Tests performed in September in the first converted tank showed that there were
problems with the turret traverse on slopes, and that when moving over bumpy ground "[t]he
hardness of the tank suspension [. . .] causes excessive movement of the gunner's body and head
with consequent blacking out and inability to use the [gun] sights." A new heavier browpad was
recommended for the gunner. LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1 /5, Lt. Col. F.D.W.
O'Rorke, Experimental Wing, A.F.V. School, Lulworth Camp, Dorset, Report E.O. No. 1/5/21,
"RAM II With 75mm. (36.5 cal) Gun," 20 September 1943.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/ 1/5, A.D.O.S. (M.T.) C.M.H.Q. to O.C. No 4
Sub Depot 1 CBOD, 16 December 1943.
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Canadian Army; however "E" Group CRU requested them for training, and they would
be sent there.61
Minister of Defence Ralston solicited the opinions of various officers concerned with
tank production at a 22 July 1943 meeting. The consensus view was that the Ram had
been a good tank when designed, because it had combined American mechanical prowess
with British fighting experience. But by mid- 1943, it was clear that the Sherman was
capable of improvement at a faster rate than the Ram. One of the participants, Brigadier
R.B. Gibson, noted that the Rams were not a total loss, because they could still be used
for training.
The opinions section of the meeting's minutes ended with, "Meeting unanimous. We
should abandon [tank] production in Canada" and use the same Sherman models with
which the U.K. forces were being supplied.63 Production would concentrate on the
manufacture of self-propelled Sexton gun carriages for Britain and Canada. The
document pointed out that most of the Ram components came from the US, and that the
"manufacture" of the tank was essentially "an assembly job with some machining and
welding."64 Of course, this was largely true of the Sexton, as well.
61 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1/5, HQ 1st Cdn Army to Q (Ops), "Ram Tks Equipped
with 75mm Gun," 20 December 1943.




The above conversation had taken place in Canada, but it appeared not to have been
communicated to London. A week later, Canadian policy regarding the manufacture of
tanks in Canada was still being discussed. The Sherman/Grizzly slated to replace the Ram
on the MLW production lines was now considered to be inferior to the M4A4 Sherman
model that Chrysler was manufacturing. The DQMG asked if it would be better to skip
the Sherman entirely and tool up to make the T20 series currently being developed by US
Ordnance because
[t]he conditions that obtained when Canada first
considered the manufacture of tanks have completely
changed, due to the great increase in USA production and
the allocation of large numbers to the British account.65
As it eventually turned out, the Canadian Sherman (the "Grizzly") had a short production
run. Only 188 out of an anticipated 2937 Grizzly I tanks were made before all of the
efforts of the Montreal Locomotive Works were concentrated on making the Sexton.
As its future as a gun tank receded, the Ram began to be considered for other roles. It
had already been used as a test bed for a 25-pounder SP gun carriage and a 3.7 inch
antiaircraft gun carriage. The 25-pounder gun carriage would eventually evolve into the
highly successful Sexton, but the 3.7 inch gun ended its days at the School ofArtillery in
the UK after trials were completed.67 It was tried out as an AVRE vehicle, but that role
65 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/36, Brig. J.R. MacQueen, DQMG, CMHQ to Mr. CA. Banks,
DM&S, London, "Policy re Manufacture of Tanks in Canada," 28 July 1943. Only a few of the
T20 tanks were produced, as they were rapidly superseded by the T26 Pershing.
66 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2602, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol. 14, "Armoured Fighting Vehicles, C.D.'s raised by
D. ofMech.," 15 March 1943. 2137 Grizzly Is were contracted for on Contract Demand L.V. 558,
and a further 800 were contracted for on Contract Demand L.V. 1742.
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eventually went to the more heavily-armoured Churchill. Other conversions were made
in small numbers, such as the Armoured Recovery Vehicle, the Beach Armoured
Recovery Vehicle, and the Ram searchlight, none of which saw action.
The Command/OP variant has already been described above, and was so successful that it
soldiered on with Canadian formations till the end of the war. Originally the use of Ram
OP tanks had been viewed as a temporary measure, because the War Office had said
70
Shermans would be available to replace them from UK stocks in June or July of 1 944.
But the Canadians considered that the Ram was better suited for use as a Command/OP
tank than was the Sherman. This was because it had many parts in common with the
Sexton SP guns with which it would operate; it had heavier frontal armour than the
Sherman; and, perhaps most important, it would not take away any Sherman gun tanks
from the Allied forces.71
The Skink, designed for antiaircraft defence, suffered from both the lack of a clear role in
armour doctrine as well as a dearth of enemy aircraft to defend against. Its development
was hampered because its turret and gun mounts had to be redesigned to take four 20 mm
67 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Ram/1/4, from C.M.H.Q. to various recipients, "25 Pr Ram
S.P.", 30 April 1943. The Ram 25-pounder was to go to the School ofArtillery complete, as was
the 3.7" gun for use as an AA Trainer; the Ram chassis was retained at Bordón.
68 The AVRE (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers) was a specially-adapted tank that was developed to
deal with fortifications, armed with a short-range gun that could blast through thick concrete walls.
The low silhouette of the Churchill gave it a marked advantage in this role.
69 Roberts, The Ram, Development and Variants, Volume I, op. cit., 10-21.
70 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/3 1 , Brig. M.H.S. Penhale, GS, CMHQ to DDEM, CMHQ,
"OP Tanks," 20 March 1944.
71 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9365, File 38/Arm Veh/3 1, Ellis (D.D.E.M., D.Q.M.G.) to Lt-Colonel J.A. Johnston,
S.D.S., "OP Tanks," 15 March 1944.
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Polsten cannons rather than the prototype's Hispanos, and the different gun and magazine
connections needed slowed its production. Only three were ever completed and only one
was shipped overseas.72 It was attached to the No. 1 Tank Demonstration Unit and fought
with six different Canadian armoured regiments over a five-week period, and then in an
antipersonnel role. However, the four cannons were found to be extremely effective in
house-to-house fighting, as their high volume of fire and mix of explosive and incendiary
shells drove German troops out of their defences.
Also known as the Armoured Ammunition Carrier, the "Wallaby" was converted from
Ram Hs, and used to transport additional ammunition for armour and artillery units. The
turret and turret basket were removed, and the turret ring plated over with 14 mm armour.
A large square hatch in the plate allowed access to the interior. The wireless set and
batteries were moved to the sponsons to make room for ammunition stowage. 76 were
ordered for the First Canadian Army, with the conversion estimated to take 10 days to
complete.74
Several Rams were converted to "Ram Towers" in much the same way as the Wallaby,
with the addition of a hook on the rear hull to tow 25-pounder guns.75 These were
intended to replace Crusader gun tractors, but it was soon found that the Towers were not
72 See Roger V. Lucy, The Skink in Canadian Sei-vice (Ottawa: Service Publications, 2005), 6-20.
73 Ibid., 23.
74 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9366, File 38/Arm Veh/42, ARMD DCGS to ADOS (MT), "Provision of Armd
Carriers," 10 August 1944.
75 LAC RG 24 Vol. 10039, File 13/AFV Req Gen/1, Major D.D. Campbell, SD 3a, "Minutes ofMeeting at
CMHQ on 8 Apr 44 to estimate the delivery of AFVs and certain "B" vehicles to Field Units," 2.
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needed and they went into storage in England until they were used in another role, as
Kangaroos, below.
The Ram Kangaroo was probably the best-known variant of all Rams. Kangaroos were
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) that were otherwise "surplus to requirements",
equipped to transport infantry into battle in relative safety. The first Kangaroos were
converted from M7 Priest SP gun carriages, but it was then realized that Rams would be
even better at fulfilling this task.77 100 were taken from late-model Ram stocks in the
UK and modified by removing the turret, turret ring and basket, moving the tank's
batteries into the sponson, and installing the No. 19 Wireless Set inside the left-hand
sponson within reach of the co-driver.78 So converted, a "Ram Kangaroo" (the new name
for these vehicles) with its 2-man crew could carry a section (10 men) into battle. An
additional 25 Ram APCs were requested on the 16th to act as a reserve, bringing the total
needed to 125.79
Ibid. See also LAC RG 24 Vol. 9366, File 38/Arm Veh/42, Lt. Gen. P.J. Montague, C.O.S., C.M.H.Q.
to G.(SD), H.Q. First Cdn Army, "Conversion Ram 17 Pr Towers to Armd Personnel Carriers",
13 December 1944, and Roberts, The Ram: Development and Variants, Volume I, op. cit., 20.
Roberts, ibid. The M7s had been replaced by Sextons in the artillery formations. To convert them to
Kangaroos, their guns were removed and the gaps in their superstructure plated over with mild
steel. In this role, they were also dubbed "Defrocked Priests".
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10075, File 13/Tanks Armd Pers/1 , Deputy Chief of the General Staff, C.M.H.Q.,
to A.D.O.S. (M.T.), D.Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q., 10 August 1944. They were initially supposed to be
in France by the 24th of August, but, because gun tanks had a higher priority, shipping of the
APCs only began around August 29th. See LAC RG 24 Vol. 9366, File 38/Arm Veh/42,
SD Main 1st Cdn Army to SD (W) CMHQ, 21 August 1944.
LAC RG 24 Vol. 10075, File 13/Tanks Armd Pers/1, A.D.Q.M.G.(A.E.) to Commandant, 1 Cdn COD,
16 August 1944.
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More Kangaroos were required by December, the original supply having been reduced in
number by both battle and mechanical losses. The 17-pounder Ram Towers in storage
were sent to workshops for refit as Kangaroos. All of the towers had been converted
from early-model Ram Hs equipped with the machine-gun cupola, and the inner hull
contours did not permit positioning of the No. 19 wireless in the left-hand front sponson.
However, it could be (and was) mounted to the right of the ??-driver, over the
transmission that ran down the centre of the tank.
The Badger was developed to replace the Wasp, a flamethrower mounted upon a
Universal Carrier (a small, lightly-armoured tracked vehicle) that was extremely
vulnerable to enemy small-arms fire and mines. The same model flamethrower was
installed in place of the machine-gun in a turretless Ram II hull and trials showed that its
heavier armour afforded far greater protection for the crew and allowed it to approach its
targets more closely. The last models of the Badger had the main turret ring plated over
with a surplus machinegun cupola turret mounted atop the plate, to afford protection for
the commander as well as close-in defence for the crew.81 The Badger, like the Kangaroo,
took its place in the assault formations of the Canadian Army.
After the Second World War ended, Rams were no longer needed. On the 1 8th of
September, 1946 the (re-named for peacetime) Department of Supply ordered that all
Ram tanks were to be scrapped as soon as possible because of a shortage of steel needed
80 LAC RG 24 Vol. 9366, File 38/Arm Veh/42, Lt. Gen. P.J. Montague, C.O.S., C.M.H.Q. to G.(SD),
H. Q. First Cdn Army, "Conversion Ram 17 Pr Towers to Armd Personnel Carriers",
13 December 1944.
81 Roberts, The Ram: Development and Variants, Vol. 1, op. cit., 19.
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for other purposes. Any items common to the Grizzly were to be salvaged before
scrapping.82 Little thought was given to the historical significance of the Ram in the
Canadian Army. Indeed, the original Ram I upper hull which had been used for firing
tests on the Valcartier range had already been scrapped in mid- 1 943. 83 However, a week
later a request was issued that two Rams, one Ram I and a Ram II, were to be kept for the
"Foreign Materiel Section Collection".84 One other reprieve was given, but a pyrrhic
one: 30 Rams were requested to be retained for use as range targets for tank guns and
PIATs.85
82 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2604, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol.19, Col. W.G. Denney, Department of Supply to
A.D.O.S. (T.S) and A.D.O.S.(G.S), 18 September 1946.
83 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2596, File H.Q.S. 3352-3 Vol. 2, R.E. Jamieson, "Tanks Committee Meeting T-37,"
25 May 1943.
84 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2604, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol.19, Lt-CoI J.R. Johnson to D.O.S., 25 September 1946.
In a handwritten comment by someone at DWD, 2 Rams were to be kept for the V.P.E.
[Vehicle Proving Establishment], Ottawa.
85 LAC RG 24 Vol. 2604, File H.Q.S. 3352-1 1 Vol.19, DWD to DCGS, 4 January 1947. The British PIAT
("Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank") was roughly equivalent to the American Bazooka and the
German Panzerfaust, a close-range weapon for infantry to use against tanks.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
It could be argued that the Ram was an enormous waste of resources, in that the Ram was
never used for its intended purpose. However, a counterargument could be made that the
Ram program suited the needs of Canadian troops during the period in which it was built.
The Rams were used for training, for experimentation as new weapons test beds, and as
the basis of several specialized designs that were used in battle. Ultimately the Ram and
its variants only accounted for about one-quarter of one percent ofwartime Canadian
vehicle production.1
It could also be argued that the experience ofbuilding the Ram and learning how to
troubleshoot the problems involved in its construction lead to the relatively trouble-free
construction of the Sexton, which used many of the same parts. Or, at least, there are far
fewer reports of dissatisfaction in the archives.
Lest the Ram be thought of as an isolated failure or an example ofuseless manufacture,
Peter Beale in Death by Design notes how obsolete tanks continued to be manufactured
in Britain, even though it was well known that they could not stand up to the rigours of
battle. Of all of the British main battle tanks produced in 1943, he estimates that over
48% had no value as gun tanks, 26% were obsolescent, and only about 25.5% were
1 LAC RG 28 Vol. 19, Army Engineering Design Branch, DM&S, "Post War Military Vehicle Design
in Canada," September 12, 1945, 32. Ram I and II tanks comprised 0.23 percent ofproduction,
with Ram Command/OP tanks comprising another 0.01 percent.
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capable ofbeing up-gunned and taking part in battle with a chance of survival. Even
Germany had the 200-ton-plus Maus super-tank as an example ofbadly-utilized
resources.
The American Sherman had its problems too. It was outclassed by many of the German
tanks that it faced, and the crews knew it soon after entering battle. In the words of one
veteran, "...until you get into action and the enemy starts filling you full of holes, you
don't realize how bad the equipment is."4 Only the vast numbers of Shermans available
to the Allies allowed them to continue to operate large" armoured formations.
The Ram went from design to prototype in less than seven months, yet its subsequent
development was glacial. It took a further six months for the first fifty tanks to be built,
and improvements never kept up with production in subsequent production. Flaws that
became evident in tanks with the same design heritage, such as the suspension problems
found on American Lees, were not remedied in Canada until long after they had been
fixed in the United States. And the failure to design a tank with a larger turret ring so that
could easily be up gunned is still an open question.
Among the reasons for the Ram's slow progress was that it lacked a single coordinating
body to push it through from design to battlefield. Responsibility was split between the
2 Beale, op. cit., Table 5.1, 124.
3 The weight of the Maus varied from 160 to 207 tons depending on its armament and point of
development. This information is from a reprint US War Department Intelligence Bulletin at
http://www.lonesentiy.com/articles/maus/index.html , accessed February 17, 2008.
4 Bernard Finestone, quoted in Patricia Burns, op. cit., 116.
Department of Munitions and Supply and the Department of Defence and their multiple
agencies and ad hoc advisory bodies, all of which at times jealously defended their own
areas and fiefdoms, contributing to the Ram's glacial pace of development. Add to these
troubles a semi-skilled workforce with insufficient supervision and an Army with no
clear idea of tank doctrine, and it is not so surprising the Ram was considered unable to
survive on a contemporary battlefield against its adversaries.
Much of the job of producing the Ram was simply assembling the parts that arrived at the
Montreal Locomotive Works, and yet this assembly never reached the level of efficiency
that it could have attained. Part of the blame for this lies with supply problems, but more
lies with a lack ofurgency and, again, the lack of a clear demarcation of responsibilities.
The entry of the United States into the Second World War in some ways contributed to
the slowdown in Ram production, because of supply shortages and increased American
supervision and interference in the Canadian tank programme. Also, the emergence of the
M4 Sherman as the main battle tank of the Allies may have contributed to the lack of
urgency in the development of the Ram. Some men in positions of responsibility, such as
R.A. Macfarlane and General McNaughton, recognized that the efforts spent on
producing the Ram would be better off diverted into other war production. But
bureaucratic inertia, misplaced pride, and a parsimonious government all contributed to
keeping the Ram in production past the time when it was useful.
The story of the Ram can be read as a demonstration of the enormous difficulty of
developing a weapon in a time of rapidly changing technology, as well as in a time of
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rapidly changing doctrines of warfare. A lack of domestic resources, combined with
inflexibility in planning and production, meant that it took almost the entirety of the
Second World War for Canada to develop a tank that had no place on the battlefield as a
tank. Even so, the Ram was only feasible because of American supply. While its
fighting design owed a great deal to Canadian and British sources, the Ram would have
remained a paper project without the manufacturing capacity of the United States.
The history of the Ram tank suggests that, for many years now, weapons systems have
become so expensive that only the richest states can afford to develop them. This in turn
suggests that smaller states are doomed to dependence on these nations when engaging in
conventional warfare. Canada, for example, uses American and NATO-member military
hardware and is essentially a client state of these suppliers. What does this mean for our
government and our military? May we only wage war when our allies deem it desirable?
We might wish for independence in foreign policy, unfettered by the constraints of
others, but we could not wage war for long without resupply from outside sources.
In retrospect, it was fortunate that the Germans and the Soviets (the two combatants
possessing the best tanks of the time) fought each other on the Eastern front, with few
German tanks managing to be spared to fight the Western allies. Given the battlefield
loss ratio of three to five Shermans, Cromwells or Churchills when put up against single
or multiple Panthers, Tigers or Sturmgeschützes (self-propelled assault guns), only the
Allied superiority in materiel allowed victory.
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